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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Response to Crisis: The Ultimate Leadership Test 
Perhaps no aspect of human social behavior has been studied with greater 
regularity, diligence, and disagreement than leadership (Bogue, 1994). Indeed, there is 
no culture or society that does not recognize leadership in some aspect of its social life 
(Bass, 1990). Throughout human history, scholars and commentators have recognized 
the importance ofleadership. They have observed it, written about it, and studied it 
carefully in order to gain a better understanding. Early concepts ofleadership were not 
based upon scholarly study, but upon the beliefs of social and military philosophers, as 
well as practitioners of leadership and their followers. Those beliefs almost always 
reflected the influence of strong cultural assumptions about the basis of human nature 
(Chemers, 1997). 
Leadership is also one of the most compelling and long-standing issues in higher 
education. Although it is a relatively small part of the overall body ofliterature, 
scholarly writing on leadership in the academy is extensive, and it is not without 
disagreement. Indeed, there is considerable controversy about the leadership role of the 
president of a college or university (Fisher & Koch, 1996). 
The literature on leadership in higher education tends not to be directly based 
upon theory (Bensimon, Neumann, & Birnbaum, 1989). It tends to be either descriptive 
or prescriptive in nature with the earliest work done by practitioners rather than scholars 
ofleadership (Birnbaum, 1992). 
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Beginning in the late 19th Century and continuing until the 1960s, literature on 
presidential leadership in higher education was limited almost exclusively to biographies 
and autobiographies of presidents (Castro, 1988). Since then, scholarly research has 
increasingly contributed to our understanding of it. Consequently, there are two basic 
lineages ofliterature concerning leadership in higher education: experiential-based 
biographies/autobiographies of presidents, and the research-based publications of 
scholars. Interestingly, these two perspectives tend to endorse very different concepts of 
the role and importance of presidential leadership. 
The writings and commentaries of presidents strongly embrace the idea that 
leadership is a critically important, if not indispensable, factor in the life of a college or 
university. Conversely, many leading scholars tend to endorse the notion that a 
president's leadership is constrained by both internal and external factors to the extent 
that he or she is typically not able to significantly change the institution. 
Many of the most highly regarded scholars ofleadership in higher education, such 
as Birnbaum (1988, 1992), Bensimon (1989), and Tierney (1988), ascribe to this de-
emphasized role ofleadership. Birnbaum (1988) proposed "leaders in higher education 
are subject to internal and external constraints that limit their effectiveness and may make 
their roles highly symbolic rather than instrumental" (p. 28). 
One of the most notable voices in leadership research, Bernard Bass (1990), took issue 
with the position of Birnbaum (1988), Cohen and March (1974), and others who 
disparaged the role of leadership in higher education, 
Worse still are the 'know nothings' who simply know little about the subject and 
do not take the time to find out. Yet, they declare that we know nothing about 
leadership. Or, what we know does not matter. Or, leadership does not exist. Or, 
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if it does, it is antidemocratic and interferes with good team efforts. (Bass, 1990, 
pp. xi-xii) 
Other scholars developed models that conceptualized presidential leadership 
along separate and distinct organizational processes. For example, Chaffee (1983), 
Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997), Kerr and Glade (1986), Birnbaum (1988), Bergquist 
(1992), and Bogue and Aper (2000) all created models for organizational and 
administrative processes. These models gave meaning to leadership through different 
perspectives of the leader-follower relationship such as bureaucratic structures and 
policies, human relationships and teams, political networks and coalitions, and shared 
symbols and meanings. Of these, the models of Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997) 
developed perhaps the most widespread following (Bogue & Aper, 2000). 
Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997) developed four cognitive frames of reference to 
describe how an institution or organization may be perceived. These cognitive frames or 
"lenses" are the bureaucratic, human resource, political, and symbolic frames through 
which presidents see issues and implement solutions to problems (Bolman & Deal, 1984, 
1991, 1997). They provide a framework for understanding organizations and 
interpreting institutional processes and the effectiveness of leader behavior (Birnbaum, 
1992; Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1997). Moreover, the frames characterize ways in which 
leaders think about and respond to everyday issues and problems. 
A president's effectiveness as a leader has been associated with his or her ability 
to recognize and operate within multiple frames. Additionally, certain cognitive frames 
of reference have been identified as more critical than others to effective leadership 
(Bensimon et al., 1989; Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & Deal, 1991, 1997). 
3 
One of the many contexts in which a college or university president leads is a 
crisis or emergency situation such as an accident, natural disaster, or act of violence. 
However, this context has been widely ignored by researchers. Studies tend to focus on 
those functions, missions, and roles of the institution and its leadership that fit the norm 
of a college or university's operation. They do not tend to discuss the demands upon 
leadership during the most disruptive times that inevitably occur, when members of the 
institutional family are suddenly and violently threatened or taken away. 
Crises and tragedies on campus have occurred with regularity in the past and will 
continue to occur in the future. After a bomb threat incident on his campus, Douglas 
Robinson, Vice President for Student Services at the University of California at Long 
Beach, concluded, "Inevitably, at some point, every campus in the country will be faced 
with some sort of crisis or emergency'' (McCarthy, Margolis, Willits, & Gephart, 2001, p. 
16). A panel of presidents attending an ACE conference on campus disasters concluded 
that emergency situations can be "the ultimate test for a president" (Campus disasters, 
2001, p. 4). 
Even within the past few years, there are vivid examples of unanticipated crises 
and catastrophes. Among these are the dormitory fire at Seton Hall University in 2000 
which killed 3 students and injured 62, the fraternity fire at the University of North 
Carolina in Chapel Hill in 1996 which killed 5 students, the bonfire collapse at Texas 
A&M University in 1999 which killed 12 students and injured 27, and the airplane 
accident in 2001 which killed 10 members and associates of the Oklahoma State 
University basketball team. How does the president lead effectively in such instances? 
Unfortunately we know little about presidential leadership in such highly demanding, 
intensely focused circumstances. 
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Statement of the Problem 
The literature endorses Bolman and Deal's (1984, 1997) model of cognitive 
frames of reference for understanding leadership behavior in a college or university 
setting. The significance of cognitive frames ofreference for this research resides in the 
correlation between certain cognitive frames and effective leadership by presidents. For 
example, studies by Bolman and Deal (1991) suggest that effective leadership is more 
likely from presidents with high cognition of the symbolic frame of reference but is 
largely unrelated to the bureaucratic frame. Those studies further conclude that the 
variables predicting effectiveness of a manager are different from those predicting 
effectiveness of a leader (Bolman & Deal, 1991). 
Additionally, other studies strongly suggest that the effective leader is more likely 
to be cognitively complex, or able to interpret institutional life through multiple lenses 
(Bensimon et al., 1989; Birnbaum, 1992). The concept of cognitive complexity reflects 
the abilities of integration and differentiation at both the organizational and personal 
levels. Integration is the ability to combine awarenesses and differing social structures 
while differentiation is the ability to perceive them independently of one another (Hunt, 
1996). 
However, research indicates that the realities associated with an important role of 
the president-leadership in a crisis scenario-may call for alternative approaches to 
leadership (Yukl, 1994). The literature has ignored a critically important scenario that is 
a vital and fundamental part of a president's responsibilities, and for which a different 
approach to leadership may be necessary. 
Studies by Halpin (1954); Mulder and Stemerding (1963); Mulder, Ritsema van 
Eck, and de Jong (1970); and Mulder, de Jong, Koppelaar, and Verhage (1986) found 
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effective leaders were more directive and authoritative in emergency or crisis situations 
than in less critical scenarios. For example, leaders consulted with subordinates less in 
crisis situation than in non-crisis situations. Subordinates expected the leader to be more 
assertive, directive, and decisive in crisis situations. Subordinates also expected leaders 
to show initiative in defining problems, identifying solutions, and directing the group's 
response to crises. 
These characteristics of leadership conflict with assessments by researchers who 
have identified cognitive frames that are most important for effective leadership in the 
academy, such as the symbolic and human resource frames of reference (Bolman & Deal, 
1991). They also conflict with researchers who contend that the president's role is more 
symbolic than instrumental (Birnbaum, 1988; Cohen & March, 1974, 1986). 
There appears to be a research gap in the study of presidential leadership. This 
gap may exist for several reasons: 
• First, it may be that the sense of urgency in a time-critical and highly intense 
scenario demands more directive and authoritative leadership from the 
president. A crisis changes the rules for decision-making and involves the 
president in decisions that would normally be delegated or arrived at in a more 
collegial and less directive manner (Kerchner, 1993). 
• Second, it may be that the president's administrative staff responds to a crisis 
more as a crisis action cell, more structured and authoritative in its operation, 
and less as a collegial, deliberative body (Kerchner, 1993). 
• Third, it may be that the symbolic role of the president assumes secondary 
importance to the instrumental role of guiding the institutional response to a 
crisis (Kerchner, 1993). 
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Research outside the higher education environment suggests that subordinates are 
more willing to let the leader take charge in crisis situations. When lives are lost or the 
operation of the institution is threatened, internal and external constituents may demand 
an aggressive and appropriate response and may be more willing to allow the president to 
lead (Yukl, 1994). In any event, research into this problem is appropriate. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to address the research problem through study of 
cases of presidential leadership during crisis scenarios. A primary case and two 
secondary cases are included in the study. The secondary cases help provide an 
understanding of those aspects of crises that are common and those that are unique to 
specific scenarios. 
The primary case in the study is an airplane crash that killed 10 people associated 
with the Oklahoma State University athletic department in January 2001. The first of the 
secondary cases is the collapse of a bonfire structure that killed 12 people and injured 27 
on the campus of Texas A&M University in November 1999. The other secondary case 
is an airplane crash that killed 31 football players and coaching staff members from 
Wichita State University in November 1970. 
The study considers those actions by the presidents and the cognitive frames of 
reference that seem to be most significant to those actions. Additionally, the study 
considers whether the leadership actions are primarily instrumental or they are primarily 
interpretive/symbolic. Specifically, the study addresses the following questions 
associated with presidential leadership during the crises: 
• Is the president's leadership style during the crisis scenario different from 
his/her typical style? 
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• What specific leadership action does the president take and what is the intent 
of those actions? 
• In what ways is presidential leadership in crisis response and recovery 
situations instrumental in nature? 
• In what ways is presidential leadership in crisis response and recovery 
situations symbolic/interpretive in nature? 
• How do others perceive the president's leadership actions? 
• What cognitive frames of reference are significant in the president's 
understanding of the crisis and the actions the president directs? 
Rationale for Qualitative Design 
This research effort used a qualitative research design. Qualitative research is an 
important mode of inquiry for the social sciences (Marshall & Rossman, 1989). Among 
the advantages a qualitative methodology offered this study was an opportunity to engage 
in an in-depth, holistic, and contextual examination of the people involved in the 
complexities of the leadership process within the time and activity-bounded scenario of 
crisis situations. 
Leadership is fundamentally concerned with human behavior and the perceptions, 
subjectivities, and meanings associated with it. It has multiple realities that reflect the 
experiences and subjectivities of the people involved. Since the separate realities are 
interrelated within the case, we can have a holistic understanding only by understanding 
those separate experiences, subjectivities, and realities (Erlandson, Harris, Skipper, & 
Allen, 1993). 
The study used open-ended, emerging data with the primary intent of developing 
themes about people's feelings, thoughts, and experiences. This study gave voice to the 
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people most intimately involved in order to gain their perspectives of a social 
phenomenon that only has meaning through the human experience (Rubin & Rubin, 
1995). 
Bass (1990) referenced a host ofresearchers who concluded that the study of 
leadership and its many facets-leaders, followers, situations, processes, influences, 
symbols, cultures, cognitions, etc.-were most appropriately studied through qualitative 
methods. For example, Van Maanen (1979) and Smith (1975) concluded that inquiry 
into the meaning and significance of the behavior of both leaders and followers is most 
appropriately done through a qualitative design. Orpen (1987) concluded that more 
qualitative research into leadership is needed as the limitations of quantitative methods in 
examining organizational complexities are apparent. McCall and Lombardo (1978) 
advocated more leadership research using qualitative methods to detect the subtleties and 
nuances involved in the leadership process (Bass, 1990). 
Theoretical Framework 
Leadership in Higher Education 
Works pertaining to presidential leadership in higher education can be divided 
into two schools of thought. One school is consistent with the overall evolution of 
leadership theory. The reflections of former college or university presidents such as 
Bogue (1994), Kennedy (1997), Kerr (1984), Rhodes (1998), Fisher (1984, 1991), Fisher 
and Koch (1996), Shapiro (1998), and Shaw (1999), as well as scholarly research from 
the late 19th Century and continuing until the late 1960s, tend to view effective 
leadership from the president as indispensable to a higher education institution. Their 
characterization of effective leadership is consistent with traditional concepts of 
leadership such as rational decision-making, political acumen, clear communications, and 
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interpersonal skills. These skills are applied to promote and gain buy-in to a common 
vision among followers (Bensimon et al., 1989; Fisher, 1984). 
The second school of thought is most dramatically represented in the arguments 
of Cohen and March (1974, 1986). They contend that the president probably cannot have 
a significant long-term effect on the institution, which they characterize as an "organized 
anarchy." It is an organized anarchy because it exhibits problematic properties. First, it 
has ill--defined and often inconsistent goals. Second, it operates on a trial-and-error basis 
without clear and consistent ideas on how to be effective. Third, authority for decisions 
is dispersed and shifts with the changing nature and interests of the participants. 
Cohen and March (1974, 1986) also contend that the president faces fundamental 
ambiguities of purpose, power, experience, and success that exacerbate effective 
presidential leadership (Cohen & March, 1986; Fisher & Koch, 1996; Nason, 1980). 
Many highly regarded scholars of leadership in higher education endorse this contrasting 
view of the role of leadership. 
Bolman and Deal's (1984, 1997) four cognitive frames of reference provide a 
concept through which a leader's actions might be understood and interpreted as 
alternative ways in which institutional issues may be perceived and addressed. The 
following paragraphs describe the bureaucratic, collegial, political, and symbolic 
frames (Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1997). 
The bureaucratic frame, also referred to as the structural frame, is useful for 
understanding an issue in terms of rational decision-making, management through an 
organizational structure, and clear lines of authority and communication. Presidents 
who perceive issues using a bureaucratic frame are likely to emphasize their roles in 
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making decisions, directing results, and establishing management systems (Bensimon 
1989; Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1997). 
The human resource or collegial frame views the college or university as a 
community of scholars. The president who uses this frame seeks participative 
decision-making, works to meet people's needs, and helps them realize their potential 
and aspirations. The emphasis is on interpersonal skills, motivation of others, and 
placing the interests of the institution first (Bensimon et al., 1989; Bolman & Deal, 
1984, 1997). 
The political frame views the institution as overlapping coalitions of both 
formal and informal groups that vie for power to control institutional processes and 
outcomes of issues. Presidents who view the institution through the political frame of 
reference attempt to build networks and alliances through persuasion, diplomacy, and 
political power to support their actions (Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1997). 
The symbolic frame perceives the institution as a cultural system of shared 
meaning and beliefs in which organizational structures and processes are invented. 
The president who views issues through the symbolic frame constructs and maintains 
systems of shared meanings through rituals, symbols, ceremonies, and myths that 
create a unifying system of beliefs for the institution (Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1997). 
Presidents may be able to perceive the institution through only one cognitive 
frame ofreference, or he/she may be cognitively complex and be sensitive to multiple 
frames. fudeed, there is considerable evidence that the ability to operate in multiple 
frames is directly related to successful presidencies (Bensimon et al., 1989; 
Birnbaum, 1988, 1992). 
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Crisis Management 
The president of a higher education institution is faced with an exceptionally 
broad range of leadership situations and scenarios. One of the most critical scenarios 
is a crisis or emergency that threatens people or facilities and mandates timely and 
appropriate leadership response. The full range of crisis management is a substantial 
and significant part of the responsibilities of the president. 
Crisis management is normally divided into four parts: mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery. It is a continuum of planning and execution to 
minimize the impact of a crisis and return the institution to a normal operational state. 
The planning can conceivably involve virtually every facet of the university, and the 
president ultimately bears responsibility for it (Texas A&M-Texarkana Crisis 
Management Plan, 2003). 
Mitigation is best described as the measures taken to avoid crises and prevent 
small emergencies from becoming large ones. Examples are as ubiquitous and far 
ranging as constructing buildings that meet appropriate fire safety codes or providing 
oversight for campus-sponsored events. For example, the president of Seton Hall 
may have had it within his power to mitigate the fire that killed three students in 2001 
by having sprinklers installed, and the president of Texas A&M University may have 
had it within his power to ensure the bonfire tradition was appropriately supervised. 
Similarly, some might argue that the president of Oklahoma State University may 
have had it within his power to mitigate the risks of air travel in 2001 for the school's 
athletic teams by ensuring appropriate oversight of the flights, including donated 
flights. 
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Preparedness is the development of plans and procedures necessary to enable 
effective and efficient use of resources in the event of a crisis. Many colleges and 
universities have crisis management plans. In most cases, the president convenes and 
leads the crisis management or response team. Harvard University has an "incident 
support team" as well as a crisis management team that evolved from tabletop exercises 
to ensure preparedness (Gewertz, 2002). 
This study is concerned with the last two phases of crisis management, crisis 
response and recovery. Response and recovery are closely aligned action phases of 
emergency management. During these phases the decision process may depart from what 
may be the norm at most institutions. Considerable research exists indicating that 
followers expect their leaders to be more assertive during crisis situations, show initiative 
in solving problems, and follow a more directive approach to leadership, which may not 
be the president's or the institution's usual style (Yukl, 1994). Additionally, a declared 
crisis may change the rules for decision-making and involve the president in decisions 
that would normally be delegated or arrived at in a more collegial and less directive 
manner (Kerchner, 1993). 
Presidential Leadership and Crisis Management 
A panel of presidents at an American Council on Education conference session on 
"What to do When Disaster Strikes" (2001) called emergency situations the ultimate test 
of both a president and an institution. They also noted that a crisis situation is ultimately 
a learning experience and that university leadership should review their actions and 
lessons learned following a crisis so that the institution is better prepared in the future 
(Campus disasters, 2001). 
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It is possible that the cognitive frames of reference that filter and frame a 
president's perceptions and leadership actions under more routine circumstances are 
appropriate and effective during crisis response and recovery scenarios. Similarly, it is 
possible that crisis scenarios may reflect the traditional view of leadership as instrumental 
to the institution's response and recovery. Alternatively it is possible that the president 
has largely interpretive/symbolic leadership impact during a crisis. 
Within the unique and demanding context of a real-world crisis or emergency 
scenario, we simply do not know the most appropriate and important cognitive frames 
and the relevance of either of the two schools of thought. Indeed, there may be other 
cognitive frames of reference in addition to the four identified by Bolman and Deal 
(1984, 1997). There may also be aspects of presidential leadership in a crisis scenario 
that are not adequately addressed by either school of thought. The leadership 
implications for presidents and institutions are significant. 
Significance of the study 
To be significant, a study should be useful in three general and broad contexts. 
First, it should contribute to knowledge in some way. Second, it should be useful and 
meaningful to the relevant policy arenas in the research. Finally, the study should be 
useful for practitioners (Marshall & Rossman, 1989). 
This study helps increase understanding of how presidents lead in crisis response 
and recovery situations. Specifically, the research increases understanding of specific 
cognitive lenses that frame a president's perceptions and actions when he or she is 
confronted with a crisis. Additionally, there is little in the way of specific research to 
suggest whether effective leadership in such scenarios is essentially instrumental or 
interpretive/symbolic. This is a fundamental disagreement between two existing schools 
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of thought on presidential leadership when applied to other, more traditional contexts for 
presidential responsibility. 
The study provides relevant information for policy. An invaluable strategy for a 
college or university in a crisis scenario is a pre-established crisis management plan. The 
plan typically provides for a crisis-action team or cell with checklists for ensuring the 
right actions are taken in the right sequence and by the right people to minimize the 
impact of a crisis. Study of specific crises and the best practices and mistakes of others 
helps administrators develop policies and plans that will help them be better prepared. 
Indeed, an increasingly common practice is for college and university administrators to 
conduct tabletop disaster scenarios to ensure all applicable considerations are included in 
crisis management planning (McCarthy et al., 2001). 
Finally, presidents who have an opportunity to study the complete details of crises 
at other institutions can learn about the specific leadership challenges and be better 
prepared when disaster strikes. Our expectations for the president of a college or 
university are understandably and appropriately high. We should better understand our 
own expectations of the institutional leader, especially when things go horribly wrong. It 
is in those times when effective presidential leadership is most needed, and least 
understood. It may be, in the absence of other research on the. subject, that many college 
presidents are not prepared to meet the challenges associated with the "ultimate 
leadership challenge" (Campus Disasters, 2001, p. 2). 
In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, it is critical that our college and 
university leadership are prepared not only for accidents, natural disasters, and public 
disorder, but also for far worse scenarios. Ifwe understand the role of presidential 
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leadership in crisis response and recovery, future presidents will be better prepared and 
higher education will benefit. 
Limitations of the Study 
As always, the findings of this study are subject to different interpretations. 
Indeed, one would be concerned if the findings were not subject to interpretation (Guba 
& Lincoln, 1989). Alternative interpretations on the part of participants are included 
where appropriate and are auditable through the availability of a confirmability audit trail 
consisting of transcripts and audiotapes. 
Another significant limitation was the amount of time spent with some 
participants due to travel constraints. Some participants live in different regions of the 
country. Consequently, more than one face-to-face session with them was impractical. 
All follow-up interviews and discussions with these were through telephone 
communications only. One senior administrator and two other participants in the primary 
case under study were interviewed by telephone only. 
The primary case study involves events that occurred in early 2001 and the two 
secondary cases occurred in 1999 and 1970; consequently, some memories have faded 
and perceptions have evolved. Those instances where recollections by participants were 
uncertain are identified as clearly as possible. 
One of the two presidents involved in the secondary cases is deceased. Therefore, 
interviews were conducted with two people who were senior administrators at the time of 
the crisis as well as the current president of the institution. The current president's 
knowledge of the crisis event lacks first-person involvement. However, his 
understanding of the continued relevance of the event upon the campus and its people is 
significant. His perception of how the institutional lessons learned have been preserved 
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is also relevant. Finally, his actions in dealing with surviving family members more than 
30 years after the crisis event are important. 
A small number of participants were reluctant to discuss the tragedy in which they 
were involved. While some participants suggested that the discussions were therapeutic 
for them, it was clear that none of them enjoyed speaking of the tragedy. 
Finally, potential litigation against the institution and the estate of one of the key 
people in a secondary case study hampered data gathering to a degree. One participant 
was not able to respond to some questions due to legal issues. These instances are 
identified in subsequent chapters. 
Definitions 
The following terms and phrases are important to an understanding of this study: 
Leadership 
The word "leader" first appeared in the English language around 1300 AD. and 
"leadership" originated in 1800 AD., but the issues ofleadership are as old as human 
civilization (Sinha, 1995). Consequently, there is no shortage of definitions for 
leadership and any number of available definitions would serve the purpose of this study. 
A restrictive or overly rigid definition is not necessary or desired. Leadership is broadly 
defined herein as Yuki (1994) defines it: "influencing processes affecting the 
interpretation of events for followers, the choice of objectives for the group or 
organization, the organization of work activities to accomplish the objectives, the 
maintenance of cooperative relationships and teamwork, and the enlistment of support 
and cooperation from people outside the group or organization" (p. 5). 
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Cognitive frames of reference 
Cognitive frames of reference represent the conceptualization of different 
perspectives from which one may perceive and define ambiguous situations. They reflect 
how people construct social reality (Bolman & Deal, 1991). There are many synonyms 
for the concept in social science: lenses, mindscapes, schemata, perspectives and images, 
for example. The four frames developed by Bolman and Deal-bureaucratic, human 
resource, political, and symbolic-·are important to this study, but they are not the only 
ones in the literature. For example, Tierney offered a fifth frame, the "cybernetic 
system" (Tierney, 1988). Bogue and Aper (2000) added another with the concept of the 
"hieratic priesthood" of the faculty. Other frames have been developed by other scholars 
and are referenced within the study. 
A significant aspect of the cognitive frame concept is that each of the frames 
represents processes that are ongoing in separate dimensions at any given time within a 
college or university. The institution functions as a bureaucracy. At the same time, 
processes involving human networks of colleagues, coalitions of power and influence, 
and shapers of meaning operate as well. Each frame of reference represents a valid 
perspective, but the significance of a particular frame may be great or small depending 
upon the specifics of a particular issue (Bolman & Deal, 1991). This term reflects 
different perspectives that provide situational awareness, or how one perceives and 
understands organizational situations. 
Instrumental leadership 
Birnbaum (1992) defined instrumental leadership as those aspects ofleadership 
that reflect technical competence, experience, and judgment. Examples of instrumental 
leadership include coordinating the activities of others, making sensible decisions, 
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meeting deadlines, representing the institution to others, and achieving goals through 
effective communication; administration, and management processes. 
Interpretive/Symbolic leadership 
Whereas instrumental leadership reflects the ability of the president to lead the 
institution through existing means and perceptions, interpretive leadership involves 
altering perceptions of the institution and the way it operates. Interpretive/Symbolic 
leadership emphasizes the management of meaning of situations and activities. Although 
instrumental and interpretive leadership are separate and distinct concepts, they can be 
represented in the same acts. Instrumental acts may often have symbolic significance and 
interpretive acts may affect the way people perceive events. Moreover, "all acts of 
presidential leadership reflect both forms (instrumental and interpretive) to different 
degrees" (Birnbaum, 1992, p. 152). 
Crisis Management 
Crisis management refers to coordinated actions to prevent, prepare for, offset, 
and recover from the consequences of natural disaster, accidents, terrorism, violence and 
other incidents that threaten an institution. Crisis management consists of four phases: 
mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. This study is primarily concerned with 
the response and recovery phases. These consist of the actions taken once a crisis event 
has occurred in order to minimize damage or injury, and then, to restore the institution 
and its processes to a normal state. 
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Chapter II 
Literature Review 
This chapter is a review of the literature in three areas that are fundamental to this 
study. The first area consists of a discussion of basic leadership theory and its evolution. 
The second is a review of presidential leadership in higher education. Finally, the 
literature review discusses crisis or emergency management as it applies to higher 
education institutions. 
Major Categories of Leadership Theory 
Plato's The Republic, written more than 2,000 years ago, was probably the first 
serious attempt to construct a systematic theory of politics and leadership. Sun Tzu's The 
Art of War, written between the fifth and third centuries B. C., is the oldest known 
military text. It contains leadership principles that are studied by military officers and 
many business executives today (Grint, 1997). Machiavelli wrote The Prince in 1513 to 
advise leaders how success was achieved and failure avoided. Napoleon expressed that 
he would rather have an army of rabbits led by a lion than an army of lions led by a rabbit 
(Bass, 1990). These classic examples illustrate that leadership has fascinated and puzzled 
us throughout the history of human society. 
Theories attempting to explain or encompass leadership can be broadly grouped 
into as many as six major categories: trait theories, behavioral theories, contingency 
theories, power and influence theories, cultural and symbolic theories, and cognitive 
theories (Bass, 1990; Bensimon, Neumann, & Birnbaum, 1989; Birnbaum, 1988; 
20 
Hollander 1985; Vroom, 1976; Yukl, 1989, 1994). The first four of these have 
substantial basis in literature. The last two, cultural and symbolic and cognitive theories, 
have been developed more recently. 
Trait Theory 
Scholarly research on leadership did not begin until the early years of the 20th 
Century (Chemers, 1997; Yukl, 1994). The first leadership theories attributed leadership 
capability or greatness to heroic qualities or particular traits of personality and character 
(Zaccaro & Klimoski, 2001). For example, several early theorists attempted to explain 
leadership on the basis of inheritance. One, F. A. Woods in his The Jrifluence of 
Monarchs in 1913, studied 14 nations and their rulers over periods of several centuries 
and found that the conditions of each reign approximated the ruler's capabilities. 
Another, A. E. Wiggam in The Biology of Leadership in 1931, proposed that 
intermarriage of an aristocratic class provided superior leaders, biologically different 
from lower classes (Stogdill, 1974). 
While these trait theories comprised the first systematic approach to the study of 
effective leadership, it was the 19th Century philosopher, Thomas Carlyle, who proposed 
a "great man" theory of leadership that was perhaps the most prominent of the early trait 
theories. The great man theory contended that great leaders possessed special traits or 
characteristics of personality and character that allowed them to attain prominence 
regardless of other factors. Effective leadership was seen as dependent upon 
extraordinary abilities such as boundless energy, perceptive intuition and foresight, high 
integrity, strong intellect, and irresistible persuasive power. Trait theories focused upon 
the individual leader with little regard for the followers, situation, or the organization 
(Bass, 1990; Stogdill, 1974; Yukl, 1989). 
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From the early 1900s until World War II, trait investigations remained the 
dominant research strategy in leadership. The kinds of traits studied most often included 
physical characteristics, personality, and ability. During the 1930s and 1940s, hundreds 
of studies of traits ofleaders were conducted to discover, define, and refine the qualities 
of effective leadership (Yukl, 1989). 
In a classic review ofliterature in 1948, Ralph Stogdill analyzed the evidence 
from 124 trait studies from 1904 to 1948 that were in favor of the trait concept of 
effective leadership. Significantly, Stogdill (1974) found that the results varied 
considerably from situation to situation and, in fact, failed to support a basic premise of 
trait theorists, that a person must possess a particular set of characteristics in order to lead 
effectively (Bass, 1990; Stogdill, 1974; Yukl, 1989). The 1948 review by Stogdill (1974) 
discouraged many leadership scholars from studying traits of leaders. 
In a subsequent review of 163 trait studies conducted between 1949 and 1970, 
Stogdill used an expanded variety of assessment and measurement procedures that 
resulted in stronger and more consistent results. Most of the same leadership 
characteristics were again determined to be significant to leadership effectiveness. 
Stogdill (1974) summarized his findings in the following trait profile: 
The leader is characterized by a strong drive for responsibility and task 
completion, vigor and persistence in pursuit of goals, venture-someness and 
originality in problem solving, drive to exercise initiative in social situations, self-
confidence and sense of personal identity, willingness to accept consequences of 
decision and action, readiness to absorb interpersonal stress, willingness to 
tolerate frustration and delay, ability to influence other people's behavior, and 
capacity to structure social interaction systems to the purpose at hand. (p. 175) 
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However, Stogdill (1974) made it clear that recognition of the relevance ofleader 
traits was not a return to the trait approach. The fundamental concept, that certain 
leadership characteristics are absolutely necessary for effective leadership, had not been 
substantiated (Bass, 1990; Stogdill, 1974; Yukl, 1994). 
Bass (1990) concluded that, "There is no overall comprehensive theory of the 
personality of leaders. Nonetheless, evidence abounds about particular patterns of traits 
that are of consequence to leadership, such as determination, persistence, self-confidence, 
and ego strength" (p. 87). 
Behavior Theory 
In the 1950s, researchers began to study more closely the things that leaders 
actually did, and how they behaved in their leadership roles. The most significant and 
comprehensive research into the behavioral aspects of leadership were initiated as part of 
the Ohio State University leadership studies by Carroll Shartle in 1945 (Bass, 1990; 
Bensimon et al., 1989; Chemers, 1997; Yukl, 1994). 
At Ohio State in the 1950s and 1960s, J. K. Hemphill and associates developed a 
list of approximately 1,800 statements, eventually reduced to 150, describing different 
aspects of the behavior of leaders that ultimately became the Leader Behavior 
Description Questionnaire, or LBDQ. Ultimately, four questionnaires were developed. 
What emerged were two factors that described leadership behavior: consideration and 
initiation of structure. Consideration referred to the extent to which a leader 
demonstrated concern for the welfare of the other members of the group or organization. 
Initiation of structure referred to the extent to which a leader initiated and organized 
activity in the group and defined the way work was to be done. Initiation of structure 
included such behavior as maintaining standards, meeting deadlines, establishing clear 
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channels of communication, organizing patterns of work, and determining what work was 
to be done (Bass, 1990; Yukl, 1994). 
Studies by Atwater and White (1985) indicated that considerate behavior by 
supervisors had a high degree of correlation with both loyalty and trust on the part of 
subordinates. Another finding was that the organization type effected the extent to which 
a leader initiated structure, was considerate, or both (Bass, 1990). The implication was 
that the organization type was a factor in determining effective leaders. 
Hemphill (1955) used the LBDQ to study the leadership of heads of academic 
departments in a university. Results showed that the department head's reputation for 
administrative competence did not have a correlation with consideration but did have a 
correlation with initiation of structure. The results also showed that consideration and 
initiation of structure by the leader were influenced by personal and situational variables. 
Indeed, an important implication with behavior theory was the assumption that leaders 
could modify their behaviors and act differently as the situation warranted (Zaccaro & 
Klimoski, 2001). 
During approximately the same period the Ohio State leadership studies were 
being conducted, another major research program at the University of Michigan found 
that three types of leadership behavior differentiated effective from ineffective leaders. 
The three types of behavior were task-oriented, relationship-oriented, and participatory 
(Yukl, 1994; Likert, 1967). 
The University of Michigan researchers initially conceptualized relationship and 
task orientations as opposite ends of a single continuum. As more studies were 
completed, the researchers concluded that when the two behavior styles described by 
task-oriented or relationship-oriented actions were treated independently, leaders were 
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able to orient to both employees and production at the same time. These findings were 
similar to the Ohio State studies, according to R. L. Kahn in 1956 (Northouse, 1997). 
Participative management postulated that leaders should use group supervision instead of 
supervising subordinates individually. Group meetings were thought to facilitate 
subordinate participation in decision-making, improve communications, promote 
cooperation, and facilitate conflict resolution. However, results from research of 
participative leadership were not consistent, probably due to the fact that various forms of 
participation were effective in some situations but not in others (Yukl, 1994). 
Conclusions from the Ohio State and Michigan studies led to Blake and Mouton's 
(1985) managerial grid, perhaps the most widely known model ofleadership behavior. 
Blake and Mouton (1985) conceptualized leadership in terms of a grid or graph on which 
concern for people ( consideration, relationship, or employee orientation) represented one 
axis and concern for production (task, initiation of task, or production orientation) 
represented another. The leader could rate either high or low on both scales, or high on 
one and low on the other. The leader who rated high in both concern for people and 
concern for the task developed followers who were committed to the task, and had a 
sense of interdependence through a common stake in the organizational purpose. The 
results were relationships of trust and respect. These conclusions were supported by 
research at the Ohio State University and the University of Michigan (Bass, 1990; Blake 
and Mouton, 1985; Northouse, 1997; Stogdill, 1974; Yukl, 1994). 
There were various other behavior theories of leadership--such as authoritarian, 
democratic, and laissez-faire. These theories differentiated leadership behavior based 
upon whether it was directive or participatory, emphasized accomplishing tasks or 
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follower satisfaction, and encouraged interpersonal contact (Bass, 1990, Bensimon et al., 
1989). 
As with trait theories, research findings did not fully support the behavior 
theories. There was no absolute set of"correct" behavior categories for effective leaders 
(Yukl, 1994). Nonetheless, the behavior approach made several positive contributions to 
an understanding of the leadership process. It marked a significant expansion in the 
focus of leadership research outside the narrow scope of the traits of leadership. Perhaps 
most importantly, research from these behavioral studies showed that a leader's style was 
composed of primarily two major types of behaviors: task and relationship (Northouse, 
1997). 
A key aspect of Blake and Mouton's (1985) managerial grid concept was the 
recognized need for leaders to select specific behavior that was appropriate for a 
particular time or situation. Blake and Mouton (1985) believed effective leaders had a 
high concern for both task and people, but the way that concern translated into behavior 
varied with the situation and from one follower to another. In other words, it was 
contingent upon variables outside the leader. 
The theory had both a universal and a situational feature. The universal feature of 
the theory was the value orientation used by an effective leader to select appropriate 
behavior. The situational aspect of the theory was that behavior must be relevant to the 
situation in order to be effective. Consequently, it was possible for a leadership theory to 
have both universal and situational aspects. Blake and Mouton (1985) never developed 
specific propositions about what actually constituted appropriate behaviors for different 
situations (Blake and Mouton, 1985; Yuki, 1994). That was left for other researchers. 
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Contingency Theory 
Development of theories postulating that leadership was contingent upon 
situational factors evolved over time. The roots of those theories were also in the Ohio 
State leadership studies in which the two categories ofleadership behavior, task-oriented 
behavior and relationship-oriented behavior, were initially constructed. 
Hersey and Blanchard (1988) modeled the two leadership dimensions in such a 
way that different combinations of task and relationship behavior might be more effective 
in some situations than others. Additionally, they modeled the ''maturity" of followers in 
terms of job maturity and psychological maturity. Job maturity was the amount of 
technical expertise or task-related knowledge, skill, experience, and ability the follower 
possessed. Psychological maturity was the level of self-confidence, commitment, 
motivation, and self-respect with respect to the task that the follower possessed. The 
theory described most appropriate leadership responses in terms of task or relationship 
behavior depending upon the maturity of followers for a given task (Hersey & Blanchard, 
1988; Hughes, Ginnett, & Curphy, 1996). 
The three main components of Hersey and Blanchard's (1988) situational 
approach to leadership were the leader, the follower, and the situation. The theory 
maintained that leaders who correctly modified their behaviors based upon follower 
maturity are more effective. The common thread in all situational approaches required 
the leader to behave in a flexible manner. The leader was able to diagnose the leadership 
style appropriate to the situation, and then to apply the appropriate style (Hersey & 
Blanchard, 1988). 
Most scholars make an important distinction between Hersey and Blanchard's 
theory and other contingency theories. The majority of contingency theories and models 
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ofleadership were based upon the premise that effective leadership was contingent upon 
situational variables; however, the implication was that the leader is much more 
consistent and less flexible in his/her behavior. Those contingency models suggested that 
leader effectiveness was primarily determined by selecting the right leader for certain 
situations or changing the situation to fit the particular leader's style (Hughes et al., 1996; 
Northouse, 1997; Yuki, 1989, 1994). 
Among the leading contingency theory models were the normative decision model 
by Vroom and Yelton (1973); the situational leadership model by Hersey and Blanchard 
(1969); the contingency model by Fiedler (1967); and the path-goal theory by House and 
Dressler (1974). All four models were fairly similar in that they specified that leaders 
should make their behaviors contingent on certain aspects of the followers or the situation 
in order to improve leadership effectiveness (Hughes et al., 1996). 
One of the most widely tested of the contingency theories was by Fred Fiedler 
(1967). Fiedler described how the situation moderated the relationship between leader 
traits and effectiveness. He used a "least preferred coworker" (LPC) measure. The 
relationship between a leader's LPC score and effectiveness depended upon a complex 
situational variable called situational favorability which was measured in terms of three 
aspects of the situation: leader-member relations, position power, and task structure. 
According to the model~ the situation was most favorable for the leader when relations 
with subordinates were good, the leader had substantial position power, and the task was 
highly structured. 
A number of studies since 1970 tested the LPC contingency model. The results of 
the studies tended to support the model (Yuki, 1994). However, the theory was 
criticized because it failed to explain fully why individuals with certain leadership styles 
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were more effective in some situations than in others. Fiedler (1993) called this a ''black 
box" problem. A second major criticism concerned the LPC scale, discounted as a 
''measure in search of a meaning" by Schriesheim and Kerr (Hughes et al., 1996; 
Northouse, 1997; Yukl, 1994). While each of these theories provided insights into 
reasons for leadership effectiveness, each one had conceptual weaknesses that limited its 
utility (Yukl, 1994). 
Each of the leadership theories previously discussed focused on the leader, 
follower, or situation. A category ofleadership theory was conceived that focused upon 
the relationship between leaders and followers. This category was based upon the 
leadership process in terms of power and influence (Bensimon et al", 1989; Chemers, 
1997; Northouse, 1997; Yukl, 1994). 
Power and Influence Theory 
One of the characteristics of the leader-follower relationship was that leaders 
exercised power. Amitai Etzioni (1965) initially distinguished between position power 
and personal power. While other scholars contributed to an understanding of the 
different sources/kinds of power, the framework provided by French and Raven (1959) 
became the most widely accepted (Stogdill, 1974). 
French and Raven (1959) identified five bases of power: coercive power, expert 
power, legitimate power, referent power, and reward power (Bensimon et al., 1989; 
Yukl, 1994). Later, Raven and Kruglanski (1970) identified information power. Hersey 
and Goldsmith (1979) proposed a seventh power, connection power (Hersey & 
Blanchard, 1988). Within the framework ofEtzioni (1965), expert, information, referent, 
legitimate, and connection power were types of personal power; whereas reward and 
coercive power were types of position power. 
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The research on these different power bases suggested that the use of personal 
forms of power typically led to greater satisfaction and performance of followers. 
Research also suggested that legitimate power tended not to correlate with the 
performance of followers, coercive power had a negative correlation, and the data 
supporting the influence of reward power was inconsistent (Bensimon et al., 1989; Yukl, 
1989). 
Transactional Theories. 
A number of theories were developed using these definitions of power that 
focused upon the ''transaction" between leader and follower. These theories were based 
upon transactional analysis, a method of analyzing and understanding behavior that was 
developed by Eric Berne (1964) and popularized in the works of Thomas Harris, Muriel 
James and Dorothy Jongeward and Abe Wagner (Hersey & Blanchard, 1988). 
Edwin Hollander (1978) developed the first and most influential transactional 
leadership theory. Hollander (1978) defined leadership as a social exchange. The 
currency of the exchange was the legitimacy of power. Hollander's (1978) idiosyncrasy 
credit model incorporated the belief that leadership was a dynamic process involving 
continuous interpersonal evaluations by leaders and followers. In this evaluative process, 
the leader provided task-oriented vision, direction, and recognition to followers. 
Followers responded with increased responsiveness to the leader, thereby lending 
legitimacy to the leader's authority. When the leader's attempts to influence were 
successful, he/she earned "credits." Credits were earned through demonstration of 
competency in helping the group and individual members reach goals (Bass, 1990; 
Chemers, 1997; Hollander, 1978). 
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Transactional theories of leadership served as the foundation for the next 
evolutionary breakthrough in understanding the leader-follower relationship, 
transformational leadership. 
Transformational Theories. 
The transformational approach has been the focus of much research since the 
1980s. The term was first coined by Downton in Rebel Leadership in 1973, but its 
importance emerged in 1978 with the classic work, Leadership, by the political 
sociologist J.M. Burns (Bass, 1990; Bass & Avolio, 1994; Northouse, 1997). Burns 
(1978) distinguished transactional from transformational leadership. Transactional 
leadership motivated followers by appealing to their self-interest. Followers exchanged 
performance with the leader for the powers the leader held to the mutual attainment of 
goals, Later writers such as Kouzes and Posner (1995) characterized transactional 
leadership as closely resembling the traditional definition of the manager. 
Transformational leadership, on the other hand, raised the consciousness of 
followers by appealing to higher ideals and moral values such as liberty, justice, equality, 
peace, and humanitarianism. Bass (1990) developed an expanded and more refined 
theory of transformational leadership in 1985. Bass' (1990) theory emphasized the 
leader's ability to transform followers. The transformational leader makes followers 
more aware of the importance and value of task outcomes. They induce followers to 
transcend their own self interest for the sake of the organization or team. They activate 
followers' higher order self-actualizing needs (Bass, 1990; Bass & Avolio, 1994; 
Northouse, 1997). Importantly, leaders not only influence followers by arousing 
emotions and identification with the organization, but also by serving as coach, teacher, 
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and mentor. In so doing, they provide additional self-actualizing opportunity (Bass & 
Avolio, 1994; Yukl, 1989). 
Bass (1990) also offered a model for transformational and transactional 
leadership. The model suggests the functions for transactional leadership are the 
following: passive management by exception, active management by exception, and 
constructive transaction. Transformational leadership, on the other hand, provides 
charismatic or idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and 
individualized consideration for followers (Bass, 1990; Bass & Avolio, 1994; Northouse, 
1997). 
A primary measure oftransfonnational leadership is the multi-factor leadership 
questionnaire (MLQ), developed by Bass and Avolio in 1990. Most of the research on 
the theory involved use of this questionnaire. Research showed that followers are more 
motivated, productive, and satisfied when leaders are characterized by parameters 
consistent with the transformational approach to leadership (Bass & Avolio, 1994; Yuki, 
1994). Results also show that effective leaders use a mix of transformational and 
transactional behaviors (Yukl, 1994). 
While Burns (1978) believed leaders were either transformational or transactional, 
the modifications by Bass recognize that transformational leadership augmented the 
effects of transactional leadership (Bass, 1990; Yukl, 1989). Some scholars criticized the 
transformational theories for lacking conceptual clarity. Further, there were concerns the 
theory was an elitist and undemocratic conceptualization ofleadership (Northouse, 1997). 
Charismatic Theories. 
During the same timeframe in which J. Burns (1978) published Leadership, 
House (1976) published a theory of charismatic leadership that received significant 
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attention. House (1976) suggested that charismatic leaders have personal characteristics 
including dominance, a strong desire to influence others, self-confidence, and a strong 
sense of their own moral values (Bensimon et. al., 1989; Northouse, 1997). House 
(1976) pointed to two situational determinants that facilitated the rise of charismatic 
leaders. Followers were most likely to be susceptible to charismatic influence when the 
situation was very stressful. Additionally, situations that provided the opportunity to 
express goals in ideological terms were very conducive to charismatic leadership 
(Chemers, 1997). 
The charismatic leadership theory developed by House spawned a series of 
popular books in the mid-l 980s until the mid-l 990s. Among the most popular of them 
were Leadership: Strategi,es for Taking Charge by Bennis and Nanus (1985); The 
Transformational Leader by Tichy and Devanna (1986), and The Leadership Challenge: 
How to Get Extraordinary Things Done in Organizations by Kouzes and Posner (1995). 
The research of Kouzes and Posner (1995) reported five practices of outstanding 
leadership. Outstanding leaders challenge the process, inspire a shared vision, enable 
others to act, model the way, and encourage the spirit of their followers (Kouzes & 
Posner, 1995). The findings of Bennis and Nanus (1985) were very similar to those of 
Kouzes and Posner. 
The research methods used to support the positions of these books included 
nonsystematic sampling, nonsystematic data gathering techniques, nonsystematic 
analysis, and relatively small data pool. The absence of any scientific methodology or 
evidence to support their assertions made their conclusions difficult to assess with 
certainty (Chemers, 1997). 
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Culture and Symbolic Leadership Theory 
Another, more recent category ofleadership study consisted of what may be 
called cultural and symbolic theories (Bensimon et al., 1989, Deal & Kennedy, 1982; 
Schein, 1985). These approaches to leadership were first explored in a 1970 case study 
(Bensimon, et al., 1989). Cultural and symbolic theories ofleadership recognize another 
level of complexity, a change in the paradigm in which the organization is viewed 
(Lincoln, 1985). 
The "naturalistic paradigm" provides an orientation of the world markedly 
different from one in which previous theories ofleadership were developed. That 
paradigm is inherently systematic, rational, and objective. Peter Schwartz and James 
Ogilvy (1979) described the basic principles of the emerging paradigm, later to be 
defined as the interpretive or constructivist paradigm (Mertens, 1998). They contended 
that the human world is socially constructed and based upon the subjective as opposed to 
objective, heterarchy as opposed to hierarchy, complexity and diversity as opposed to 
simplicity and probabilism, holographic as opposed to mechanical, indeterminate as 
opposed to determinate, and mutually causal as opposed to linear causal (Huff, 1985). 
Organizations were seen as social inventions of the human mind; consequently, 
organizations were ''whatever their designers and members think they are" (Downey & 
Brief, 1986, p. 168). 
With the development of large and complex organizations, social scientists 
incorporated the conceptual foundation of the naturalistic paradigm in different ways. 
Their views reflected the perspectives of their particular disciplinary fields. Rational 
systems theorists, primarily sociologists, emphasized the organization in terms of 
structure, roles, goals, and technology. Human resource theorists, primarily scholars of 
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psychology and organizational behavior, emphasized the relationship between people 
within the organizations and the interdependence of people and the organization. 
Political theories, developed by political scientists, emphasized power, conflict, and the 
competition for limited resources in the organization through power management, 
bargaining, and coalitions. Symbolic theorists, primarily anthropologists, emphasized 
images and their meanings (Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1997). 
Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997) termed these various views of organizations a 
product of "conceptual pluralism" and used them to develop four "frames" of reference 
for viewing organizations: the structural frame, human resource frame, political frame, 
and symbolic frame (Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1997). While three of the frames commonly 
assume a world that is relatively certain, rational, and with goals and measurements of 
effectiveness, one of them--the symbolic frame--does not. 
The symbolic frame of reference assumes that the most important element of an 
organizational event is not the event itself, but the meaning of the event as interpreted by 
humans. It also assumes that most significant events and processes in organizations are 
substantially ambiguous. People create symbols and assign meanings in order to reduce 
ambiguity and confusion (Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1997). The shared meanings helps 
define an organization's culture. 
Bolman and Kennedy (1982) developed factors that distinguished symbolic 
leaders from others who were less attuned to the importance of culture. Symbolic leaders 
are sensitive to the cultural organization, its rituals, and their importance for long-term 
success. 
In a longitudinal study of the development of managers, Schein (1985) concluded 
that the unique function of leadership is the creation and management of culture. In 
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organizations with dysfunctional culture, leadership is needed to help the group unlearn 
some cultural assumptions and learn other assumptions. In organizations with strong or 
enabling cultures, one of the functions ofleaders is to support and shape the culture. In 
so doing, the leader must be attuned to organizational values, heroes, and rituals (Deal & 
Kennedy, 1988). 
A study by Bolman and Deal (1991) concluded that the variables that predict 
effectiveness as a manager are different from those that predict effectiveness as a leader, 
and that leadership effectiveness is particularly associated with high scores on the 
symbolic dimensions, but is largely unrelated to the structural frame. The study did not 
define the meaning of leader effectiveness and manager effectiveness but left it to the 
implicit meanings participants gave to the two concepts. 
Cultural and symbolic theories are predicated upon leaders creating organizational 
reality for followers (Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1997). Cognitive theories, on the other 
hand, are based upon the notion that followers invent their leaders (Bensimon et al., 
1989). 
Cognitive Leadership Theory 
Cognitive theories of leadership were consistent with cultural and symbolic 
theories and the naturalistic paradigm from which they are considered. In 1975, Shaw 
demonstrated that group members' perceptions of concrete events could be influenced by 
whether the members believed that those events led to desirable outcomes. Group 
members were perceived to create visions of reality consistent with their beliefs of how 
groups operated. Social cognition was defined as the way people think about people, 
situations, and people in situations. A cognitive schema was defined as the mental 
structure that serves to organize knowledge in some systematic fashion, often operating 
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unconsciously. It was "an abstract structure represented in thought which an individual 
used to represent real-world phenomena" (Downey & Brief, 1986, p. 166). A third term 
important to an understanding of cognitive leadership theory was the cognitive script, a 
schema devoted to understanding and enacting dynamic patterns of behavior. A script 
supplied knowledge about expected sequences of events and guided behavior so that it 
was appropriate in a given organizational situation (Gioia & Sims, 1986). Cognitive 
leadership theory was based upon the perception of the organization as a group of 
individuals attempting to create meaning and/or learning it from others who were also 
involved in its construction (Gioia, 1986; Downey & Brief, 1986). 
Cognitive leadership theories emphasized the expectations followers have of their 
leaders, consistent with their cognitive schemas about how organizations worked, and 
postulated that leaders conformed to those expectations. The implicit expectations of 
followers tended to color their perceptions of what was and was not good leadership 
(Bass, 1990). Leaders may act in ways consistent with what followers believed was good 
leadership according to the cognitive script, whether it was or not. 
Leader cognitions were important since leadership occurred in response to non-
routine, ill-defined events, and required the formulation of abstract systems that shaped 
both internal and external processes. Therefore, the leader needed a schema as well to 
know what leadership actions were appropriate (Lord, 2001). 
Continued Evolution of Leadership Theory 
As the concept of leadership evolved, nothing useful was abandoned. As new 
ideas ofleadership emerged, previous ideas were not discarded. Instead, every new idea 
contained previous ideas and built something new on them, using the older ideas as a 
base (Drath, 1998). 
37 
In the evolution ofleadership theory, there has been a consistent tendency to 
increase equality between the leader and followers. From the ancient idea that the leader 
is the absolute ruler, to the idea that the leader's job is to influence people to do what the 
leader sees as needing to be done, to the idea that leaders and followers must share an 
inner commitment to a larger purpose, the gap between the power and role of the leader 
and that of the follower has narrowed (Drath, 1998). 
The concepts and practice of leadership may be undergoing continued change. 
Although the new form is as yet unclear, the change in leadership appears to involve 
erasing fundamental distinctions between leaders and followers. In the future, leadership 
may be understood as a process that plays out in reciprocal actions between group or 
team members (Drath, 1998). 
Presidential Leadership in Higher Education 
Just as our understanding ofleadership has evolved, so has our understanding of 
the role ofleadership in higher education. In the 19th Century, American higher 
education presidents were characterized as bold, larger-than-life leaders who single-
handedly shaped the course of their institutions (Gilley, Fulmer, & Reithlingshoefer, 
1986). From the late 19th Century and continuing until the 1960s, the traditional 
leadership role of the president was characterized as one that provided guidance through 
rational decision-making and directives, albeit in a collegial manner (Bensimon et al., 
1989; Fisher, 1984). 
Following a ''vintage" period for most colleges and universities during the late 
1950s and early 1960s, the academy changed. Beginning in the 1970s, there was a 
growing perception of a progressive weakening of the presidency. The perception was 
that the college presidency was in trouble due to changes in both the external and internal 
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environment. By May and June of 1970, at least 1,000 campuses in the U.S. were on 
strike (Bogue, 1994; Fisher, 1984; Kerr 1984; Kerr & Gade, 1986). 
Some scholars decried the absence of strong presidents in higher education. At a 
blue-ribbon conference entitled "Past, Present, and Future Leaders of American Higher 
Education" in the late 1990s, the general consensus was that the lineage of visionary 
leaders such as Charles William Eliot, Nicholas Murray Butler, and Robert Maynard 
Hutchins ended with Clark Kerr and Father Hesburgh (Chait, 2001). 
Conversely, commentators and scholars of 2000-era presidents who responded to 
the question, "Where have all the leaders gone?" contended that there never really was a 
"golden age" of presidential leadership (Chait, 2001; McCorkle & Archibald, 1982). 
Nonetheless, Keohane (1998) acknowledged that, with a few exceptions, presidents 
"have been less visible, and less obviously authoritative, in recent decades" (p. 13). 
Clark Kerr (1984) headed a commission chartered to investigate the condition of 
the presidency and to make recommendations for enhancing its role. The commission 
interviewed more than 800 presidents, former presidents, spouses, and others. They 
concluded that it was more difficult to get highly qualified people to serve as presidents 
than in earlier times-more specifically the early 1960s. The reason for the increased 
difficulty was widespread perceptions of growing pressures, more pressing current 
problems, and greater constraints on a president's ability to lead (Kerr, 1984). 
The commission noted that only about one-half of top academic officers~the 
single greatest source of new presidents-indicated interest in becoming presidents. 
Furthermore, the commission concluded that presidents had become less engaged in long-
term planning for the future of their institutions while becoming more focused on current, 
more pressing problems. The commission also concluded that U.S. colleges and 
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universities were in desperate need ofleadership (Kerr, 1984). During this period the 
office of the president was seen as declining in educational significance and becoming 
more managerial in nature (Benezet et al., 1981 ). 
Research by Kerr and Gade (1986) indicated that presidents frequently 
experienced loneliness, a sense of being driven and harried, a sense of being under 
constant observation, and a sacrificed family life. Kerr and Gade (1986) noted 
differences between the business model and higher education model for leadership. A 
business corporation had no tenured faculty and no guarantees of academic freedom. The 
corporation had single-service customers and a single bottom line-current profits. The 
corporation president had more control over expenditures of his/her time, much less 
social and cultural obligation, and many more internal sources of support. 
Harold Stoke, in The American College President in 1959, defined the president's 
major function as clarifying the institution's purposes and selecting the appropriate 
means to achieve them. He also noted that the president's influence on education had 
been declining because of specialization that forced presidents to be managers. 
Benezet, Katz, and Magnusson (1981) noted that assessments written by former 
presidents shortly after leaving office, such as Dexter Keezer' s The Light That Flickers 
(1947), Warren G. Bennis' The Leaning Ivory Tower (1973), and Gail T. Parker's The 
Writing on the Wall: Inside Higher Education in America (1979), portrayed the position 
as being a largely futile exercise. 
The perception of a diminished role of the president that emerged and grew from 
the late 1960s led to the development of presidential leadership theory to explain the 
change. Consequently, researchers developed theories that ran counter to the traditional 
theories that supported strong presidential leadership 
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Traditional Presidential Leadership 
Perspectives of Presidents. 
Many former college and university presidents have reflected on the leadership 
role of the position. Examples include Kennedy (1997), Rhodes (1998), Fisher (1984, 
1991), Bogue (1994), Shapiro (1998), and Shaw (1999). Virtually all of them tend to 
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endorse the significance of the president in traditional, strong and influential leadership 
roles. 
Fisher (1984) borrowed from the power topology of French and Raven (1959) by 
asserting that all forms of power or leadership fell under one or more of the following 
categories: coercion, reward, legitimate, expert, and referent or charisma. Fisher, Tack 
and Wheeler (1988) took exception to those, Birnbaum and others, who maintained that 
the solution to the problems in higher education resided in decision-making based on a 
consensus born of collegiality. Fisher (1991) also concluded that effective college 
presidents tended to retain final authority and make hard decisions. They also supported, 
praised, challenged, and encoµraged creativity to the benefit of institutional colleagues, 
while remaining committed to shared governance (Fisher, 1991). 
Writings by Kerr (1984), Kerr and Gade (1986), Fisher (1984, 1991), and Gilley 
et al. (1986), were among those who described the weakening of presidential leadership 
as a result of the constraints of more federal/state controls, courts, more influence by 
faculties, and unionization. They offered antidotes for what they considered to be a 
serious problem. 
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Research Supporting Traditional Leadership. 
Many of these early writings were based on the experiences of presidents, with 
little empirical support. One of the early empirical studies of administrative style in 49 
private colleges and universities between 1972 and 1977 came from the Exxon Education 
Foundation's Resource Allocation Management Program. Results of that study showed 
that presidential leadership styles were related to a number of faculty and student 
outcomes that seemed consistent with traditional, take-charge leadership style (Astin & 
Scherrei, 1980). 
Gilley et al. (1986), in a study of 20 colleges that were widely recognized as 
performing well and successfully gaining new levels of excellence, concluded the 
following: 
A crucial component in the successful development and implementation of a 
strategic mission is leadership. Recognition of the importance of quality 
leadership, and of its necessity for institutional growth, was evident without 
exception at the schools we visited. While many on the campuses gave kudos to 
faculty, deans, vice presidents, and others, the primary credit for institutional 
achievement was given to presidents as those who made a significant difference. 
(p. 25) 
Chaffee (1983) described five models for decision-making in higher education 
administration: the rational model-directed by values and supporting data, the collegial 
model-directed by consensus, the political model-directed by conflicting self-interests 
and power, the bureaucratic model-directed by traditional administrative patterns, and 
the anarchical model-directed by accidents of timing and interest. Chaffee's (1983) 
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research supported the thesis that the rational model can effect significant improvements 
in management as follows: 
The rational decision process is necessarily connected with values and this 
connection promotes predictability and fairness, using a rational decision process 
is a means of saving faculty and students from cynicism, possibly the greatest 
threat faced by higher education in the 1980s. (Chaffee, 1983, p. 4) 
Chaffee (1983) also noted that it was traditionally assumed that colleges and 
·universities make most of their decisions according to the "collegial model." She 
concluded that the collegial model might apply to academic decisions. The model did not 
describe the non-academic decisions that caused the greatest problems for administrators 
(Chaffee, 1983). 
Astin and Scherrei (1980) postulated four presidential leadership styles: the 
bureaucrat, the intellectual, the egalitarian, and the counselor. These styles reflected how 
and to whom presidents tended to communicate most often, as well as how they were 
perceived by faculty and administrators. Astin and Scherrei (1980) also identified five 
administrative styles: hierarchical, humanistic, entrepreneurial, insecure, and task-
oriented. They found that institutions with particular administrative styles tended to be 
led by a president with a particular leadership style. Hierarchical and task-oriented 
institutions were most often led by bureaucratic presidents; humanistic institutions, by 
egalitarians; and insecure institutions, by intellectuals. Entrepreneurial institutions were 
least often led by intellectuals. 
Astin and Scherrei (1980, p. 4) viewed presidential leadership in terms of 
''power," and quoted Clark Kerr (1984), "of all the problems confronting higher 
education in the coming years, the greatest will be leadership." This position is 
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consistent with the traditional view of strong, visionary, and authoritative presidential 
leadership. 
Benezet et al. (1981) performed a study to determine whether the president was 
widely considered to be a leader or a manager. The Presidency Project, 1976-1979, 
consisted of interviews with presidents, senior academic administrators, faculty, and 
students at 25 public and private colleges and universities. A key highlight of the study 
was the near-unanimous expression that college presidents needed to carry out the full 
measure of their office. The study came to three conclusions: the president did make a 
difference through leadership and not just management, the job required an enormous 
expenditure of time and energy, and most presidents aspired to be leaders in education as 
well as administrative leaders. The conclusions were consistent with the view that higher 
education called for strong presidential leadership. 
Benezet et al. (1981) identified six leadership styles: the take-charge president, 
the standard-bearer, the organization president, the moderator president, the explorer 
president, and the founding president. They found that the largest representation was the 
take-charge president. They concluded that ''training for the college presidency is so 
sparse and unsystematic that it can hardly be said to exist in a formal sense" (p. 105). In 
addition, they reported somewhat prophetically, "the effective president of the future will 
be less a potentate of a small separate kingdom and more a catalyst of dynamic contacts 
involving faculty members, students, and a variety of educational environments" 
(Benezet et al., 1981, p. vii). 
Fisher, Tack, and Wheeler (1988) measured five characteristics of presidents: 
management style, human relations, image, social reference, and confidence. They found 
that effective presidents were committed, thoughtful and deliberate in making decisions, 
44 
possessed strong self-control, believed in close collegial relationships, and tended to be 
unencumbered by bureaucracy. Furthermore, effective presidents were characterized by 
others as strong, confident, intelligent, insightful, and decisive. 
While the Fisher et al. (1988) study indicated that effective leaders tended to be 
risk-takers and maintained social distance from others, work by Gilley, Fulmer, and 
Reithlingshoefer (1986) indicated effective presidents tended to be risk-averse and have 
strong orientation toward people. These conflicting results tended to support scholars 
who maintained there were no universal, static traits for presidential leadership 
effectiveness under all circumstances (Bensimon et al., 1989). 
The Non-traditionalist Perspective. 
Juxtaposed against the position taken by those whose findings supported strong 
presidential leadership was the view of Michael Cohen and James March in the 
influential Leadership and Ambiguity (1974, 1986). Cohen and March contended that the 
college president had more potential to influence the institution than any other person in 
the institution but had less power than commonly perceived. They believed that 
"egalitarian norms" of the institution result in the president being ''resented because he is 
more powerful than he should be [and] ... scomed and frustrated because he is weaker 
than he is believed capable of being" (Cohen & March, 1986, p. 116). 
Cohen and March (1974, 1986) contested the "heroic" concept of the president, 
and argued that the hero theory only led to false expectations and disappointments. They 
also maintained that the president was probably mistaken to imagine he or she could have 
a significant long-term effect on the institution's position because of the nature of the 
higher education institution. They characterized the institution as an "organized 
anarchy." 
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It'was an organized anarchy because it exhibited problematic properties. First, it 
had ill-defined and often inconsistent goals. Secondly, it operated on a trial-and-error 
basis without clear and consistent ideas on how to be effective. Finally, authority for 
decisions was widely dispersed and shifted with the changing nature and interests of the 
participants (Cohen & March, 1974, 1986). 
The college president also faced fundamental ambiguities associated with the 
institution that exacerbated obstacles for effective presidential leadership. The institution 
had ambiguity of purpose, power, experience, and success. Cohen and March (1974, 
1986) proposed the concept that leadership in colleges and universities was made difficult 
and even problematic because of the dual control systems-administrative and academic 
governance, conflicts between professional and administrative authority, unclear goals, 
and the special properties of professional organizations. 
A number of leading scholars adopted and contributed to the organized anarchy 
concept. These scholars focused attention on the environmental and organizational 
constraints that limited presidential power and made a vision of strong presidential 
leadership an illusion. (Bensimon et al., 1989; Birnbaum, 1992; Nason, 1980; Walker, 
1979) 
The normative career ladder for almost 89 percent of college and university 
presidents was through the faculty and administrative ranks as "scholars or stewards" of 
the system. Consequently, presidents had the opportunity to learn how the organized 
anarchy functioned. This experience allowed them to be as effective as they appeared to 
be (Birnbaum & Umbach, 2001, p. 206; Cohen & March, 1974). 
Continuing the perspective popularized by Cohen and March (1974, 1986), 
Tierney (1988) identified three problems associated with presidential leadership studies. 
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He contended that most research on leadership was either time-bound or time-free. 
Secondly, he believed that there had been little agreement on the concept ofleadership. 
Finally, he argued that it was not possible to define good leaders without reference to a 
values framework and agreement as to what determinants should be measured. 
Tierney (1988) offered an alternative framework in which he contended that the 
thing holding people together in an organization was "not based upon interactionist 
principles or on psychological variations that offer individual-based interpretations of 
situations" (p.17). From the vantage point of Tierney's alternative frame, one could 
discover how things happened as a result of presidential leadership within the social 
constructs of the institution through analysis of time, space, and communications 
(Tierney, 1988). 
Another important contributor to the research on presidential leadership in higher 
education, Birnbaum (1988), proposed the following: 
Common ideas about the efficacy of strong and decisive leadership may have 
some validity in business firms that are hierarchical and goal directed and in 
which subordinates expect to receive directives from superiors. But leaders in 
higher education are subject to internal and external constraints that limit their 
effectiveness and may make their roles highly symbolic rather than instrumental. 
(p. 28) 
In subsequent writing, Birnbaum (1992) distinguished interpretive from 
instrumental leadership. Presidents provided interpretive leadership by changing 
perceptions through emphasizing some aspects of the institution and its environment and 
de-emphasizing others. This kind ofleadership emphasized "management of meaning," a 
term attributed to Smircich and Morgan (1982). Birnbaum (1992) noted a natural 
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tendency for people in organizations to look toward leaders for guidance in making sense 
of an ambiguous world. Clearly, symbolism played a significant role in a president's 
interpretive leadership. Instrumental leadership, on the other hand, had to do with a 
president's actions with respect to decision-making, coordinating, and managing and 
emphasized qualities of technical competency, experience, and judgment (Birnbaum, 
1992). 
Birnbaum (1992) acknowledged and discounted as incomplete four different 
models of organization and governance in higher education institutions--bureaucratic, 
political, collegium, and organized anarchy--as invented systems designed to give 
meaning to leadership. 
Benezet et al. (1981) argued that the Cohen and March (1974, 1986) concept of 
organized anarchy armed the professorate against a president. It also lessened 
administrators' guilt about not taking charge of the academic organization as they should. 
Leadership and Ambiguity was a popular book among presidents. Its popularity was 
explained, in part and somewhat cynically, because it reassured executives that a 
''transforming leadership" could be neither expected nor controlled (Benezet et al., 1981). 
Benezet et al. (1981) described two divergent schools of thought for the 
conceptualization of presidential leadership in higher education. The first reflected the 
traditional belief that the presidency, with all its defects and inherent obstacles, retained a 
power and an obligation to move an institution in a chosen direction. The other school of 
thought placed the president amid a stream of forces that stressed the limitations of time, 
energy, funds, and a persistently problematic sociology for those who would seek to lead, 
consistent with Cohen and March (1974, 1986). 
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Cognition-Based Models. 
A number of scholars altered the focus of the fundamental dimensions or 
"frames" of reference within higher education institutions that gave leadership its 
relevance. These researchers studied leadership from the perception of the "naturalistic" 
paradigm described earlier. Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997) were instrumental in the 
origination of that perspective through the typology of"frames." Frames were different 
vantage points from which situations within organization and its leadership could be 
perceived. 
Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997) identified four frames: structural, human resource, 
political, symbolic. Each organizational frame contained implications for effective 
leadership. 
The structural frame, exemplified by the theory of Max Weber, viewed the 
organization from the perspective of a rational-structural system. From this perspective, 
the organization was a machine-like structure, composed of interdependent parts. 
Leadership was a matter of directing actions on the part of organization members. 
The human resource frame viewed the organization as an extended family with 
networks of relatives and obligations. Leadership was more concerned with relations and 
with the socialization and development of subordinates. 
The third frame, the political frame, viewed the organization as a political system, 
a dialectic system of conflicting interests and coalitions. Leadership in the political frame 
was based upon power and the allocation of scarce resources. 
The fourth view of the organization was the symbolic frame. From this 
perspective, the organization was symbolic, whereby members of the organization played 
roles that communicated meaning to others about what was happening (Bolman & Deal, 
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1984; Bass, 1990). This view of the organization appears to have had significant 
influence on scholars ofleadership in higher education such as Tierney (1988), 
Birnbaum, (1988, 1992), Bensimon (1989), and others. 
Additional research by Bolman & Deal (1991), and Bensimon (1989) showed that. 
leaders in colleges and universities rarely used more than two frames and virtually no 
president used four frames. Presidents were found most likely to use the human resource 
frame and least likely to use the structural frame. They were also much more likely to 
use the symbolic frame than other higher education administrators. Another provocative 
finding was that researchers were able to predict a minimum of74 percent of the variance 
in perceived leadership effectiveness. They also found that the structural frame was the 
best predictor of managerial effectiveness, but was the worst predictor of effectiveness 
for a leader. For the symbolic frame, the pattern was reversed (Bensimon, 1989; Bolman 
& Deal, 1991). 
Most scholars contended that at least some of the organizational frames of 
reference conceived by Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997) were helpful when considering 
various organizational perspectives of the university. If an observer had the perspective 
provided by the structural frame, the university was seen as a bureaucracy. If the 
perspective was of the human resource frame, the university was seen as a collegium or 
community of equals. The perspective of the political frame yielded an appreciation and 
understanding of the university as a political system. Finally, the perspective offered by 
the symbolic frame provided a vision of the university as the organized anarchy 
developed by Cohen and March (1974, 1986). 
The symbolic perspective on leadership was criticized by proponents of the more 
traditional leadership approaches. Nonetheless, each of the frames provided a widely 
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endorsed perspective of the way the university worked and the way presidential 
leadership operated as well (Birnbaum, 1988). 
Culture-Based Models. 
In addition to the conceptualization of cognitive frames of reference, more recent 
scholars emphasized the cultural and symbolic aspects of presidential leadership. These 
perspectives also seem to be more compatible with the characteristics of the academy 
championed by Cohen and March (1974, 1986). 
Similarly to the concept of organizational frames by Bolman and Deal (1984, 
1997), and Bimbaum's (1988) perspective of four institutional types, Berquist (1992) 
described four cultures of the academy as a reference for insights into improving 
leadership in the collegiate setting. First proposed in a report during the 1970s, 
Berquist's conclusions were from a study that was based on more than 150 consultations 
at 300 colleges and universities with more than 800 faculty members and administrators. 
The cultures Berquist (1992) identified were the collegial culture, managerial 
culture, developmental culture, and negotiating culture. The managerial and collegial 
cultures could be traced back to the origins of higher education in the U.S. However, 
developmental and negotiating cultures were new and resulted from the seeming failure 
of the other two to adapt to changes in society and higher education. Berquist (1992) 
defined the developmental culture as the creation of programs and activities to facilitate 
personal and professional growth for members of the institution. The negotiating culture 
was the establishment of equitable and egalitarian policies and procedures for distribution 
of resources and benefits. This culture valued bargaining, negotiation, and confrontation 
between competing interests (Berquist, 1992). 
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Berquist (1992) found that leaders operating within the different cultures tended 
to use different kinds of power. In the developmental culture, leaders tended to use 
expert power; in the managerial culture, they tended toward rational-legal power; in the 
collegial culture, they tended toward political power; and in the negotiating culture, they 
tended to use formal authority in collective bargaining scenarios (Berquist, 1992). 
The Institutional Leadership Project 
One of the most comprehensive research efforts studies ever conducted on 
leadership in higher education was the Institutional Leadership Project (ILP). The ILP 
was a five-year longitudinal study of 32 formal leaders of colleges and universities during 
1986-1987 and 1988-1989. A total of 412 people were interviewed. The study served as 
the basis for a number of works by researchers in higher education leadership. It differed 
from other studies in that it viewed institutions as cultural systems in which leaders and 
other players constructed a social reality through interpretations they made of events. It 
was also the first study that gave attention to how academic leaders thought and the 
frames through which they made sense of their institutions and their own performance 
(Birnbaum, 1992). 
The conclusions of the ILP led Birnbaum (1992) to identify certain ''myths" of 
academic leadership. First was the myth of presidential vision. The myth was not that 
organizational vision was unimportant, but that the vision must be developed by the 
president from his/her own personal agenda. The study suggested the importance of a 
shared vision within the institution. 
Secondly, Birnbaum (1992) identified the myth of the president as a 
transformational leader, concluding that transformational leadership was an anomaly in 
colleges and universities. Goals, values, and other "enduring purposes" of the institution 
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were shaped more by its history, culture, and socialization processes than by its leader. 
Effective presidents could not be characterized as exclusively transactional or 
transformational. The ILP suggested that transactional presidents tended to place 
emphasis on maintaining the status quo, while transformational presidents tended to focus 
on incorporating change in the institution (Birnbaum, 1992). 
A third myth concerned presidential charisma. The study showed that many 
successful presidents did indeed possess charisma, but so did many unsuccessful 
presidents. Birnbaum (1992) also identified the myth of presidential distance. He 
maintained that engagement and accessibility by important constituencies, particularly 
the faculty, was important for building support for a president. However, the benefit of a 
close relationship was contingent upon the culture of the institution. This was a counter-
position to Fisher (1991), who maintained that the president must stay aloof. 
A final myth identified by Birnbaum (1992) concerned presidential style and 
traits. The study found no evidence of"one style fits all" in terms of personality traits or 
style on the part of presidents. Any trait differences between successful and unsuccessful 
presidents were reflected in the perceptions by constituents. The successful leader was 
perceived to be competent, open to influence, and respectful of the institution's culture 
and traditions (Birnbaum, 1992). 
The ILP study affirmed the significance of organizational frames or perspectives 
identified by Boleman and Deal (1984, 1991). It highlighted the importance of a 
president being able to operate in more than one frame. Birnbaum concluded that 
presidential leadership was important in both the instrumental sense and the interpretive 
sense. Instrumental leadership was important through technical competence and 
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judgment. Interpretive leadership was important through altering perceptions and 
similarly managing the meaning of events (Birnbaum, 1992). 
In assessing why presidents appeared to succeed or fail, the ILP study concluded 
that failure almost always resulted from a president unilaterally executing a task-oriented, 
managerial act that appeared to be insensitive to the human aspects of the organization 
and faculty culture. Such acts typically caused a president to lose the support of faculty 
members, trustees, and other administrators. Exemplary presidents, on the other hand, 
·were more likely to be cognitively complex and seen to be responsive and open to faculty 
influence (Birnbaum, 1992). 
Bensimon (1991, p. 641) referred to responsiveness to faculty input and influence 
as ''taking the role of faculty." Bensimon argued that the significance of a president's 
cultural and symbolic theories ofleadership by constructing reality that was congruent 
with follower's beliefs and reflected desired ends. One important way new presidents did 
this was by taking the role of faculty through symbolic gestures. These gestures were 
perceived to put the president on the level of the faculty and allowed the voices of faculty 
to be heard and advocated faculty interests. 
Neumann and Bensimon (1990) used data from the ILP to conceptualize four 
presidential types based on presidents' individual perceptions of their roles in three 
dimensions. The three dimensions consisted of a president's target of attention (internal 
or external), mode of action (initiating or reacting), and relatedness to the institution 
( connected or distanced). When analyzed in terms of two contextual features, financial 
stability and faculty morale at the institution, the results showed that presidents who were 
in more stable settings tended to be more initiating and connected to the internal 
institution. Presidents who were associated with less stable circumstances in institutional 
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finances or faculty morale tended to be more reactive, more distant, and were oriented 
externally to the institution. 
Neumann (1989) also used ILP data to determine which strategies for solving 
organizational problems were used by college presidents. The framework for the 
assessment was Chaffee's (1985) identification of three strategies used in finding 
solutions to organizational problems-linear, adaptive, and interpretive. The linear 
strategy involved a process of gathering and analyzing data, considering alternate 
solutions, and taking action based on the facts of the matter. The adaptive strategy 
involved adjusting or adapting the organization based on environmental threats and 
opportunities. The interpretive strategy placed less importance on reality, and more on 
perceptions and feelings about it (Bass, 1990). Neumann (1989) found that presidents 
tended to move toward more interpretive strategies as they gained experience. 
Crisis Management 
The president of a higher education institution is faced with a wide range of 
potential leadership situations and scenarios. One of the most critical scenarios is a 
crisis or emergency that threatens people or facilities and mandates timely and 
appropriate leadership response. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) describes an 
emergency as "any unplanned event that can cause deaths or significant injuries to 
employees, customers, or the public; or that can shut down ... operations, cause 
physical or environmental damage, or threaten the facility's financial standing or 
public image" (University of Wisconsin-Stout, 1998, p. 1). For a college or 
university, such events most often fall into the following general categories: natural 
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disaster, accident, death or injury/illness, terrorism, and campus violence/disruptive 
behavior (McCarthy et al., 2001). 
There are four fundamental factors associated with an institution's 
preparedness in dealing with a crisis. These factors are the type of crisis, its phases, 
systems available to manage the crisis, and the constituents or stakeholders (Mitroff, 
Pearson, & Harrington, 1996; Zdziarski, 2001). There are numerous categorization 
schemes or typologies to identify crises. Crises may be categorized as physically 
violent or nonviolent; resulting in death, injury, or physical damage; intentional or 
unintentional; naturally occurring or man-made; accidental or malevolent; on-campus 
· or off-campus, or in several other ways (Coombs, 1999). 
Crisis management consists of four parts: mitigation, preparedness, response, 
and recovery (Texas A&M-Texarkana Crisis Management Plan, 2003). It is a 
continuum of planning and execution to minimize the impact of a crisis and return the 
institution to a normal operational state. 
Preparedness is the development of plans and procedures necessary to enable 
effective and efficient use of resources in the event of a crisis. Many colleges and 
universities have crisis management plans. In most cases, the president convenes and 
leads the crisis management or response team (Gewertz, 2002). 
Awareness of the importance of campus plans to cope with an emergency or 
disaster scenario has grown in recent years. Terrorist actions against the World Trade 
Center, Pentagon, and White House on September 11, 2001 focused the attention of 
colleges and universities on the need for planning and preparedness in meeting crisis 
and emergency response situations. McCarthy et al. (2001) observed the following: 
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Nothing could have emphasized the importance of planning for the worst than 
the events of Sept. 11,2001. Amid everyone's shock, horror, tears and fears, 
there must be uncluttered minds to provide the leadership and guidance to get 
your campus community back on track. The demonstration of strength 
generates a confidence from students, staff and faculty, that things will be 
fine, that you'll get through this in the finest tradition of your institution. (p. 1) 
The Chairman of the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, Carl 
Renfro, observed, "Making sure that our public higher education institutions are 
doing all they can to be prepared for any campus crisis is extremely important and 
should not be taken lightly, particularly in light of September 11" (Crisis 
Management Experts, 2001, p. 2). Harvard President Lawrence Summers mandated 
that the university's emergency response procedures be evaluated and structured for 
optimal coordination after September 11 (Gerwitz, 2002). These are only examples 
of the new sense of urgency that many institutions now have in assessing their 
vulnerabilities and preparedness for disaster. 
Mitigation includes measures taken to avoid crises and prevent small 
emergencies from becoming large ones. Examples of mitigation are as diverse as 
ensuring there are emergency call boxes on campus, sprinkler systems in dormitories, 
responsive student services for potential suicides, niaster plans that respect flood 
plans, drug/alcohol abuse programs, travel provisions for athletic teams, and 
emergency response teams that are well trained (Texas A&M-Texarkana Crisis 
Management Plan, 2003). 
Response and recovery are closely aligned action phases of emergency 
management. During such situations the decision process may depart from what may be 
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the norm at most institutions, particularly in the absence of response and recovery plans. 
Research by Halpin (1954); Mulder and Stemerding (1963); Mulder, Ritsema van Eck, 
and de Jong (1970); and Mulder; de Jong, Koppelaar, and Verhage (1986) indicates that 
followers expect their leaders to be more assertive during crisis situations, show initiative 
in solving problems, and follow a more directive approach to leadership, which may not 
be the president's or the institution's usual style (Yuki, 1994). Additionally, a crisis 
changes the rules for decision-making and involves the president in decisions that would 
normally be delegated or arrived at in a more collegial and less directive manner 
(Kerchner & Schuster, 1982). 
Crisis management systems consist of those mechanisms and structures that 
can either cause or prevent crises and typically consist of an institution's plan, 
procedures, and organizational structure. Examples include crisis management teams, 
the culture of the institution, and the character of the people working to counter crises 
(Mitroff, et al., 1996). Those institutions that have plans to guide the response to a 
crisis explicitly place the responsibility with the president. For example, Texas A&M 
University introduces its Crisis Management Plan with the following: "The President, 
Texas A&M University, has primary responsibility for effectively managing any 
crisis which might occur on or affect the Texas A&M campus" (Crisis Management 
Plan, 2002, p. 3). 
A panel of presidents at an American Council on Education (ACE) conference 
session, ''What to do When Disaster Strikes," concluded that an emergency situation is 
the ultimate test of both a president and an institution. They also noted that a crisis 
situation is ultimately a learning experience. University leadership should review its 
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actions and lessons learned following a crisis so that the institution is better prepared in 
the future (Campus Disasters, 2001). 
Wilms and Zell (2002) found that when critical decisions had to be made, faculty 
and senior administration tended to act in concert with one another. Their research also 
indicated that when the faculty became seriously engaged in identifying problems and 
searching for solutions, they responded in a supportive and effective manner. However, 
engaging the faculty in planning for the university's long-term welfare seemed to be 
another matter. They tended not to be interested or involved in strategic planning even 
when given the opportunity (Wilms & Zell, 2002). The implications these conclusions 
have for presidents during crisis response are not known. 
Summary 
Benezet et al. (1981) described two divergent schools of thought for the 
conceptualization of presidential leadership in higher education. The first reflects the 
traditional belief that the presidency, with all its defects and inherent obstacles, retains a 
power and an obligation to move an institution in a chosen direction. It holds that the 
traditionally directive, authoritative, rational, and "strong" leadership style, tempered by 
the collegial nature of shared governance, is the model for effective leadership in higher 
education (Fisher, 1991; Fisher & Koch, 1996; Kerr, 1984; Kerr & Gade, 1986). 
The other school of thought stresses the limitations of time, energy, funds, and a 
persistently problematic sociology for those who would seek to lead, consistent with 
Cohen and March (1974,1986). It emphasizes the constraints on the presidency due to 
the complexities of the higher education external environment and internal culture. The 
resulting constraints impair presidential leadership as traditionally defined. The 
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organization tends to be viewed as a more complex system that values different kinds of 
social interaction depending on the perspective of the observer. 
Leadership in academic organizations is viewed as talcing different forms, 
depending on whether the university is regarded as a bureaucracy, collegium, political 
system, or organized anarchy. With this perspective, cultural/symbolic and cognitive 
theories ofleadership, have greater significance and are more enlightening in explaining 
presidential leadership in higher education (Bolman & Deal, 1986; Cohen & March, 
1974; Bensimon, 1991; Bensimon et al., 1989; Bensimon & Neumann, 1993; Birnbaum, 
1992; Kennedy, 1997). 
There is still no comprehensive theory of fundamental leadership. Moreover, 
presidential leadership in higher education institutions offers complexities that are not 
typical of organizations in which the concept ofleadership has been studied more 
extensively. Research on presidential leadership has not included the role of the 
president in a crisis scenario. Yet, that role is increasingly recognized as an important and 
demanding test ofleadership. Consequently, it is critically important that research be 
performed in this area. There is clearly more to be learned. 
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Chapter III 
Methodology 
This chapter describes the conceptual framework, assumptions, design, and 
implementation procedures of the study. It begins with a discussion of the theoretical and 
conceptual framework from which the study was conducted. This framework is based on 
the works of several leading scholars of leadership in higher education and organizational 
theory. The chapter then discusses the philosophical concepts and assumptions inherent 
in the study. These concepts and assumptions have to do with the nature of reality and 
knowledge, and the relevance of the human perception to both. Next, the chapter 
discusses and explains the rationale for selection of the methodology of the study and the 
methods that were used to gather and analyze the data. The chapter then outlines 
implementation processes. Finally, the chapter discusses measures of rigor of the data 
collection and analysis processes and conclusions. 
Theoretical/Conceptual Framework 
As leadership theory evolved into increasingly sophisticated explanations of the 
phenomenon, scholars in higher education incorporated those explanations into their own 
ideas. They created theories and models for understanding presidential leadership and 
the cultural environment of higher education institutions. Concepts such as the following 
informed the works of the most highly regarded scholars: transactional versus 
transformational leadership; collegial, cultural, and symbolic frameworks of the 
institution; instrumental and interpretive/symbolic leadership, cognitive frames of 
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reference, and cognitive expectations (Bensimon et al., 1989). Among these concepts, 
two are central to this study. The first is the concept of instrumental and 
interpretive/symbolic leadership. 
Instrumental and Interpretive/Symbolic Leadership. 
There are two competing schools of thought on presidential leadership. The first, 
more traditional view is that the president leads the institution. He or she has both the 
power and the responsibility to guide and direct the institution using a rational decision 
process. Considerable research and the experiential writings of former and current 
presidents endorse the concept of this "take charge" presidential style (Astin & Scherrei, 
1980; Berquist et al., 1981). 
This view of the president emphasizes instrumental leadership. Instrumental 
leadership is based on technical competence, experience, and judgment. It is manifest in 
activities such as coordinating the activities of others, making sensible decisions, meeting 
deadlines, representing the institution to others, and achieving goals through effective 
communication, administration, and management processes (Birnbaum, 1988). 
The other school of thought on presidential leadership is based on an alternative 
perception of the institution and the presidency. This concept approaches the institution 
from cognitive and cultural/symbolic perspectives. It embodies the view of the 
institution as an "organized anarchy" and emphasizes presidential leadership as primarily 
symbolic in nature with limited power to lead the institution. This concept highlights 
environmental and organizational constraints on presidential power and makes a vision of 
strong presidential leadership an illusion (Birnbaum, 1992). Indeed, Birnbaum (1988) 
asserted the following: 
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Common ideas about the efficacy of strong and decisive leadership may have 
some validity in business firms that are hierarchical and goal directed and in 
which subordinates expect to receive directives from superiors. But leaders in 
higher education are subject to internal and external constraints that limit their 
effectiveness and may make their roles highly symbolic rather than instrumental. 
(p. 28) 
Birnbaum (1992) developed the idea of interpretive leadership to reflect the 
symbolic nature of the president's leadership role. Whereas instrumental leadership 
reflects the ability of the president to lead the institution through existing means and 
perceptions, interpretive/symbolic leadership involves changing perceptions of the 
institution and the way it operates. Interpretive/Symbolic leadership emphasizes the 
management of meaning of situations and activities. Although instrumental and 
interpretive/symbolic leadership are conceptually distinct, they interact with one another 
such that instrumental acts may have symbolic significance and interpretive acts may 
affect the way people perceive events and generate actions on their part (Birnbaum, 
1992). 
There is considerable disagreement among leading researchers about the relative 
significance of instrumental leadership versus interpretive/symbolic leadership. 
However, questions concerning which leadership concept is more applicable to a 
president's actions in a crisis scenario have not been addressed. 
Cognitive Frames of Reference. 
The second leadership concept central to this study is that of cognitive frames of 
reference. One of the most widely acknowledged and accepted conceptual frameworks 
for defining and perceiving leadership in higher education was developed by Lee Bolman 
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and Terrance Deal (1984, 1997). Table 1 provides a model of Bolman and Deal's (1984, 
1997) concept. Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997) identified four cognitive frames of 
reference or "lenses" that serve as conceptual maps for understanding the organization 
and interpreting the effectiveness of leaders' behavior (Birnbaum, 1992; Bolman & Deal, 
1984, 1997). 
Table 1 
The Bolman & Deal Cognitive Frames of Reference Model (Bolman & Deal, 1997) 
Structural Human Political Symbolic 
Resource 
Metaphor for Factory or Family Arena, Contest, Carnival, 
Organization machine Jungle temple, theater 
Central Rules, roles, Needs, skills, Power, conflict, Culture, 
Concepts goals, policies, relationships competition, meaning, 
technology, organizational metaphor, 
environment politics ritual, 
ceremony, 
stories, heroes 
Image of Social Empowerment Advocacy Inspiration 
Leadership architecture 
Basic Attune structure Align Develop agenda Create faith, 
Leadership to task, organizational and power base beauty, 
Challenge technology, and human meaning 
environment needs 
Note: From Re.framing Organizations: Artistry, Choice, and Leadership (p. 15), by L.G. 
Bolman and T.E. Deal, 1997, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publications. Copyright 
1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Adapted with permission. 
The frames characterize ways in which leaders think about and respond to 
everyday issues and problems. They also identify blind spots, or areas in which 
leadership might be ineffective due to a lack of perception in a particular frame. These 
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frames of reference imply that the institution has multiple realities. A leader who can 
recognize and use multiple lenses to perceive those realities is more effective than one 
who deals with problems from a single perspective (Bensimon, 1989). 
Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997) contend that presidents implicitly use the different 
cognitive frames to define their roles and understand organizational behavior. Each 
frame represents a distinctive cognitive realization or perception that helps the president 
determine what is important and what can be ignored, as well as how problems are 
defined and what courses of action should be taken (Bensimon, 1989). 
The four cognitive frames described by Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997) are the 
bureaucratic, human resource, political, and symbolic frames. The leader who views the 
institution through the bureaucratic frame focuses on the institution's formal structure 
and organization and emphasizes a rational process of setting priorities, making 
decisions, and communicating through established lines of authority. Leaders who use 
the human resource frame achieve goals through collective action, emphasizing 
consensus building and problem solving through a team approach. This frame of 
reference emphasizes human needs and how the organization can be tailored to meet 
them. When using a political frame of reference, leaders use influence and power 
relationships to mobilize and dispense resources, develop coalitions, and make 
compromises. Leaders who view the organization through the symbolic lens shape 
common organizational meanings through symbols, stories, icons, and rituals. These 
tools help overcome the ever-present ambiguity of actual events to provide a shared and 
managed meaning (Bolman & Deal, 1991, 1997). 
The significance of cognitive frames of reference for this research resides in the 
correlation between specific cognitive frames and effective leadership by presidents. For 
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example, studies by Bolman and Deal (1991) suggest that effective leadership is more 
likely from presidents with high cognition of the symbolic frame of reference but is 
largely unrelated to the structural frame. Those studies further conclude that the 
variables predicting effectiveness of a manager are different from those predicting 
effectiveness as a leader (Bolman & Deal, 1991). Additionally, other studies suggest that 
the effective leader is more likely to be cognitively complex or able to interpret 
institutional life through multiple lenses (Bensimon, 1989; Birnbaum, 1992). 
Philosophical Paradigm for the Research 
Every inquiry, every quest for knowledge and understanding, contains 
assumptions about the world and the relationship of the human experience to it. These 
assumptions provide relevance and define the philosophical stance or paradigm upon 
which the research is based (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). The assumptions establish the 
· framework that ground and legitimatize the logic of a research process and its criteria. 
The philosophical paradigm of any research has four components or dimensions. 
First, it has ontological assumptions about the nature of reality and the human 
relationship to it. Second, it has epistemological assumptions about the nature of 
knowledge and how we "know." Third, it has assumptions about the axiology or the 
relationship of values such as ethics, aesthetics, and spirituality to the human experience 
(Guba & Lincoln, 2000). Finally, it has the methodological determination of how we can 
legitimately go about creating knowledge (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, 2000). 
The philosophical paradigm from which this research was conducted fits in the 
often-combined interpretivist/constructionist paradigm (Creswell, 2003; Guba & Lincoln, 
1989, 2000; Mertens, 1998). The following paragraphs examine the four dimensions of 
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the interpretevist/constructionist paradigm and discuss how they apply to this research 
effort. 
The interpretivist/constructionist philosophy of the nature of reality disavows 
absolute truths and single realities in human perceptions and experiences (Crotty, 1998; 
Mertens, 1998). The philosophy assumes multiple, sometimes contradictory and 
conflicting, social realities that are the results of human intelligences. It implies an 
imperative to understand or verstehen1 the nature and experiences of a person, society, 
culture, and historical context in order to comprehend its unique set of perceptions, or 
"truths." Additionally, on this side of the "great divide" 2 wherein human perception is 
recognized to give the world meaning, researcher subjectivity is not only acknowledged, 
it is embraced. Multiple, socially constructed realities are assumed for researchers as 
well as research participants (Crotty, 1998). 
The ontological position of this research effort is based on the view that 
leadership results from the subjective perceptions ofleaders and followers. It is based on 
their interpretations of reality through their own cultural lenses. Leadership actions do 
not speak for themselves; they must be interpreted (Birnbaum, 1992). Leadership is a 
wholly human invention without substance in the physical world. Therefore, our 
understanding of leadership is dependent on our understanding of the perceptions of 
people and the cultural environment in which they operate (Birnbaum, 1992). 
The second component of a research philosophical paradigm is the epistemology 
or philosophy of the nature of knowledge. The theory of knowledge in the 
interpretivist/constructionist paradigm contends that each ofus is presented throughout 
life with cultural sets of meanings. These meanings are taught to us in a "complex and 
subtle process of enculturalization" (Crotty, 1998, p. 79). Therefore, knowledge is not 
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discovered; it is constructed within the framework of meaning defined by human culture 
(Crotty, 1998). 
The epistemological dimension for this research assumes that the meaning of 
leadership and followership have been framed and defined by the pre-existing cultural 
settings in which those processes occur (Schein, 1985). We can know those meanings 
only through understanding the meaning assigned by the people within those cultural 
settings (Crotty, 1998). 
The distinction between constuctivism and constructionism is important to this 
research. Constructivism contends that the individual human being engages with objects 
in the world and makes sense of them. Constructionism contends that the culture 
framework for meaning is largely pre-established by society for an individual and not 
usually created by the individual when confronted with a social scenario. Meaning is 
provided for us and taught to us within a social environment; therefore, the cultural 
framework of existing society largely pre-empts the process of the creation of meaning 
implied in constructivism (Crotty, 1998). This research assumes that the cultural 
framework for perceptions of leadership effectiveness already existed within the contexts 
of the case studies. 
The third dimension of the interpretivist/constructionist research paradigm, its 
axiology or value system, is based on assumptions that values are not separable from the 
human experience, either for research subjects or for researchers. A sense of what is 
right, important, and beautiful frames everything in the human experience. This 
dimension is undeniably part of any research perception or conclusion and should be 
identified (Guba & Lincoln, 2000). 
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The axiological position or value system of this study is a spirituality that 
endorses the sanctity of the individual and individual human rights. Additional values 
included respect for the rule oflaw, learning, and the aesthetic perceptions consistent 
with those of popular, U.S. culture in the early 21st Century. 
The final dimension of the research philosophical paradigm is the methodology of 
the study (Crotty, 1998; Guba & Lincoln, 1998). This research follows a qualitative 
methodology. The word qualitative implies an emphasis on the qualities of entities, 
processes, and meanings that are not experimentally examined or measured in 
quantifiable terms such as amount, intensity, or frequency. Qualitative research stresses 
the socially constructed nature of reality, relationships, and situations (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2003). 
Rationale for a Qualitative Study 
Mertens (1998) identified three fundamental reasons for choosing a qualitative 
methodology: the researcher's view of the world, the nature of the research question, and 
practical reasons associated with the nature of qualitative methods. A qualitative 
approach is most appropriate in this study for each reason. 
Researcher View 
First, the choice of methodology is somewhat constrained by the ontological and 
epistemological stands of the researcher. Guba and Lincoln (1989) tell us that a 
qualitative approach is preferable for research from the interpretive/constructionist 
paradigm, although it is possible to use quantitative methods as well. 
The most distinctive characteristic of qualitative inquiry is its emphasis on 
interpretation (Stake, 1995). Interpretations of the meanings of various social 
constructions are based on an understanding of the participant's social constructions. The 
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nature of social constructions suggests that individual constructions can be understood 
only through interaction between researcher and participants under study. 
From this perspective, the world may very well exist beyond human experience 
and comprehension; however, that existence is largely beside the point. It is the human 
experience that provides meaning to the world. Human behavior cannot be understood 
without a comprehensive understanding of the meanings and purposes associated by 
humans to their activities and behaviors. Qualitative inquiry has the potential to provide 
rich insight into that human behavior. It also provides contextual information that is 
largely transparent to quantitative research (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). 
Nature of the Question 
Second, the nature of the research question suggests a qualitative approach. The 
focus of the research is on the leadership process and its implementation in a particular 
type of scenario. Therefore, in-depth information is needed about the leadership 
phenomenon. The phenomenon is based on humanistic values that require personal 
contact and an understanding of the culture in which it occurred (Mertens, 1998). The 
focus of the inquiry is on participants' perceptions and experiences and the way they 
make sense of their lives in a particular scenario, requiring an appreciation and 
understanding of multiple realities (Creswell, 2003). 
The literature on leadership theory indicates that cultures, perceptions, and 
experiences are integral to leadership and that qualitative means are essential to 
determine those facets of human society (Bass, 1990; Bensimon, 1991; Schein, 1985; 
Yukl, 1994). Additionally, qualitative methods are particularly effective in getting at the 
subtleties of how leaders think and how they frame their experiences (Bolman & Deal, 
1991). 
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Numerous researchers such as Bass (1990), Van Maanen (1979), Smith (1975), 
Orpen (1987), and McCall and Lombardo (1978) advocate qualitative methods for the 
study ofleadership. Van Maanen and Smith (1979) concluded that inquiry into the 
meaning and significance of the behavior of both leaders and followers is most 
appropriately done through a qualitative design in which the actions of people can best be 
explained in terms of the contexts in which they occur. Orpen (1987) concluded that 
more qualitative research into leadership was needed due to limitations of quantitative 
methods in examining organizational complexities. McCall and Lombardo (1978) 
advocated more leadership research using qualitative methods to detect the subtleties and 
nuances involved in the leadership process. 
Practical Reasons for Qualitative Design 
Finally, a qualitative approach is appropriate due to the need to provide an in-
depth understanding of the total context, impact, experiences, and perceptions of 
participants. When a crisis or tragedy strikes a college or university campus, the 
institution's response indelibly and dramatically represents the values of the institution as 
a whole. Indeed, perhaps no single event better represents the institutional values that 
guide the campus under both routine and extraordinary circumstances ( Campus disasters, 
2001). This research cannot be done experimentally for practical reasons associated with 
the complexities and unpredictability of a crisis scenario (Marshall & Rossman, 1989). It 
is not possible to artificially create the system under study. 
Rationale for a Case Study 
This research is based on case studies of presidential leadership during crisis 
management scenarios. A case study is the study of the complexities, intricacies, and 
multiple perspectives of scenarios, activities, or circumstances within a bounded, 
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integrated system (Stake, 1995). It is one of the most common ways to do qualitative 
inquiry (Stake, 2003). It is an appropriate method for a qualitative research approach 
since it examines a complex system of relationships and events, and requires a thorough 
understanding of that system. Understanding is developed through extensive description 
and analysis of the system and its context, as well through the realities of people within 
the system (Mertens, 1998). Indeed, the case study is the most appropriate tool to 
understand complex social phenomena since it includes all factors and dimensions 
involved with the phenomena (Yin, 1994). 
Another advantage of the case study method is that it preserves the context and 
provides a holistic view of the leadership process in a real-world scenario, thereby 
preserving the qualities that make qualitative research meaningful. Additionally, the 
case study approach provides the opportunity to give voice, texture, and context to people 
deeply involved in the case (Stake, 1995). 
Finally, other qualitative approaches are impractical due to the exceptionally 
localized nature of crisis events. Crises tend to be of high intensity and short duration, 
infrequent, and highly unpredictable. 
The study is focused primarily on presidential leadership in a single or primary 
case. A less extensive examination of two other cases of presidential leadership in crisis 
scenarios at two other institutions provides an additional perspective. These two 
scenarios are referred to as secondary cases. The secondary cases present an opportunity 
to identify commonalities and differences in leadership initiatives, effectiveness, 
environments, and outcomes. 
Case study research has several purposes including the following: to chronicle 
events, to depict or characterize, to instruct, and to prove or test (Marshall & Rossman, 
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1989). These different purposes require different approaches and yield different 
products. The primary purpose of this research was to characterize the leadership actions 
and perceptions of the president in a crisis scenario. 
Methods Employed 
Qualitative interviewing is a versatile tool of research to learn about the feelings, 
thoughts, perceptions, and experiences of people (Stake, 1995). Primary data was 
obtained from a series of face-to-face and telephone interviews with participants. 
Interviews were conducted with 17 participants, 14 of which were face-to-face 
interviews. Interview follow-up for the purposes of confirmation and triangulation of 
previously gathered data was typically through telecommunications. 
In-depth interviews were conducted with the presidents of the three institutions 
involved in the cases in this study-one primary and two secondary cases. Interviews in 
the primary case were also conducted with people who were central observers or 
participants in the president's actions and decision-making during the crisis. This 
included senior members of the president's administrative staff and members of 
important constituencies. Perceptions of effective leadership depend on the perceptions 
and support of many constituents of the institution. Senior administrators, trustees, and 
faculty are the most prominent and critical to perceptions of effective presidential 
leadership; consequently, the input from these constituencies was particularly relevant 
(Birnbaum, 1992). 
Initial selection of participants was based on a bureaucratic model of the higher 
education institution. This model identified people most likely to be involved in the 
decision making and decision implementation process. Participant selection was 
modified as the study unfolded and revealed other potential participants who had more 
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prominence in the president's leadership actions than the bureaucratic model of the 
institution suggested. Some interview participants were selected based on the 
recommendation of the president. Selection of participants from constituencies outside 
the administrative staff was based on their ability to provide meaningful and typical, yet 
divergent and multi-dimensional data, insight, and understanding of the research 
questions (Erlandson, Harris, Skipper, & Allen, 1993). 
Interviews with the presidents of the universities involved in the secondary cases 
served to identify commonalities and differences in leadership responses during crisis 
response and recovery. Those interviews provided a frame of reference to identify both 
similar and dissimilar circumstances, responses, and outcomes of three different campus 
tragedies. One of the two presidents involved with the secondary cases, President Donald 
Beggs of Wichita State University, was not in office at the time of the crisis. Two senior 
administrators at Wichita State who were key participants in the crisis were interviewed 
along with Dr. Beggs. 
Information was also gathered from document, audio/visual material, and artifact 
analysis. These media provided a significant amount of meaningful data that helped 
develop the following: the nature of the case, historical background, thematic contexts, 
and informants through.whom the case could be known. Monuments and mementos 
provided important information as artifacts and physical symbols of remembrance of the 
victims (Stake, 1995). 
Public documents such as newspapers and other periodicals, accident 
investigation reports, letters, and calendars of public officials were reviewed. Private 
documents such as journals, letters, photographs, and email discussions were also 
reviewed. This data provided background material and historical reference. In some 
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cases the data confirmed information obtained through interviews. Audio/visual 
materials such as photographs and videotapes provided detailed contextual information. 
Data Collection Procedures 
Interviews were conducted in accordance with the philosophy, techniques, and 
objectives of the long interview, as described by McCracken (1998). The long interview 
is a four-step process of inquiry that provides a formalized, disciplined, and robust 
framework for interview processes and standards. It contributes to an appropriate 
balance between formality and informality in the relationship between researcher and 
respondent. It also facilitates an unobtrusive inquiry and addresses time constraints and 
privacy issues. The long interview process insists on a questionnaire for the actual 
interview and a rigorous a priori literature review that serves to focus the interview 
process on critical analytical categories in designing interview questionnaires 
(McCracken, 1988). 
The first step of the process was to conduct a comprehensive literature review to 
identify analytic themes or categories. The literature review not only served to provide a 
foundation for creation of the interview questionnaire but also provided an intellectual 
backdrop against which I was able to identify data that defied expectations (McCracken, 
1988). 
The second step of the process was a review of cultural categories to provide a 
detailed and systematic appreciation of my own personal experience with the topic. 
Extensive researcher familiarity with the cultures under study has the potential to provide 
both benefits and hazards. Cultural familiarity provides insight during the analysis 
process. On the other hand, familiarity may dull the researcher's potential for sensitized 
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observation and analysis by seeing through the lens of a known perspective (McCracken, 
1988). 
The review of cultural categories both familiarized and defamiliarized me with 
cultural experiences in order to preclude interference from personal cultural assumptions 
as much as possible. Therefore, this step in the long interview allowed me to 
"manufacture distance" between my expectations and the data in order to "see the 
familiar in unfamiliar ways" (McCracken, 1988, p. 22, 24). Mason (1996) refers to this 
as critical self-scrutiny by the researcher, or active reflexivity. I also maintained a 
reflexive journal of insights, decisions, and schedules as an aid to the transferability, 
dependability, and confirmability of the study (Ehrlandson et al., 1993). 
The third step of the interview process consisted of construction of the 
questionnaires, selection of respondents, and the interviews themselves. One portion of 
the interview questionnaire called for biographical and background information to help 
cue the analysis to factors that framed and informed respondent testimony. Another 
portion of the questionnaire was constructed such that two general principles important to 
the qualitative data collection process were followed. The first was that the respondents 
express their own perceptions in their own terms. This required that the phrasing of 
questions be general and non-directive in nature. The second general principle allowed 
me to unobtrusively prompt the respondent toward areas of interest that failed to surface 
spontaneously. 
Interview protocols or questionnaires for interviews ensured all aspects of key 
events, sequences, and issues were covered fully and in the same order for each 
interviewee. A review of analytic categories drove the initial design of the interview 
questionnaires for participants (McCracken, 1988). 
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The last step of the process was the analysis portion. This analysis determined the 
categories, relationships, and assumption that informed the respondent views of the world 
and the specific topic of interest. This was done through a process that accessed the data 
in increasingly generalized levels of categories. The conclusions of the literature review 
and culture review were used to identify the systematic properties of the interview data 
that resulted in patterns and themes of interest. Once all themes were identified, an 
analysis of interrelationships of themes was conducted (McCracken, 1988). Specific 
application of the long interview process is reflected in the data analysis portion of this 
chapter. 
Letters of introduction served to initiate contact with the participants and are in 
Appendices A and B. The letter to each participant advised that he or she would be 
contacted to schedule a face-to-face, audio taped interview. Interview locations were at 
the discretion of the participants. Some topical/biographical questions were answered 
prior to any interview sessions through review of curriculum vitae, news accounts of the 
crisis events, and archived material (Stake, 1995). 
A list of study participants is in Appendix C. Without exception, each participant 
provided permission for use of his or her name in the research documentation and 
subsequent reports. A Prospectus and Information Sheet for the study was provided to 
each interview participant, an example of which is in Appendix D, and each was provided 
an Advisement and Consent for Participation form in Appendix E. 
The interviews were both open-ended and structured. Structured portions of the 
interviews consisted of questions to determine relationships and roles of participants with 
respect to the institution, the victims, and the president and any incomplete biographical 
data. Interview protocols are in Appendices F, G, and H. 
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During the unstructured portion of the interviews, each participant had the 
opportunity to describe the following in his/her own words: perceptions of the president's 
leadership, the sequence of events associated with the crisis from his/her perspective, the 
observed leadership actions on the part of the president, and the perceived degree of 
effectiveness of those actions in coping with and recovering from the event. Multiple 
open-ended interviews of the president in the primary case were required. The interview 
sessions ranged from one and a half to two hours in duration for each participant, 
consistent with the long interview practice. All interviews were audio taped with one 
exception. One participant declined to have the interview audiotape recorded. 
The interview questionnaires were tailored to two groups of participants: the 
presidents, and other interested/involved members of the institution such as 
administrative associates of the president, governing board members, and faculty. 
Interviews with the three presidents focused on the following: general leadership 
philosophy and perspectives, identification of specific actions following the crisis, 
priorities and rationale during the crisis, and guidance provided both during the crisis 
recovery·and its aftermath. The intent was to determine the following: the extent to 
which the president provided direction for actions associated with the crisis event, the 
nature of those actions, the intended outcomes, and the extent to which the ideas of others 
were solicited. Interviews consisted of initial and in some cases follow-up sessions to 
ensure emerging themes were adequately identified and explored. 
Interviews of administrative associates were intended to determine perceptions of 
the president's leadership actions and their outcomes from those who were in the best 
positions to observe the president and his involvement in the crisis response and 
recovery. Interviews of members from other constituent groups were intended to 
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determine the perceptions of those who could provide representative impressions from 
key constituent groups. 
Perceptions of presidential leadership actions, intentions, and effectiveness were 
classified in two ways. The first classification was in terms of cognitive frames of 
reference using the concept and approach developed and used by Bolman and Deal 
(1984, 1997) to determine cognitive characteristics. 
The second classification was in terms of whether the president's leadership 
appeared to be essentially instrumental or essentially interpretive/symbolic in guiding the 
response and recovery phases of the crisis. Additionally, assessments of the president's 
leadership style and effectiveness in the primary case under non-crisis conditions were 
included. The assessments provided a baseline against which any change of leadership 
method could be seen (Birnbaum, 1992; Bolman & Deal, 1984, 1991; Neumann & 
Bensimon, 1990). 
Data Analysis 
Data analysis is the process of bringing order, structure, and meaning to collected 
data. Data analysis in qualitative studies is an ongoing process throughout the duration of 
the research effort. It does not occur only at the end of the study. Analysis of qualitative 
data tends to be recursive, with themes and relationships among the data emerging into 
patterns and ultimately into conclusions. Consequently, the analysis process is 
systematic and comprehensive, but it is not rigid in nature (Marshall & Rossman, 1989). 
Data analysis was conducted on the premise that qualitative research uses 
inductive analysis of the evidence or data in an iterative process of making sense of the 
total context of leadership (Mertens, 1998). The analysis was intended to determine in 
what ways presidential leadership was perceived to have made a difference in the 
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effectiveness of the institution's response to crisis using the cognitive frames developed 
by Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997). 
The analysis presumed to categorize leadership activities into one or more 
cognitive frames. Interview transcripts were reviewed to determine factors associated 
with presidential leadership that were consistent with one or more cognitive frames of 
leadership. Additionally, interview transcripts and other documents were reviewed to 
determine whether the president's leadership actions could be classified as either 
instrumental to the institutional response and recovery, or interpretive/symbolic. 
Analytic Categories. 
The literature review defined the problem, precipitated analytic categories for 
investigation, informed the knowledge basis from which the questionnaires were created, 
and established expectations against which the data was measured and analyzed 
(McCracken, 1989; Stake, 1995). The goal was to define categories during the process of 
research with the expectation that the nature and definition of the categories will change 
in the course of the project (McCracken, 1989). Consequently, the analytical categories 
were modified as the study unfolded. The literature review consisted of literature 
concerning three areas: the evolution of basic leadership theory, leadership theory and 
experiences of presidents in higher education institutions, and crisis management at 
colleges and universities. The analytic categories suggested by the literature review were 
the following: 
• Fundamental leadership philosophies of the president vis-a-vis six major 
categories ofleadership theory. 
• Presidential leadership perspectives by the president. 
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• Use of multiple cognitive frames ofleadership (Bolman & Deal, 1991; 
Birnbaum, 1992). 
• Effective leadership actions of the president and cognitive frames as perceived 
by constituent members. 
• Decisions, sources of decisions, and effectiveness during crisis management 
response. 
• Consistency of presidential action with exemplary crisis management 
response in accordance with literature. 
Cultural Categories. 
The cultural perspectives from which the research was conducted were the human 
resource, bureaucratic or structural, symbolic, and political perspectives. 
The human resources culture is present in the interactions of the president, 
administrators, faculty, and students. Personal relationships are significant to the higher 
education institution. They are important in the way both the formal and informal 
networks of the institution function. The culture of human resources within the 
institution in the primary case study is shaped by its status as a public, land grant 
institution in a rural setting. Many of the students and most of the staff are from the rural 
areas of the state. 
The bureaucratic culture reflects the organizational structure of the institution. 
The bureaucratic culture of a college or university is concerned primarily with the 
fundamental missions of the institution: instruction, research, and outreach. These 
missions are presumed to require collegial relationships and coordination between the 
administration and the faculty. There is a widely recognized system of dual governance 
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and presumed collegiality between the administration, the faculty, and the board of 
governance (Birnbaum; 1988). 
The bureaucratic culture is also concerned with the practical mandates of 
managing the institution efficiently and effectively. These concerns are most prominent 
within the senior administrative staff The institution must adhere to its budget, pay its 
bills, police its grounds, balance student recruitment and retention dynamics, and 
heat/cool its classrooms, among other tasks. 
The culture of symbolism of each higher education institution is somewhat 
unique, based on its own set of myths, legends, and symbols. Factors such as institution 
size, mission, and academic programs also contribute to differences between institutions. 
There are forces that drive similarities such as the national educational system and the 
need for educated citizens, the academic profession, and the academic discipline 
(Birnbaum, 1988). The institution in the primary case uses symbols to identify it as a 
land grant institution with a western and agricultural heritage. 
The political culture of a college or university is active on many levels. Internal 
to the institution, political liaisons and alliances are formed within units of the institution 
and across departments. Faculty members, staff, and students organize among 
themselves to identify common concerns and increase their political power. The 
president must work with these political entities and form alliances that further his/her 
own goals. External to the institution, the president must cultivate alliances with various 
political forces such as the legislature and other elected officials, civic and industrial 
partners, and other institutions. 
There were three contexts within which the cultures operated for the cases in this 
study. The first was the context of a higher education institution. The second was the 
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context of a relatively small administrative staff or "team" with both general and specific 
responsibilities to a central authority figure-the president. The third context was a crisis 
management team that is typically ad hoc and convenes infrequently, but with levels of 
great intensity when it does meet. 
My most relevant experience in the cultures reflected in higher education 
institutions consisted of six years at two institutions as a department head. One 
department was an administrative support organization and the other was a small, 
specialized academic department. Both institutions were public, land grant universities. 
Additionally, I served on and led crisis management teams prior to this study. 
Consequently, as a result of prior education and experiences as well as the 
literature review, I had clear expectations and preconceived notions about the dynamics 
of presidential leadership and its effectiveness. These notions encompassed the four 
cultural perspectives within the contexts of routine institutional activities, administrative 
staff dynamics, and crisis management team. 
Issues of Rigor 
Criteria and techniques for ensuring that qualitative research meets standards of 
rigor and "trustworthiness" are discussed in the following paragraphs. A summary of the 
criteria, techniques, and actions taken in this study to ensure criteria were met is in Table 
2 (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Mertens, 1998). 
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Table 2 
Issues of Rigor 
Criterion Area Technique Action 
Credibility - Triangulation - Triangulation of interview 
- Peer debriefing sources and of methods 
- Terminal and in-process (interviews, printed 
member checks material, pictures) 
- Multiple cases - Post-interview follow-up 
- Reviews of narrative by 
participants 
- Peer Debriefing (2) 
- Three cases 
Transferability - Multiple Cases - Three cases 
- Thick Description - Heavy direct quotes 
Dependability - Dependability Audit - Audiotaped interviews, 
professional transcription 
- Heavy use of direct quotes 
Confirmability - Confirmability Audit - Audiotaped interviews, 
professional transcription 
- Heavy use of direct quotes 
All of the above - Reflexive Journal - Reflexive journal, updated 
following each interview 
Credibility and Transferability 
Credibility, representing the qualitative equivalent to internal validity of the 
research, was ensured through triangulation of sources, member checking, and external 
auditing. Triangulation of sources and methods was used for factual data, but total 
consistency across sources was not possible or expected for subjective impressions (Guba 
&Lincoln, 1989). Consequently, member checking through post-interview reviews of 
transcripts and review of the study narratives by members was the primary tool for 
credibility. Two colleagues provided peer debriefing. Additionally, credibility is 
increased when multiple cases are involved and the data reflects core concepts and 
themes that occur consistently in multiple cases in different settings (Rubin & Rubin, 
84 
1995). Consequently, the inclusion of interview data from two other crisis scenarios at 
two other institutions enhance the study's credibility. 
Transferability, representing the qualitative equivalent to external validity, was 
based on thick, detailed description and the heavy use of detailed, direct quotations. 
These descriptions assist in determining whether the findings are transferable to other 
settings. Additionally, the inclusion of two other, secondary cases strengthened external 
validity of the research (Mertens, 1998; Yen, 1994). 
Confirmability and Dependability 
Confirmability, the qualitative parallel to objectivity, assures that the influence of 
the researcher's judgment is minimized. Dependability, the qualitative parallel to 
reliability, confirms that the study evidence/analysis preserves the quality of stability over 
time. Both confirmability and dependability were ensured through a confirmability audit 
and a dependability audit to provide a "chain of evidence" or audit trail for all 
conclusions of the research. This ensured that data could be linked to its original source 
and that the compilation ofinformation could be confirmed (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, 
Mertens, 1998). The audits were done in conjunction with one another through 
maintenance of a case study protocol that detailed each step in the research process. The 
protocol permitted review of field notes, interview transcripts from audio tapes, and other 
documents by research peers. Heavy use of direct quotations from participants also 
contributed to both dependability and confirmability. Finally, a reflexive journal was 
maintained to provide a chronology of researcher thought and provide added support for 
data analysis and conclusions (Erlandson et al., 1993). 
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Chapter IV 
Case Studies of Leadership in Crisis Events 
This chapter begins with a discussion of President James E. Halligan's leadership 
philosophy and style. It includes the significant changes that occurred at Oklahoma State 
University during his presidency, and the manner in which his leadership style guided 
those changes. The chapter then describes and analyzes the actions and perceptions of 
the president and members of his administrative staff who had to deal with a tragedy that 
struck the OSU community on January 27, 2001. It was then that an airplane crash killed 
ten people associated with the University's basketball team. Finally, the chapter will 
describe the actions and perceptions of the presidents and administrators at two other 
institutions as they dealt with tragedies in their campus communities at Texas A&M 
University and Wichita State University. 
A President's Leadership 
Leadership Philosophy and Style 
By January 2001, Dr. Jim Halligan was a seasoned veteran. Seven years into his 
presidency at Oklahoma State University and 65 years old, he had served as president of 
public institutions of higher education for more than eighteen years--seven years at 
Oklahoma State, ten years at New Mexico State University, and more than a year as 
interim chancellor at the University of Arkansas in Fayetteville, spanning a 28-year 
academic career (Gonzales, 2002). 
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He followed the normative career ladder for 89 percent of college presidents up 
through the ranks in faculty and administrative positions at six different institutions. He 
served as chemical engineering faculty, department chair, dean of engineering at two 
institutions, vice chancellor for academic affairs, and finally president (Birnbaum & 
Umbach, 2001; Halligan Curriculum Vitae, 2003). 
Over the course of that career, he developed a clearly defined leadership 
philosophy based upon his perception of the way a public university works and how an 
effective president leads. And, he developed a leadership style to match his philosophy. 
The President's Perception. 
Halligan describes the foundation of his own leadership style as participatory and 
team-oriented, with the goal of creating a sense of personal commitment from followers. 
He believes that, "you get more by offering people a sense of ownership than you do by 
instilling a sense of fear" (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003). He 
worked to gain buy-in and commitment to a common vision based upon his belief that, 
"Success has a thousand fathers, and defeat is an orphan. Everybody wants to be on a 
winning team" (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003). He felt it 
was essential to "celebrate everyone who has contributed ... do not claim credit for 
yourself' (Halligan Notes, 2003). 
His typical approach was to solicit, and in some cases demand, input from his 
staff and others before rendering an opinion or decision himself. He recommends the 
following when leading a meeting: 
In an important meeting, the leader should speak last, unless he/she senses the 
situation is getting out of control. .. When meeting with your administrative team, 
set up the problem or issue and then be quiet, let everyone else speak before you 
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voice an opinion .... It is amazing how people change their tack once they know 
which way the wind is blowing. (Halligan Notes, 2003) 
He believes in setting up an executive staff that is team-oriented, having an inner 
circle of very trusted colleagues, and having a limited number of people who report to 
him directly. Beyond that, he routinely let his senior staff attend to the daily business of 
the University. 
His philosophy of the president's proper relationship with the institution's 
governing board is captured by the phrase ''Noses in, fingers out" (Halligan Notes, 2003). 
In other words, board members were always welcome to look at any area of the 
institution at whatever depth; however, if the board or any member tried to get directly 
involved with the operation of the institution, it was time to find a new president. 
Halligan applied a similar operating principle to his own supervisory and administrative 
role, and did not micromanage OSU academic or support units. 
Halligan believes his effectiveness as president was the result of personal 
relationships or alliances, and "having previously developed relationships whereby 
people would trust me. Keeping my word at times when it was pretty tough" (J.E. 
Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003). These personal relationships were 
with students, faculty, senior staff, legislators, alumni, donors, and local citizens. 
Halligan believes there is important relevance for personal relationships from a 
political perspective as well. He feels, "Politics is as essential to social life as sex is to 
biological life-it is the way the really important work gets done. It is the process human 
beings use to make really important decisions." He practiced good campus politics in 
ways great and small: "Walking into the composition room of the student newspaper or 
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the offices of student government is particularly advisable. It is just tougher to criticize 
someone who you see on a regular basis" (Halligan Notes, 2003). 
At a higher level of political involvement, "Cultivating good relationships with 
the appointment secretary and Chief of Staff to the Governor are crucial ... Personal 
involvement in lobbying is extremely important. The President must spend considerable 
time in this area to ensure success" (Halligan Notes, 2003). 
Perceptions of Others. 
While an understanding ofHalligan's views of his own leadership style are 
important, the views of those who worked most closely with him are even more 
informative. His senior administrative staff at OSU, those who were most directly 
involved with his leadership, had perceptions ofHalligan's leadership that were 
consistent with his own. Those staff members also had observations of other strong 
features including a team orientation, decisiveness, compassionate nature, and deep 
personal commitment. They had an understanding of his style that mirrored his intent 
and his own perception of what he hoped to accomplish and how to go about it. 
Halligan's staff members understood his team-oriented approach to leadership 
precisely as he intended. Everett Eaton, OSU Director of Public Safety and Chief of 
Police, describes the usual flow of a meeting with Halligan: 
He typically would let everybody say his or her piece in a meeting. Then he 
would go around the room individually and make sure that everybody had a 
recommendation-what do you think? What is your opinion? And then he would 
come to a decision after it had been kicked around discussed, and fussed, and then 
after everybody had made a recommendation. (E. Eaton, personal 
communications, October 7, 2003) 
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Another senior administrator, Dr. Harry Birdwell, Vice President for Budget and 
External Relations, recalls the same practice: 
(He) would ask our opinions on virtually every significant issue that came down 
the pike. And if you were a 'yes' person, you didn't serve his interests at all. If 
you disagreed with him, he wanted you to disagree, because he believed so 
strongly that multiple opinions force a better think tank decision, if you will. I 
think that's one of the things I admired most about him, is that he always asked 
our opinion. (H. Birdwell, personal communication, October 21, 2003) 
The development of personal relationships that Halligan credits for his leadership 
effectiveness is perceived by virtually all of his senior staff to reflect a remarkably caring 
and compassionate man. He was personally affected when N atalea Watkins, the 
Assistant Vice President for Communications, was seriously injured in an automobile 
accident and when his executive vice president suffered a heart attack. His 
compassionate nature was apparent to his senior staff. N atalea Watkins describes that 
compassion: 
He leads by doing the right thing, by caring--his personal sense of caring and 
responsibility and pain and all of those things were very much guiding the way 
that OSU handled things. It was very personal and empathic. He put himself in 
the role of people who would be suffering whatever the issue was." (N. Watkins, 
personal communication, October 1, 2003) 
Another senior staff member, Dr. Terry Don Phillips, Director of Athletics during 
Halligan's tenure as president, describes it further: "There is a personal touch to his style. 
He cares about what happens to you individually, your family, and the things that impact 
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you personally. Jim has a very personal touch, both he and (his wife) Ann" (T.D. 
Phillips, personal communication, December 5, 2003). 
Observations and perspectives of his vice presidents and other senior staff 
members reflect not only a participatory leadership style but also a decisive style and 
total personal commitment from both Halligan and his wife, Ann, that inspired 
commitment from others. Dr. Marvin Keener, Executive Vice President of OSU, 
describes his view of Halligan' s commitment as follows: 
He was able to put together a team of people who wanted him to be successful. 
(His predecessor) never got that. The other big factor, and it is hard to quantify, 
but he worked himself incredibly hard. He and Ann just willed it, and just would 
not let it fail. He was just not going to allow it. And just by sheer force of 
personality and hard work, he was willing to do and go and be a part of whatever 
it took. It inspired everybody else to do the same thing. (M. Keener, personal 
communication, October 9, 2003) 
. There was also no question among the staff of his focus on the institution and not 
on personal achievement. Phillips notes, "(Halligan) was unequivocal and unapologetic 
about what he was doing and what he believed to be important. It wasn't about 
(Halligan), it was about how OSU could be the best it could be" (T.D. Phillips, personal 
communication, December 5, 2003). Birdwell adds, "He is ego-less. Not looking for 
credit, but for success in the organization. Success in the organization is more important 
than whether or not there is credit that comes to the head of the organization" (H. 
Birdwell, personal communication, October 21, 2003). Birdwell's description rings of 
Halligan's view that "success has a thousand fathers and defeat is an orphan." 
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Among others, Dr. Lee Bird, Vice President for Student Affairs ofOSU, notes 
another recurring theme among his staff--Halligan's ability to be a decisive leader: 
He was very strong. On some issues, it was very much a conversation to solicit 
information and 'what do you think?' In other cases, it was clear that this was not 
a democracy, and that ultimately it would be his decision and his responsibility, 
but he would most often, on most issues, solicit a great deal of input and then 
make his decision. (L. Bird, personal communication, October 13, 2003) 
Phillips summarizes the same observation: 
You understand that he is in charge. That is very clear, but at the same time, he 
has a very congenial style. You understand he is the boss, but he handles his 
authority in such a fashion that you want to do a good job for him. (T .D. Phillips, 
personal communication, December 5, 2003) 
Birdwell concludes the following: 
He was decisive .... Most of the time when you were in a meeting with him, you 
decided the issues that you were meeting about. You rarely put it off to another 
time. I thought that was one of his stronger leadership characteristics, is the 
ability to decide difficult issues rather than not dealing with them. (H. Birdwell, 
personal communication, October 21, 2003) 
Once a decision was reached, a common perception was that, "He let others do 
their jobs," expresses Dr. David Bosserman, Vice President for Administration and 
Finance, and Controller (personal communication, November 5, 2003). Birdwell 
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summarizes, "He is hands-on in the sense that he sets the tone, and then he lets others do 
their work." (H. Birdwell, personal communication, October 21, 2003) 
Keener believes Halligan had another ability: 
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(Halligan) was extraordinarily gifted in understanding how people would perceive 
something, far better than anyone else at OSU .... He understood bully pulpits and 
saying things publicly that presented the right kind of image. For example, 
having students out to his house all the time, giving them food, treats, all the time. 
The students loved him. (M. Keener, personal communication, October 9, 2003) 
While he may have seemed gifted in foreseeing the perceptions of others, 
Halligan also paid due diligence to understanding those perceptions. He solicited 
feedback and listened to it well. He recalls one episode that was helpful to him: 
I actually had them (faculty members) come to my office ... Because what I was 
really getting was their perspective of what other people were saying about it 
when I wasn't there, which was terribly important because you can go out and 
interact with people, that's one thing, but to have people who you grow to respect 
because they'll be honest with you, to have them come and talk is just invaluable. 
(J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003). 
Additionally, Halligan observes that, "Walking into a professor's lab can be 
exciting for everyone including the relevant dean and the president. If no one else is 
there you may get some straight talk concerning how the rank and file perceive" 
(Halligan Notes, 2003). 
The image that emerges from Halligan's views and the perceptions of his staff is 
clear. President Halligan led through a team whose contributions and feedback helped 
guide his decisions. He let his senior staff work within the larger decisions for which he 
took responsibility. He was decisive and committed, and he listened well. Perhaps most 
importantly, he led through personal relationships that conveyed a strong sense of caring 
to those who worked with him. 
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Leadership Impact 
Halligan subscribes to the traditional view of the president's leadership impact 
on a college or university and bristles at the suggestion of an "organized anarchy." He 
does not believe a president is constrained by competing constituents to the extent that 
the position is largely a symbolic one, unable to lead the institution in a particular 
direction (Cohen & March, 1974, 1986). There is substantial evidence to suggest his 
leadership had enormous impact at OSU. The following paragraphs discuss some of the 
most significant areas ofHalligan's impact as president. 
Enrollment. 
One of the things of which Halligan is most proud is the reversal of a downward 
trend in enrollment during his tenure as president. Oklahoma State University enrollment 
had declined in each of the twelve years before his arrival, and had increased during each 
year of his presidency. He summarizes the significance as follows: 
The impact of 12 years in a row of declining enrollment on an institution is just 
enormous, because there is a general reduction in morale on the part of the 
faculty. If you are a good faculty person, you certainly start looking at your 
options at other institutions. And whenever a faculty position opens up, the 
administration is under tremendous pressure to take it out of the budget ... and so 
the impact on the institution in just every quarter is just enormous and so we had 
to turn that around. And of course, we did. Dramatically. 
So I would have to say that I have a lot of pride, and our team should have a lot of 
pride because if you don't solve (the enrollment problem) ... They actually had a 
study that said OSU should go down from 17,000 to about 12,000 to 14,000 
students. (J.E. Halligan, personal communications, October 21, 2003) 
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Sense of Community. 
Declining enrollment was only the most significant symptom of an overall 
malaise that plagued OSU when he first arrived on campus. When Halligan arrived at 
OSU there was an obvious morale problem. Keener summarizes, ''You can't imagine 
how low the University had sunk. Students were mad, the faculty were mad, the staff 
were mad, the alumni were mad, the legislators were mad" (M. Keener, personal 
communication, October 9, 2003). Halligan recalls his own early perception of the 
demoralized institution: 
When we first took our trip through Oklahoma, in Bartlesville and Ponca City in 
particular, but on numerous occasions, we were surrounded by alums who were 
just furious with the institution. One person came up and gave me a pin and said 
that he had intended to give his estate to Oklahoma State but he had lost so much 
pride in the institution that he gave it to me and said he could never wear it again. 
(J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003) 
Halligan set about to fix the general malaise that hung over the institution. 
Natalea Watkins recalls the following: 
He said from the very beginning that one of his goals was to create a sense of 
community at OSU that he felt was missing ... a sense of community in the 
University family that extended far beyond Stillwater, the alumni and just all 
around. It is increasing a sense of pride, a sense of ownership, and a sense that we 
are all in this together. (N. Watkins, personal communication, October 1, 2003) 
Harry Birdwell, Vice President for Business and External Relations, summarizes, 
"He took us out of the doldrums of the (previous) administration. He got us moving 
together as an institution rather than opposed to each other" (H. Birdwell, personal 
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communication, October 21, 2003). Bird agrees, "I think building a campus culture that 
was very positive was something he was proud of, and should be" (L. Bird, personal 
communication, October 13, 2003). 
OSU-Tulsa. 
In a watershed event for the University, Halligan took the lead and convinced key 
members of the legislature and Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education to select 
OSU as the institution to take over what was then the University Center at Tulsa. The 
goal was to develop it into a large public campus in Tulsa, but on terms that were 
acceptable to the OSU campus at Stillwater and the existing OSU System. 
Halligan feels it would have been a disaster for the rural Stillwater campus if 
another independent public campus were established in urban Tulsa. "If Tulsa had its 
own separate governing board, I think it would be a disaster. We would have had two 
governing boards fighting for the same turf, going to the state regents and (both) 
claiming, 'We're OSU' (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003). 
At the same time, it was essential to convince the Tulsa community and their 
political representatives that an OSU-administered Tulsa campus would be a priority for 
the president. He convinced the state legislators and executive branch to charter the 
institution in a way that was an opportunity, and not a threat, to the existing system. He 
also convinced the Tulsa community leaders and their representatives that the Tulsa 
campus would indeed be a priority of the institution. This would establish the OSU 
System as the future "political centerpiece of the state's higher education system," 
Halligan believes (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003). 
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Infrastructure. 
Other substantive, milestone initiatives completed through Halligan's personal 
involvement were an expansion of the basketball arena, planned expansion and upgrade 
of the football stadium, and lengthening of the Stillwater airport runway. All three 
projects were considered essential for OSU to remain in the Big 12 athletic conference 
and, most importantly, remain a peer with the members of that group, particularly the 
University of Oklahoma. Halligan recalls, "The perception was that if OSU did not 
remain in the Big 12, it would have an enormously difficult time in the state legislature 
maintaining parity in funding with OU" (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 
21, 2003). 
He also was responsible for gaining approval and funding for building more than 
$225 million of critically important student housing-reversing a trend of students 
moving away from campus--and turning a $160 million fund raising campaign into a 
$270 million achievement (OSU James Halligan, 2003). 
These accomplishments during Halligan's tenure as president were indeed 
significant to altering fundamental characteristics and prospects of the institution. The 
manner in which he went about getting those things done is profoundly informative of his 
leadership approach and is discussed in the following section. 
How Leadership Drove Change 
The significant achievements during President Halligan's tenure that are 
described above provide a mosaic of his approach to guiding the university and leading 
planned change. An examination of how these difficult and significant changes were 
implemented speaks to the effectiveness ofHalligan's leadership style and provides 
insight into the character of the man. 
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Enrollment. 
The enrollment issue was galvanized for Halligan by a conversation with the 
president of another state institution. As related by Keener, the Executive Vice President, 
We were just over 17,000 students when (Halligan) started and in his first year he 
visited the presidents of all the other institutions (in Oklahoma) and when he went 
to (one institution), the president there told him, 'We are going to bury you.' I 
think that is a quote, 'We are going to bury you. You will be the fourth largest 
institution in another four years.' Right after that, Halligan came back, came 
down to my office, sat down in a chair and said, 'That's what (he) said, and it is 
up to you to grow this institution.' So, we did (M. Keener, personal 
communication, October 9, 2003). 
The specific tactics of turning around enrollment consisted of more aggressive 
recruiting and improved retention through initiatives to enhance the undergraduate 
experience. Such initiatives included a "no rookies on rookies" approach in providing 
experienced faculty for first-year students-making it a more personal experience, more 
residence halls that enabled more students to have a greater connection with the campus, 
an addition to the student union that brought offices serving students under one roof, and 
increased use of tuition waiver. However, the key feature was the resolve and 
commitment of Halligan and the commitment of his senior staff to ensure it happened 
based upon creating personal relationships from top to bottom. 
Sense of Community. 
Halligan's own view of a collegial environment for the institution was that 
"Community is just so important. If you get people together and they're in common 
cause, it is astonishing what they can accomplish" (Halligan Notes, 2003). He gave his 
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senior staff a "little lecture" early on in his presidency about what sort of ''body 
messages" they were giving: 
I was known for walking across campus and smiling. Saying hello to people. So 
we as an administration needed to exude that feeling. That we have some 
challenges and all that sort of business, but you know what, we're going to get our 
arms around it and we're going to figure out solutions to them. We're not down 
in the dumps here. So dig up the box. Shoot off the lock, and spend it. By God, 
it's going to get better around here and it's going to get better right now. (J.E. 
Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003) 
He was known for having students visit his home and developing a rapport with 
many of them. "Students can quickly sense whether or not the president is interested in 
them," (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003). Halligan invariably 
would talk to students as he walked across campus, starting conversations with them, 
buying whatever they were selling outside the Student Union, and hosting frequent meals 
and events for students at his residence. 
He also set the bar for his senior staff in terms of standards for the vision he 
would establish-"Oklahoma State University, the University of Choice in Oklahoma." 
Keener reflects, 
He more or less communicated, and not necessarily directly, but also indirectly 
what his expectations were. And I would say, the expectations were that the 
University would be first class in its responses. Whether it was responding to a 
legislator, student, or parent, we were not to think about what would make things 
easy for the University, but what would make things easy for them. (M. Keener, 
personal communication, October 9, 2003) 
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During the news conference wherein he announced his intention to retire as 
president, Halligan said, "The vast majority of students, when I walk across campus, say 
'Hello,' and it is my assessment that they know who I am and I really think that is 
important to developing a community on campus" (Gonzales, 2002). 
OSU-Tulsa. 
Initially, the nod for assuming responsibility for the University Center at Tulsa 
campus and establishing a large-campus presence there was widely perceived to be going 
to the University of Oklahoma. Halligan recalls the following: 
A prominent person called me and said the cause was lost and I should just try to 
make the best deal I could for Stillwater (OSU campus). And I go home about a 
quarter to midnight and I left him a message. I said that this was Ensign Halligan 
reporting in, and that we installed a bilge pump and we were pumping as fast as 
we could but we were still under water, but the surface was in sight. 
And I would have to say that. .. knowing how to get into the governor's office and 
talk to the governor's chief of staff after hours. That's when we really turned it 
around. (The University of Oklahoma) was winning, and we were losing. And I 
think from that moment on, the momentum went from one side of the field to the 
other. And then it was a question of putting in the structure. (J.E. Halligan, 
personal communication, October 21, 2003) 
There remained the problem ofOSU-Tulsa becoming a stand-alone, 
comprehensive university in Tulsa. If that occurred, Halligan feels, "Stillwater faced a 
very bleak future" (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003 ). He adds, 
I would have to say that there was a crucial moment in the negotiations, I said 
there should be a provost at Tulsa, and he should be part of the system. One of 
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the senators in very colorful language said he didn't know if it was pra-vost or 
provost; he didn't know if it was a janitor. He used very direct language. And I 
said, 'Senator, I think we can make a deal. We can call that person President, but 
if I agree to that, I want you to make the board an advisory board and not a 
governing board for Tulsa.' And he stuck out his hand, and I shook it as fast as I 
could (laughs). (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003) 
When it was clear that OSU would be established as the lead for the flagship 
public higher education institution in Tulsa, Halligan went about establishing credibility 
for the concept of OSU-Tulsa as a viable campus in the OSU system. He leased an 
apartment in Tulsa and maintained a presence there that was designed to convince the 
citizens of Tulsa of the University's commitment to developing an institution of"20,000 
students by 2020." He stayed on average two nights per week at the leased apartment. 
He attended church in Tulsa regularly, virtually every week for two years. He attended 
Tulsa Chamber of Commerce events, Lions Club, Rotary Club, and a host of other local 
citizens' groups. He and his wife attended cultural events there regularly and were very 
visible to the local community. Halligan recalls the following: 
We really tried to work on that. To convince the people, and the essential issue 
was, if this is given to OSU, will they just try to keep it in the bottle and let 
nothing happen to protect their position in Stillwater. When you cooked it all 
down, that's what it was. I had lunch with some leaders in Tulsa, and that's no 
longer a concern of theirs. They now believe that OSU will allow that to come to 
full flower. (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003) 
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Infrastructure. 
In order to achieve the improvements in infrastructure necessary to remain in the 
Big 12 conference, Halligan had to generate the funding for expansion of the basketball 
arena and extension of the airport runway. He did so by winning support from the 
students and then the city of Stillwater to convince them it was essential to the future of 
the institution. As Halligan remembers it, 
We went to the students first. They voted to service $15 million of debt, and then 
we went to the city, and said, you're going to benefit a lot from this, and we want 
you to pass a tax such that you'll service $9 million in debt, and in both places, 
without being threatening, people needed to know that ifwe couldn't accomplish 
it we really needed to get someone else that they had greater confidence in who 
could accomplish these things because they were essential for the institution. (J.E. 
Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003) 
As the centerpiece to his approach to getting things done, Halligan's emphasis on 
personal relationships was instrumental in the fund raising campaign as well. Keener 
speaks of the mini-lecture Halligan gave his staff about the many guests they were 
entertaining at the president's home: 
Having people outto his house all the time; he and Ann, especially in his first few 
years, had something about every day. And he told us what he expected from the 
leadership. I remember a day, we (executive staff) sat around the (senior staff 
meeting) table and he said, 'When you guys come you act like you're invited 
guests. You're not there to participate, get free food, and have a good time. 
You're there to work. You're there to make the other people feel like they are the 
most important people that ever walked through the doors of that place. So, yes, 
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you can have something to eat but that's not the reason you're there.' (M. Keener, 
personal communication, October 9, 2003) 
Halligan recollects the same session and reflects that it was an opportunity for his 
senior staff to learn about personal relationships: 
(Laughing) I gave them a real talking to. We were trying to develop those 
relationships. I was not interested in (the senior staff) once or twice a week 
coming to the house and having a nice time and seeing me sort of dance in front 
of them. That was not what we were talking about. This was a team effort. We 
needed all these people, particularly since we launched the fund raising campaign. 
We started out with something like $160 million in the campaign and ended up 
with $270 million. You can't raise that kind of money if you haven't had a lot of 
people out to the house and schmoozed them big-time. And that means 
everybody. Everybody's in the game. (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, 
October 21, 2003) 
Halligan himself recalls an off campus after-dinner session with a donor oflarge 
potential. When the self-made, wealthy rancher offered up a toast oflarge shots of 
whiskey, Halligan knew that to enhance rapport with the man, it was not the time to 
request a diet soft drink or Chardonnay. The relationship eventually paid off in the form 
of a large donation to OSU (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003). 
Interpretive/Symbolic Leadership. 
Halligan expresses an appreciation and understanding of the application of 
symbols to his presidency as well: "The importance of symbolism cannot be overstated. 
When the symbols are wrong, it can be more important than substance." Halligan 
recognizes that symbolism is even important in the non-verbal messages a leader sends, 
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"It is worthwhile to think about your persona. Trudging around campus with a glum look 
on your face does not give cheer to the troops .... Someone has to project the feeling that 
things are getting better and hope for the future is well founded" (Halligan Notes, 2003). 
In another reflection of the importance of the messages that the president sends, as 
well as the need for understanding the perceptions of others, Halligan observes, 
Your style has to match your personality, but it is advisable about once a week to 
reserve some time to eat in the food court of the Student Union and to walk 
around the campus. People want to know that you have some sense of their world 
and what they are experiencing at the institution ... Things are going on the 
campus and you need to have a feel for the pulse. (Halligan Notes, 2003) 
When an OSU social fraternity posted photos on a web site of two whites 
oppressing a black student in civil war garb from a party, the OSU campus was outraged. 
There were widespread calls for the expulsion of the students involved, and banishment 
of the fraternity from the campus. The campus newspaper and African-American student 
group led the demands for Draconian, punitive action against those responsible. 
Instead of taking action that would harm the campus community and likely 
generate opposing cries of political correctness, Halligan gave the fraternity leadership a 
chance to recover. He offered them "an opportunity to volunteer" to perform community 
service, to undergo multicultural awareness sessions, and apologize. He also met with 
and involved the African-American student group to gain their buy-in to the plan (J.E. 
Halligan, personal communication, October 21, 2003). 
He sponsored and attended a candlelight vigil at which the president of the 
fraternity provided an emotional apology. The vigil was an opportunity for the campus 
community to come together, recognize the seriousness and impropriety of the act, and 
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resolve to eliminate racial bias from the campus. What could have been an extraordinarily 
divisive event on the campus became one of symbolic unification through the leadership 
of the president. 
Halligan took baskets of cookies to the campus newspaper staff and was keenly 
aware of the benefits of that relationship in human resource, political, and symbolic 
terms. "There are few constituencies on the campus that the president should devote 
more thought to than the editorial board of the student paper. Bringing them a basket of 
cookies (six dozen) at the beginning of the fall semester and sitting for a detailed 
interview can pay tremendous dividends" (Halligan Notes, 2003). He also made it a 
practice to present baskets of cookies to winners of a "Celebrate State" award for staff 
and faculty who distinguished themselves or made a noteworthy contribution to the 
university in some way. The award was conceived and developed by administrative staff 
members before his arrival but he recognized the value of it and adopted it as a 
presidential award, personally delivered without announcement and without orchestrated 
fanfare except for gathering of faculty and staff in the recipient's home department (M. 
Keener, personal communication, October 9, 2003). 
The disillusioned alumni who returned the pin to Halligan on his inaugural trip 
around the state asked to have the pin back seven years later. 
The overwhelming opinion among those who knew him is that the most 
. significant of the hallmarks was Halligan's leadership following the airplane crash in 
January 2001. 
Crisis Event: Aircraft Accident, Oklahoma State University 
On January 27, 2001 a twin-engine Beech King Air 200 aircraft, call sign Eight 
One Papa Foxtrot, crashed in rangeland approximately 30 miles east of Denver, 
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Colorado. The aircraft had departed Jefferson County, Colorado en route to Stillwater, 
Oklahoma. There were eight passengers and a crew of two on board. None survived. 
The ten were returning from a men's college basketball game in Boulder, Colorado 
between the University of Colorado and Oklahoma State University. It was one of three 
aircraft carrying team members, coaches, trainers, and other members of the athletic 
department, in addition to a well-known sports broadcaster and the pilots back home. 
The souls on board consisted of two players, 20-year-old freshman guard Nathan Z. 
Fleming and junior guard Daniel P. Lawson, Jr., 21; broadcast engineer Kendall C. 
Durfey; sports information employee William R. Hancock III; director of basketball 
operations Pat Noyes; trainer Brian W. Luinstra; student manager Jared G. Weiberg; 
play-by-play announcer William B. Tietgans {Teegins); pilot Denver R. Mills; and co-
pilot Bjorn G. Falistrom (Aircraft Accident Report, 2003; Schmitt & McCabe, 2001). 
The National Transportation Safety Board concluded that the primary cause of the 
accident was spatial disorientation of the pilots following a failure of a primary flight 
instrument. At the time of the crash, weather conditions necessitated instruments to 
maintain spatial orientation and aircraft control (Aircraft Accident Report, 2003). 
January 27--The First Response 
On the evening of January 27, 2001, Jim and Ann Halligan returned home at 
about 8:30 p.m. following a football recruit dinner and had started to "decompress from 
the day." The president and his wife were normally invited to the recruiting dinners and 
the Halligans attended when his schedule permitted. There was a telephone message 
waiting, but at the end of the message Halligan was not sure what it meant. The message 
was that one of three airplanes carrying the OSU men's basketball team back from their 
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game at the University of Colorado was overdue at Stillwater Airport and presumed to be 
"down" (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003). 
Halligan decided to go to the airport because he thought, if the plane was down, 
maybe it had an emergency landing somewhere and they would probably have the best 
information at the airport. Before leaving, he specifically stopped and put on a shirt and 
tie, for which he would be thankful as the evening progressed. 
Halligan drove the IO-minutes from the OSU president's residence to the 
Stillwater Airport. Upon his arrival, he was faced with the stunning realization that the 
airplane wasn't "down," it had crashed. Halligan made some calls to the OSU Police 
and to his Vice-President for Business and External Relations, Dr. Harry Birdwell, to 
notify them and find out where the head basketball coach, Eddie Sutton, was at the time. 
After learning that Coach Sutton and a number of the basketball players were at the 
basketball offices on campus, Halligan proceeded there (J.E. Halligan, personal 
communication, October 24, 2003). 
When he arrived, he found players and coaches who were inconsolable. The 
basketball offices were chaotic and packed with people, many of the people from the 
other two airplanes, and others from the athletic department. Halligan felt it was 
critically important that the circumstantial evidence pointing to a crash from which there 
were no survivors was confirmed before notification to families was made. By this time, 
local television stations in Oklahoma City and Tulsa were interrupting broadcasts with 
news alerts that one of the planes carrying members of the basketball team was missing. 
Shortly, they began to carry live feeds from a Denver television news team on site at an 
airplane crash in which there appeared to be no survivors. Still, there was no 
confirmation that the plane was the one carrying the OSU people. 
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Dr. Terry Don Phillips, OSU Athletic Director, notified Everett Eaton, Chief of 
OSU Police, that it was believed the plane had crashed but that confirmation was needed 
and asked for Eaton's assistance. Chief Eaton began to make telephone calls from his 
home to law enforcement and other agencies in Colorado to get confirmation. While 
making those calls, Eaton also received several more calls from Phillips, as well as from 
Halligan and Birdwell. Halligan asked to be given a call on his cell phone as soon as 
Eaton learned something and indicated three or four places he might be. 
Dr. Suzanne Burks, Director of University Counseling, received a call from an 
assistant director of Residential Life telling her to turn on the television. It was 
approximately 9:00 p.m. She saw it as a breaking news television bulletin from her 
home-radar contact with the plane had been lost. The plane was missing. She 
contacted Dr. Lee Bird, six months at OSU as Vice President for Student Affairs, to 
notify her. Bird was at a friend's house playing cards and Burks picked her up on the 
way to the basketball offices. On the way, Burks called several of her key people and 
sent them to various places where they thought there was a need. As it turned out, there 
were people at the airport, basketball offices, and at least two residence halls who were 
anxiously awaiting word. "It was a bit chaotic, as you can imagine, as we found out there 
were people at the airport. There were people at the residence halls. There were people 
at the basketball offices, and the media was descending," Burks recalls (S. Burks, 
personal communication, October 6, 2003). 
Many of the counseling staff were also learning of the missing plane through 
television and were already moving in the direction of the campus. Burks remembers, 
''We had people mobilizing from that first 30 minutes and we had people mobilizing 
themselves to see how they could be of assistance" (S. Burks, personal communication, 
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October 6, 2003). Burks and Bird spent the next couple of hours helping at the basketball 
offices, helping people, and meeting with basketball players and support staff, helping 
with phones, helping in every way they could, before making rounds to visit with people 
and counselors at various residence halls on the campus. At one point, they decided to 
provide food. Bird recalls that evening in the following: 
We decided to open up the cafeteria because in a time of disaster, what do people 
do? They eat. So we opened up the cafeteria and the cafeteria workers just 
showed up ... and there was no concern about (charge) swipes or anything. It was 
like, let's make some sandwiches and if anyone wants a sandwich and a drink; 
they've got it. (L. Bird, personal communication, October 13, 2003) 
The phones at the basketball offices were "ringing off the walls." Players' 
families and others were calling in, trying to find out who was on the plane. There was 
pacing and flying paper as the search for names, phone numbers, and addresses of those 
on the plane were collected. 
Dr. Marvin Keener, OSU's Executive Vice President, received a call from 
Halligan asking him to notify the members of the OSU Board of Regents that the plane 
was missing and presumed crashed with no known survivors. Later, Keener was asked to 
call the regents to advise them that the team working the response was "calling it quits for 
the night and they would be called the next day." The next day, it was Halligan who was 
keeping the regents informed (M. Keener, personal communication, October 9, 2003). 
This followed a pattern that continued during the crisis response and recovery. Keener 
was to handle,the internal organizational constituents-the deans, faculty, staff, and 
students--on matters concerning the tragedy. Keener was "Mr. Inside" to Halligan's "Mr. 
Outside," as Halligan recalls (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003). 
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Upon gaining confirmation that the aircraft crash site in Colorado was indeed the 
plane carrying the OSU contingent, President Halligan and Coach Sutton called the 
families of each of the people on board to tell them the airplane had crashed and all 
indications were that there were no survivors. Halligan recalls, 
People were, they were just so sad .... Just calling people, some of whom you had 
never met in your life, and saying the plane was down and that the assessment is 
that they are all dead. It really drained everything out of you. (J.E. Halligan, 
personal communication, October 24, 2003) 
By this time, news reporters and television stations had set up outside the 
basketball offices and at the Stillwater Airport. Prior to any acknowledgement of the 
crash, Halligan ensured the families were notified. He then had the athletic department 
media representative advise the media that a news conference would be held at the airport 
shortly. 
At the brief news conference, the Director of Media Relations for the Athletic 
Department, Steve Buzzard, made opening comments addressing the fact that an aircraft 
had crashed and identified the people on board, then introduced President Halligan. 
Halligan spoke for 1 minute and 20 seconds at the news conference, expressing the deep 
sadness that Oklahoma State University shared with the families. Then Birdwell and 
Phillips spoke briefly and Birdwell and Buzzard answered questions from the media. 
Halligan did not take any questions from the assembled media, but was later "cornered" 
by a television reporter and answered a couple of questions on camera. Over the next 48 
hours, Birdwell, Buzzard, Watkins, and Nestor Gonzalez, the News Bureau Manager, 
would handle the brunt of the media questions. 
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Following the press conference, Halligan convened his senior staff at the offices 
of Athletic Director Phillips. The offices were temporarily located in an off-campus 
building since renovation of Gallagher-Iba basketball arena and athletic offices was 
underway. Selection of the meeting site was a conscious decision to get away from the 
media and others who would distract from an intense period of crucial decision-making. 
It was well after midnight when Halligan and his staff met. Most of his "inner-
circle" vice-presidents, along with several members of the athletic department, 
Counseling, and Communications Services were there, along with Ann Halligan. The 
people who were involved in the early morning session recall it as a time filled with an 
extraordinary number of key decisions in an emotionally charged context. Throughout, 
Halligan's leadership style remained consistent with the style that those familiar with him 
had come to know. Natalea Watkins recalls his handling of the assembled group: 
It really wasn't his style to stand up and give orders like a general. It was really 
more to set a tone, if you will ... to listen to what each person thought believed 
needed to be done from their area of expertise. He listened to the police, he 
listened to the public relations people, he listened to the athletic department, he 
listened to the counselor about stages of grieving, all of those sorts of things 
enabled him to decide what he would personally do, and he would give a thumbs-
up or thumbs-down on what people were going to do. (N. Watkins, personal 
communication, October 1, 2003) 
There were a number of very significant decisions made that morning from after-
midnight until approximately 4:00 a.m. and during a follow-up session from 9:00 a.m. 
until 11 :00 a.m. that same day. Most of those decisions concerned the surviving family 
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members and required both short-term and long-term actions and commitments from the 
institution to "do the right thing by them." 
First, it was decided that representatives from OSU would depart later that same 
day for Strasburg, Colorado to provide on-scene representation and assistance by the 
institution. There was a strong feeling that OSU people needed to be the ones to provide 
timely and accurate information to the families and represent them. It also seemed 
important at the time that someone from OSU ''be the last person to hold the victims' 
hands" recalls Birdwell (H. Birdwell, personal communication, October 21, 2003). 
Included on that team were Dr. David Bosserman, who was then the Associate 
Vice President and Controller. Bosserman had qualifications and experiences that 
seemed to make him uniquely suited for the role. As a senior member of the 
administration and one authorized to commit university funds, he possessed the gravitas 
to make on-scene decisions and commitments on behalf of the university. Additionally, 
as a retired lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, Bosserman had experiences with aircraft 
accidents and mortuary affairs from tours of duty in Vietnam (H. Birdwell, personal 
communication, October 21, 2003). Finally, Bosserman had an unpretentious style and 
personality that related well to people. The people with whom he dealt at the crash scene 
were pleased to work with one who did not conform to their preconceptions of how an 
academician operated, recalls Captain Roger Engelsman of the Adams County, Colorado 
Sheriff's Department (R. Engelsman, personal communication, November 26, 2003). 
The second person on the team was a member of the OSU Police Department, 
Sergeant Leon Jones. Jones spoke the language of security, understood the perspectives 
oflaw enforcement and fire protection professionals, and was able to work well with 
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local public safety agencies and their representatives (E. Eaton, personal communication, 
October 7, 2003). 
The third team member was Carter Matson, an assistant athletic director who had 
a juris doctorate and was working on a Ph.D. in history. Matson sent back detailed 
reports to Phillips and Halligan every evening while at the crash site in Colorado. 
Bosserman provided similar reports to Birdwell each night between 11 :00 p.m. and 1 :00 
a.m. that were relayed to Halligan. These three people, Bosserman, Jones, and Matson, 
provided a broad range of expertise and were able to establish an exceptionally strong 
professional relationship, a bond, with the people who were caring for the recovery of the 
OSU crash victims and the crash site (R. Engelsman, personal communication, November 
26, 2003). 
The team's first trip to Colorado lasted seven days, until the victims had been 
identified and were in route to their final destinations. Over the course of the next several 
months, until the crash-site memorial dedication in August, 2001, Bosserman would 
make five additional trips to the crash site to make the arrangements for return of the 
victims and their personal effects, purchase land for a memorial site, coordinate 
construction of the memorial, and dedication of the memorial itself. He also made 
arrangements for ongoing maintenance of the memorial site. 
In retrospect, Halligan considers the decision that he not go immediately to the 
crash site a good one: "When I tried to figure out what I could do there and what I could 
do here, there was no question. I should stay here and send people with great expertise to 
the crash site. We sent a lawyer, a policeman, and Bosserman, who had the authority to 
commit the institution'; (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003). 
Perhaps most importantly, Halligan believed that the president should "go where the 
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situation is worst," and the situation was worst where the grieving families and friends 
were (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003). Halligan did go to the 
accident site in mid-March and viewed the aircraft wreckage, which was laid out in a 
hangar for analysis. 
Other significant decisions in those first hours reflect a commitment by the 
institution to do whatever it could for the families of those killed and to always remember 
the victims. That commitment was vocalized as the standard by Halligan to his staff and 
was central to the university's response. 
First, with input from his staff, Halligan decided that two liaisons from the 
university would be assigned to each family. The primary liaison was to handle all 
matters associated with the deceased family member. It was up to the liaison to ensure 
that correct and timely information was provided to the family and that all the needs of 
the family were met to the degree possible. In most cases one of the liaisons was 
someone from the athletic department who knew the victim. Included in those liaisons 
were Dean Lee, Vina Spickler, Mart Sargent, Cathey Jo Warner, Dave Martin, Steve 
Buzzard, Rick Allen, and Tom Johnson (T.D. Phillips, personal communication, March 5, 
2004). Phillips recalls the value of those liaisons to the families of the victims: "The 
tremendous role the family liaisons and Suzie Burks played in the relationships with the 
families cannot be overstated. But for their very caring and unselfish work, the 
relationships between the families and OSU could possibly have unraveled" (T.D. 
Phillips, personal communication, March 10, 2004). 
The second liaison for each family was a trained counselor from University 
~ounseling Service to provide support for the grieving and healing process. Both liaisons 
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turned out to be very valuable to the surviving family members (S. Burks, personal 
communication, October 6, 2003). 
A second key decision was to conduct a memorial service at the campus as soon 
as possible. It was decided a memorial service would be held just three days later and 
would include family members of the victims. This would be the first time the families 
would be brought to the campus as a group to be "enveloped with the love and care of the 
institution" (H. Birdwell, personal communication, October 21, 2004). As with the other 
major decisions, this one decision drove countless other questions and issues that had to 
be resolved immediately. For example, what access should the media have? A decision 
was made that the media would be provided a single picture feed out to them, and 
television cameras would not be permitted in the service. Subsequently, a last-minute 
decision was made to not lower the lights at the ceremony so that the implicit promise to 
the media would not be broken. 
While the larger decisions were made at Halligan's two meetings with his staff on 
Sunday, the smaller decisions and ''thoughts of care" came from the people who actually 
handled the details of the memorial service. For example, someone thought to put a box 
of tissue under each family member's chair. Another thought to have digital pictures 
taken of every floral arrangement and placed in identical books for each family. Small 
teddy bears were also given to each family (L. Bird, personal communication, October 
13, 2003). Kerri O'Keefe Shepard and Watkins were central figures in the planning of 
the memorial service at Gallagher-Iba Arena. Watkins describes it as a reflection of 
leadership: 
It was just a myriad of people working together to make it so personal by thinking 
of those small personal details. I give Dr. Halligan credit, his personal leadership 
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style causing those kinds of things to happen. There would be no way somebody 
could have ordered those kinds of things to happen. It happened because people 
were trying to hold or meet his example. (N. Watkins, personal communication, 
October 1, 2003) 
Another decision made that first day was that memorials would be constructed at 
both Gallagher-Iba Arena and at the crash site. It was also decided that a commitment to 
the surviving families would be made in the form of scholarships to children of the 
victims. Later, this was expanded to include minor siblings of the victims. 
Other matters discussed in the first meeting were any benefits for the families that 
might be expedited; and who would take the lead on coordinating and communicating 
with the news media. 
The discussion turned to ways that everyone on the campus and others could 
demonstrate their grief for the victims and show their support for the families. In order to 
provide a way for people who were not close to the accident victims to share the grief 
with families and friends of the victims, it was decided that orange folded ribbons would 
be made available to the campus community as a visual, outer symbol of remembrance 
for the deceased and support to their families. It was agreed that several thousand 
ribbons would be made prior to the memorial service three days hence. Later, a 
modification of the symbol of the orange ribbon with a superimposed "10" would be 
displayed as decals on auto windows across the campus. A very large board was set up 
inside Gallagher-Iba Arena to allow people to write messages and condolences to the 
families. Additionally, an area outside Gallagher-Iba Arena next to the "Spirit Rider"-a 
full-sized bronze statue of a cowboy with an OSU flag flying at full gallop--was set up 
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for people to leave flowers, stuffed animals, and other mementos to demonstrate their 
caring and sorrow. 
The practical issue of funding for construction and maintenance of the memorials; 
transportation, lodging, and meals for the families; and scholarships for the surviving 
children was raised. Halligan quickly concluded that the amount of funding should not 
be a fundamental issue: "I was still trying to decide do we have the money, and finally 
concluded that this is not an arithmetic problem. We just have to do it and figure out how 
the hell we're going to fund it" (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 
2003). 
There was no discussion of any legal implications in the accident or any of the 
planned actions by the university. Later on, there was some effort to gain an 
understanding of how the arrangements for the donated flight of the mishap aircraft were 
made and to what degree the OSU travel policy had or had not been followed. When 
Halligan came to the conclusion that the travel policy had not been complied with, and 
that the existing policy appeared to be inadequate, he directed that it be revised and 
rewritten such that it would be the model for team-travel policies for higher education. 
It was Ann Halligan who suggested an end to the early morning meeting of the 
president and the others. She leaned over and touched his arm, "You need your rest. 
Tomorrow will be a long day" (L. Bird, personal communication, October 13, 2003). It 
was 4:00 a.m. on Sunday, less than 11 hours after the crash. 
Within the first 24-36 hours following the accident, Halligan called Dr. Ray 
Bowen, President of Texas A&M University, to ask for his counsel and lessons-learned 
from the Bonfire tragedy on the A&M campus in 1999. Bowen recalls he offered to help 
in any way possible, but did not offer specific advice: "I did not think it was appropriate 
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to give a lot of advice at that stage" (R. Bowen, personal communication, February 8, 
2004). Halligan also received a call from Dr. Jim Rhatigan, Vice President Emeritus of 
Student Affairs at Wichita State University. Rhatigan was Dean of Students at WSU in 
1970 when an airplane accident killed 31 football players and others associated with the 
team. Both contacts were beneficial in framing the OSU response by Halligan. Indeed, 
Halligan borrowed remarks from Wichita State's experience to use at the memorial 
service at Gallagher-Iba Arena on January 31, 2001 (J. Rhatigan, personal 
communication, November 4, 2003). 
Birdwell recalls Halligan's efforts to reach out to those who might provide 
counsel in the following: 
He talked to a lot of people, asking their opinions, asking what should we do, how 
can we use this as a tragedy to pull our families together. How can we, and he 
used the word repeatedly, "envelope" these families. What can we do to fold 
them into a circle that says this is not just a university; this is family. (H. 
Birdwell, personal communication, October 21, 2003) 
The touchstone of each of the early decisions was a commitment to the families of 
the victims that the OSU family would always remember the ten people. The theme of 
"do the right thing by them" was established by the president, and in the days and weeks 
to come, it became apparent that he was the one most committed to it (H. Birdwell, 
personal communication, October 21, 2003). 
Post-Tragedy Recovery 
The memorial service at Gallagher-Iba Arena on January 31, less than four days 
after the accident, was a time of intense emotions for the surviving families and for the 
University. More than 14,000 people attended. Both Governor Frank Keating and 
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Lieutenant Governor Mary Fallon of Oklahoma attended and spoke. Kevin Ogle, a 
television news broadcaster and friend and colleague of Bill Teegins, the announcer 
killed in the crash, served as the ''master of ceremonies." Both Dr. Phillips and Coach 
Sutton spoke as well. A composed and eloquent Harry Birdwell offered the most 
extensive remarks. An OSU alumnus and holder of a law degree, Birdwell delivered 
what was the centerpiece summary of what the ten victims meant to the university. When 
a visibly distressed Halligan spoke, he spoke directly to the families and told them of the 
love with which the institution wished to envelope them and pledged a commitment to 
the memory of their lost loved ones by the institution. He then asked those in attendance, 
"Join me in resolving that every time you enter this building .... you will remember. 
Resolve that we will never forget them" (OSU Memorial Service Video, 2001). 
In the days and weeks that followed the memorial service at Gallagher-Iba, 
Halligan hosted the families at his home for meals and visited the homes of the families. 
He played with the young children of the victims. He read to them and played dress-up 
with young daughters. At least one widow took pictures of him on the floor reading to 
her children so she could show them in years to come that the President of OSU cared 
enough about their father to do it (S. Burks, personal communication, October 6, 2003; 
J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2003). 
Halligan's own perception was that it was not necessarily his role, the role of the 
president, to form a personal bond and become a grieving family member along with 
those most impacted, but in this case, "It was circumstances. You could just look at the 
people involved, talk to them, and you knew. You're it." And besides, "They (the 
families) understand 'the President.' They understand that word" (J.E. Halligan, 
personal communication, October 24, 2003). Moreover, it fit his belief in the value of 
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personal relationships and the caring nature, widely known by his staff. Indeed, Birdwell 
recalls Halligan's stance concerning people in the following: 
There were four or five times during (Halligan's) presidency that I can remember 
him being very personally affected by something. And ifl am not mistaken, 
every single one of them was either student safety or the safety of people who 
were university-involved. In four or five instances, he just sort of assumed so 
much of the burden that it became such a personal issue ... When it involved the 
safety of kids and this plane crash, he almost brooded over the incident to a point 
of personal ownership. It was just one of those things that was so intensely 
personal to him. (H. Birdwell, personal communication, October 21, 2003) 
Halligan attended all the funerals he could and his wife attended all that he was 
not able to attend. Early on, he was asked to speak at some of the funerals and found 
himself phoning back to Stillwater to get more information on the victims. Halligan 
remembers some of the demands placed on him at those funerals. 
(I was) requested to give comments about people, some of whom I had never met. 
So I had my staff get information about them. You can't stand up and say, 'You 
know, I'm an executive person. I don't have a clue who some of these people 
were.' You can't do that. So, I told the staff I want to know what were they like? 
What were their characteristics? What was important to them? All that happened 
very quickly. It was like a dream. (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, 
October 24, 2003) 
At the crash site, Bosserman represented the university to the local authorities and 
emergency response units and also represented the families. He coordinated with the 
local police, coroner, and the National Transportation Safety Board team to identify 
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victims, identify personal effects, and serve as the OSU liaison for the public safety 
agencies. He was the communications focal point between the public agencies and the 
families. 
Phillips recalls the value to the families ofBosserman's on-site presence: 
The assurance that each of the deceased was handled with extreme care and 
dignity from the time of recovery, transportation to their home site, and through 
their funerals is something that was a critical first step in the healing process. 
Additionally, the in-person conference call between Dr. Bosserman, the coroner, 
me, and the families during that first week, while tremendously difficult, was a 
critical moment in the assurance that OSU would reach out, in unqualified 
fashion, to each family. {T.D. Phillips, personal communication, March 10, 2004) 
Captain Roger Engelsman, the Sheriff of Adams County, Colorado was one of the 
first responders on the scene and remained involved throughout the recovery of the 
aircraft and remains, accident investigation, and the construction of the memorial at the 
site and the ceremony in August 2001. Engelsman and representatives of the other public 
assistance groups were relieved to have assistance in contacting and coordinating with the 
family members and both he and the NTSB documented it in their after-action reports (R. 
Engelsman, personal communication, November 15, 2003). For example, the coroner 
needed information to confirm the identity of the victims and requested assistance in 
contacting the families. Bosserman arranged a tele9onference with the ten families on 
the Tuesday after the accident and the coroner was able to ask them about distinguishing 
clothing, jewelry, or characteristics. (D. Bosserman, personal communication, November 
5,2003) 
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Bosserman also formed a good professional relationship with the NTSB team on 
the site. He was initially told he could not come to the NTSB briefings, but after his first 
visit to the crash site with the chief investigator, Bosserman was invited to attend their 
briefings and had access to documentation such as radar plots almost immediately. It 
became apparent through Bosserman that the NTSB report would convey concern about 
university policy and its implementation, even though the NTSB would state that such 
was not causal to the accident. By university policy, the OSU Flight Manager must 
approve all flight contracts, whether donated or not, and they had not been involved in 
coordinating or certifying the accident flight. The final NTSB report would note: 
OSU's former air transportation policy was not causal to the accident. In fact, the 
policy was not likely different from those in place at other universities of the same 
size as OSU. However, even though the university's athletic department knew the 
accident pilot, the Flight Department had no records on file regarding him, the 
second pilot, or the accident airplane, as required. Also, because the accident 
flight was a donated flight, it was not coordinated with the Flight Department 
Manager, as were charter flights and flights involving university airplanes. Thus, 
OSU did not provide any significant oversight for the accident flight. (Aircraft 
Accident Report, 2003) 
An effort was made to determine how the arrangements for the donated flight of 
the mishap aircraft were made and to what degree the OSU travel policy had or had not 
been followed. When Halligan came to the conclusion that the travel policy had not been 
complied with, and that the existing policy could be improved, he directed that itbe 
revised and rewritten with the intent that the resulting document would be the model for 
team-travel policies for other institutions of higher education. 
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Phillips recommended to Halligan that someone outside the athletic department 
chair a task force to review the tragedy. Halligan formed the task force and asked 
Birdwell to chair it. The task force recommended ways to improve the safety and 
oversight policy for its athletic team transportation and to produced a revised 
transportation policy. The task force included family members of the victims. On April 
22, 2002 OSU issued a revised team travel policy. The stated purpose of the policy was 
to "provide a framework for safe and efficient athletic team travel" for the OSU Athletic 
Department, and also to "assign responsibility and accountability for enforcement." The 
revised policy was included in the NTSB final report and was also forwarded by the 
NTSB to the President of the National Collegiate Athletic Association as a safety 
recommendation for other institutions (Aircraft Accident Report, 2003). Bosserman 
recalls, 
I was given the opportunity to review the draft (report). I had no input, but ifl 
saw something that didn't make sense, I certainly told them that ... We did tell 
them we would have (a revised travel policy) and they asked when will it be ready 
because they would like to include it. (D. Bosserman, personal communication, 
November 5, 2003) 
Dealing with the impact to the internal university fell to "Mr. Inside," the 
Executive Vice President, Dr. Keener. He emailed a memorandum to all faculty and staff 
expressing the sorrow of the entire university community and asking each member to be 
mindful of those who were suffering among them and to be watchful for them. It read in 
part, 
It is nearly impossible to identify all close friends and acquaintances of the 
deceased students and athletic department personnel, so we ask that you please be 
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alert to the emotions and behavior of students in your classes and staff within your 
area. (Keener, 2001) 
In the months to come, Keener never received any negative feedback from any 
source in the university about the way the institution was handling the aftermath. It was 
rare for a significant action by the administration to receive no criticism whatsoever. 
Keener recalls, "My sense was that the campus thought it was handled beautifully. I 
heard no complaints, and that's unusual. Usually someone would complain, complain 
about something" (M. Keener, personal communication, October 9, 2003). 
Dr. David Buchanan, a past president of the Faculty Council, heard no complaints 
about the way the administration responded to the airplane crash. The only suggestion of 
a complaint he heard was from a colleague from another institution. The colleague saw 
the memorial service on television and observed that the religious overtone ofBirdwell's 
comments seemed inconsistent with a secular institution (D. Buchanan, personal 
communication, January 28, 2003). 
Edward F. Keller, member of the Board of Regents for the Oklahoma Agricultural 
and Mechanical Colleges, the governing board for OSU, also heard no complaints. He 
believes, "The manner in which they handled and supported the families was a credit to 
the university. I can't think of anything they didn't think about" (E. Keller, personal 
communication, March 17, 2004). 
If the memorial service at Gallagher-Iba Arena on January 31 was a time to come 
together and "envelope" the grieving families with love and bond with them in sorrow, 
the dedication of the memorial at the crash site in August was a time when, "We ripped 
open all of the wounds," as Bird describes (L. Bird, personal communication, October 13, 
2003). Halligan remembers it as "undoubtedly the most difficult time" (J.E. Halligan, 
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personal communication, October 24, 2003). By then he had come to know the family 
members and felt their sadness even more. 
The day prior to the memorial dedication, it was warm and sunny in the Colorado 
eastern plains and people were advised to dress lightly and bring sunscreen. Overnight, 
the weather changed dramatically. The weather for the dedication was cold and rainy. 
The local sheriffs office provided blankets for the family members, most of whom were 
not dressed for the weather. Halligan recalls it was such a sad occasion, someone 
remarked to him, "Even the heavens are crying" (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, 
October 24, 2003). 
Halligan had some difficulty maintaining his composure in the overwhelming 
emotions the family members were experiencing, but he knew it was important for him to 
do so. It was left to Ann to put a gentle hand on his knee and offer a family-traditional 
encouragement to be strong. "Buck up," she said (L. Bird, personal communication, 
October 3, 2003). 
The memorial to the ten victims at Gallagher-Iba Arena was dedicated on 
February 22, 2003. It features three black granite walls with the likenesses of the 10 
victims and with words chosen by the families. In the center of the memorial is a large 
and very poignant statute of a cowboy, head down, kneeling with his hat in both hands, 
the brim lightly resting on the ground. It was sculpted by noted Oklahoma artist Harold 
Holden. Birdwell recalls how the statue came to be. Birdwell visited with Holden and 
told him of the need for a centerpiece for the memorial: 
All I said to him was we need something that expresses the grief of the Cowboy 
Nation over this, that will not let it go away. He took a single sheet of paper (rips 
a legal sheet from a pad on his desk), and on the comer of my desk in about a 
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minute, he drew the statue. And it did not change ... The lock of hair right in the 
front is the only thing that changed at all, from that initial sketch to the time it was 
erected out there. And I said to him later, when we were up there seeing the clay 
model of this large piece, 'How did you do that so quickly? That must have 
already been there.' 
He said, 'It was. One Sunday afternoon a couple of years ago, my wife and I 
were out riding in the pasture when one of our friends came to tell us that our 
grandson had been killed. I just fell off my horse. That statue is me.' 
He said a cowboy never touches the ground with his hat, unless he's been bucked 
off or unless he is in incredible grief, in incredible pain. (H. Birdwell, personal 
communication, October 21, 2003) 
After Thoughts 
When asked what insight they now have into the adequacy of the institution's 
response following the tragedy and what they would do differently, few of the senior 
administrative staff have significant changes to suggest. Most of them seem to have 
intensely personal reasons for the changes they would make. 
Suzanne Burks regrets she did not immediately visit family members who lived 
outside the local Stillwater area, believing that she was able to help those she met within 
the first few days more than those she met later on (S. Burks, personal communication, 
October 6, 2003) 
Marvin Keener notes that at least one scholarship awarded in the name of one of 
the student-athlete crash victims was not adequately coordinated. The lack of 
coordination resulted in some embarrassment when the award temporarily ran afoul of 
126 
NCAA guidelines and restrictions (M. Keener, personal communication, October 9, 
2003). 
David Bosserman wishes he were more insistent that the university accept the 
offer of the governor's airplane to transport his team to Colorado the day following the 
crash. It would have placed Bosserman and the team at the crash site earlier, while the 
bodies were recovered, something for which he regrets an OSU person was not present. 
The plane was a Beech King Air, the same basic model as the crash airplane, and 
President Halligan declined the governor's offer for thatreason. Bosserman also regrets 
and was amazed to discover that there were no fingerprint samples of the victims, other 
than the two pilots, to aid in identification following the crash. He believes fingerprinting 
of teams and other groups for potential identification purposes should be part of a policy 
on group travel (D. Bosserman, personal communication, November 5, 2003). 
Cynthia Washington is an OSU clinical counselor and one of the key people 
associated with administering to the counseling needs of the families and other students. 
She notes that the university had never funded a critical incident response cell for 
responding to such incidents before the crash. Almost immediately following the crash, 
money was made available to fund a response cell. OSU, not unlike most institutions 
across the country, suffers 7-10 student fatalities a year from incidents such as 
automobile and other accidents, illness, and suicide. However, it often takes a stunning 
incident such as the airplane tragedy to generate movement toward creating an adequate 
counseling response unit (C. Washington, personal communication, November 6, 2003). 
Speaking about the tragedy and the university's response to it, Halligan mentions 
the travel policy on two separate occasions without prompting. It seems to haunt him to 
think that there may have been something that the university, that he, might have done 
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differently. Intellectually, he understands there was nothing he could have done. He 
remembers the policy being discussed in his presence at a meeting, but it was something 
of which he had only a surface awareness. "It was just so far below the radar .. .It never 
entered my consciousness. The first lady ( of OSU) flew on the plane. The guy who 
donated (the flight) was a wonderful person" (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, 
October 24, 2003). 
When asked about the tragedy's impact on the institution and themselves, the 
university people involved respond overwhelming that it is both profound and long term. 
Executive Vice President Keener offers the following: 
I think it had a profound effect on the president. I think it shortened his life as 
president. It shortened all our lives essentially. All ofus became less tolerant 
about the petty things that come through administration. A lot of the stuff we 
have to put up with as administrators, even though it's pretty important to a dean 
or a faculty member, is just petty in comparison .... And the people not directly 
effected by (the accident) don't understand. (M. Keener, personal communication, 
October 9, 2003) 
N atalea Watkins believes that, "The energy that the whole episode; the whole 
event, and just all of the things related to it, took from him may have shortened his time 
at OSU" (N. Watkins, personal communication, October 1, 2003). Bosserman believes 
the reports communicated to Birdwell every evening while at the crash site were being 
relayed to Halligan and "were just eating him alive" (D. Bosserman, personal 
communication, November 5, 2003). Burks recalls, "I just know (Halligan's) heart, it 
broke for those families" (S. Burks, personal communication, October 6, 2003). 
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Halligan's assessment of the impact to his own presidency is consistent with 
Keener's view, "I don't think there's any question it sort of hastened the decision by quite 
a few members of the team. Look, we've been here. We've had our tum in the left seat. 
It's time someone else had a time in the left seat" (J.E. Halligan, personal 
communication, October 24, 2003). 
In the future, the senior staff will continue to remember. Phillips, currently the 
Athletic Director at Clemson University, writes to the family members about three times 
a year (T.D. Phillips, personal communication, December 5, 2003). Bosserman travels to 
the crash site each year with two of his staff members "to reaffirm my commitment to 
remember" (D. Bosserman, personal communication, November 5, 2003). Halligan 
offers, 
We recently had a discussion of how we would assemble for a memorial this year, 
to refresh our commitment, and I said, I don't look forward to this. It's tough, but 
(the current OSU President) was not acquainted with the victims or their families. 
He doesn't know who they are, so it kind of falls ... 
He stops mid-sentence and then, "We try our best, always." (J.E. Halligan, 
personal interview, October 24, 2003) 
Halligan's assessment confirms the view that the tragedy provided a new 
perspective for him and for the others as well: 
Suddenly some of the, well, the dance with the faculty council became so trivial 
in light of the interactions we'd had with the families .. .! am sure someday it will 
diminish in intensity but it certainly has not. It made me say, boy, you'd better 
pick a few roses here at the end. Better pick a few roses. It's just there all the 
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time. It's there all the time. (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 
2003) 
Regent Keller believes that "the most important thing is that Jim demonstrated the 
heart and soul of the university. It was not an institution without a soul. He conveyed 
that in a manner that was very believable" (E. Keller, personal communication, March 
17, 2004). 
Birdwell offers a perspective that captures a near-universal sentiment among 
Halligan's administrative team: 
You sort of take a leadership tone from the president all the way down. And if this 
had not been such a priority, if doing the right thing by these families and 
expressing the empathy and sympathy and grief of the university and the 
goodness of the university, were not a priority of the president, not nearly so 
much would have happened to benefit the families or heal the university. The 
tone comes from the top. (H. Birdwell, personal communication, October 21, 
2003) 
Secondary Case Crisis: The Bonfire Collapse, Texas A&M University 
In the early morning hours of November 18, 1999, approximately 70 current and a 
few former students at Texas A&M University were working at the campus Polo 
Grounds on what was simply known as "Bonfire." Bonfire had been an institutional 
hallmark leading up to the Texas A&M versus University of Texas football game for 
ninety years, and was an important event in the tradition of "Aggie Spirit." Bonfire itself 
had grown to enormous size over the years. When completed, it was 7,000-8,000 logs 
stacked upright in a six-tier wedding cake design in excess of 55 feet high (Kavanagh, 
1999; Special Commission 2000; Tang, 2000). 
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At approximately 2:45 a.m. that morning, as students worked on each of the four 
tiers that had been erected to that point, the 2 million pound, 4,000-log Bonfire structure 
fell. Eleven students and one former student were killed; 27 were injured. Many of the 
dead and injured were pinned in the stack oflogs for hours. Approximately 3,200 paid 
personnel and volunteers participated in the intense, 23-1/2 hour response operation. The 
last living person was removed from the stack after being pinned for seven hours. He 
spent the next five months in a hospital (Crissey, 2000; Kavanagh, 1999; Special 
Commission, 2000; Whitmarsh, 2000). 
An independent commission, chartered by the University to identify the causes of 
the tragedy would conclude that both cultural and structural changes over time 
contributed to the collapse. Its report faulted a lack of oversight by current and past 
university officials (Special Commission, 2000). 
The First 30 Hours 
The morning of the accident, Texas A&M President Ray Bowen returned home at 
1:30 a.m. to his on-campus residence following a recruiting trip. His wife was out of 
town. A couple of students were also living there at the time due to a dorm fire. One of 
the phones in the residence was disconnected, so when the university police first tried to 
call him, they could not contact him. He did not get a call until 3: 15 a.m. It was from the 
Vice President for Student Affairs. Upon notification, the first question that went 
through Bowen's mind was, "who is in charge?" As it turned out, the Vice President for 
Administration, a retired Air Force colonel, was on the scene and in control, providing 
security and communications coordination for the university. He remained the 
operational focal point for most of the rescue operation. Most of the emergency response 
control was through the several emergency response and safety agencies that responded. 
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By the time Bowen arrived at the accident site on the campus, three people had been 
pulled from the stack and parents were calling in, panicked because they had heard the 
stunning news on radio or television (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 
2003). 
"I felt completely useless out there," Bowen said. "At the site, everyone had a 
task. I basically stood there and felt helpless. I didn't bring any equipment, get the food 
and water to the workers, or manage the phones. I didn't tell the parents their child had 
died. I wanted to climb on top of that stack and lift those logs one by one. It was an 
overwhelming feeling of great frustration" (Brown, 2001). 
The University Student Affairs staff immediately began the process of working 
with residence hall students, Corps of Cadets students, and others to create a list of all 
those who may have been working on the stack at the time. Experienced, knowledgeable 
staff members were dispatched to both local hospitals to provide a communication link in 
those locations. A "command center" was established in the offices of the Vice President 
for Student Affairs. The university's landline phone and computer systems were 
overwhelmed by messages from people all over the world (LeBas, 1999). Bowen recalls 
that University responders ended up relying a lot on cellular phones and feels that the cell 
phones probably saved the day (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 
2003). 
An information center was set up on campus for family members to receive 
updates. Staff and counselors, telephones and food were available around the clock in 
that location. Additional smaller rooms were set up nearby for families to use when staff 
came to bring updates about their students. Each family member was assigned a staff 
liaison to stay with them throughout their time there. Students organized a memorial 
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service that was held on the afternoon of November 18 and attended by 13,000 people. 
Another memorial service was held after rescue and recovery operations were over. 
More than 40,000 people attended (Kibley, 2000). 
The university's Media Relations handled the crush of the media. There were 25-
30 satellite dishes set up around the accident site. Television stations were flying 
helicopters overhead. Fear of a mid-air collision led to the establishment of a no-fly zone 
over the accident site. Bowen remembers that when the cameras were on, the news 
people reported professionally, but when the cameras were turned off, they were very 
emotionally involved as well. 
Bowen contacted the members of the Board of Regents. Governor George W. 
Bush, on a trip to Iowa, called at 6:15 a.m. Both of them were crying on the phone. 
Bowen decided that classes should not be cancelled that day because he didn't want 
40,000-50,000 students with nothing to do but come to the accident site (R. Bowen, 
personal communication, November 13, 2003). 
It took 24 hours to get the stack down and the university held a series of press 
conferences during that time. The president ended up speaking at all the press 
conferences. A representative from Media Relations would open it up. Bowen would 
give the hard data, and then the president of the student body would speak. Bowen was 
shielded from the media for the most part except for the press conferences. But the 
media grabbed anyone they could to make on-air statements. During those 24-hours of 
rescue and recovery, Bowen recalls that his staff"never stood together arid developed a 
strategy but were mindful of what they said, knowing that if they said the wrong thing, it 
could hurt students later on." The last press conference was held 30 hours after the 
collapse (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 2003). 
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The last living person was removed from the collapsed structure after seven 
hours. Rescue and recovery efforts ended after less than 24 hours when workers removed 
the last body from beneath the pile oflogs (Kavanagh, 1999). All total, about 50 
agencies worked the recovery. Approximately 3,200 paid professionals and volunteers 
participated in the intense 23-plus hour response operation. Members of Texas Task 
Force I, the state's elite emergency response team, located in the home town of Texas 
A&M University, were on the scene within minutes of the collapse, bringing with them 
high-tech equipment to assist in locating and removing trapped victims (Brown, 1999, 
2000; Whitmarsh, 2000). 
The Recovery 
On Friday, the same day rescue operations ended, Bowen called together his 
senior staff and others to discuss what they should do within the next 48-hours and 
beyond. Their focus was on ways to provide help to the victims and to help the 
university community get through the tragedy. Bowen was somewhat surprised that the 
university lawyers were in attendance. 
At that meeting, Bowen announced he intended to request an independent special 
commission to investigate the causes of the accident. The lawyers present were very 
much opposed to the idea, since it would mean losing control of what was released to the 
public. Nonetheless, Bowen insisted on the independent commission and was 
subsequently supported by the governing board for the university. It was not a court 
proceeding or a prosecutor/special counsel determined to prove a particular case, but was 
a fact-finding body committed to ascertaining the truth (Brown, 1999). Bowen has no 
doubt that if he had not insisted, the independent commission would not have happened 
(R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 2003). 
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Following another meeting with lawyers and two Regents the following 
Wednesday, Bowen decided to collect every piece of paper associated with Bonfire and 
put it in a special place in the library. He had previously discussed this with various 
members of his staffbut did not discuss at a staff meeting. The purpose of the library 
collection was to have a central, unassailable source for all Bonfire-related information. 
So when the media started the second round of coverage, focused on identifying who was 
to blame, the university was able to tell them that everything about Bonfire was available 
there. It helped them avoid massive requests for information from the media. It also 
avoided attacks by the media saying that the university refused to comment or was 
withholding information. 
Establishing the archive was not an attempt to avoid answering questions, Bowen 
says. It was an attempt to manage the requests for information and ensure only correct 
information was disseminated (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 2003). 
The university placed more than 2,000 memos, letters, emails and other documents 
relating to the 90-year old Bonfire in a special library collection (Brown, 1999; Emails 
Discuss Bonfire, 1999). 
Bowen recalls that there were regular interactions with the families: 
We had a lot of interaction with the parents at the time of the tragedy and during 
the many weeks afterward. Our Student Affairs Division essentially made 
available a person to work with each individual family. In addition, we held a 
group meeting with them prior to the release of the Bonfire Commission report. 
We have had other meeting with them as a group .. .In addition, we had many 
individual meetings as individual issues came up. Today, we remain rather close 
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to about half of the families. (R. Bowen, personal communication, February 8, 
2004) 
In early December, the local newspaper reported that university officials 
announced they no longer would answer media questions. "Since the Special 
Commission on the 1999 Bonfire has begun its work, the university will be taking the 
position that its personnel will refrain from commenting on any aspect of the inquiry or 
on any of the multitude of documents it has placed on file for public review," Cynthia 
Lawson, Executive Director of University Relations, was quoted as saying (Brown, 
1999). 
Bowen feels that, in many ways, they were incredibly lucky the way things came 
together and the way the big issues were taken care of. There was a crisis action plan for 
the university, at least on paper, but it was not used. Nonetheless, he feels the university 
did most of the important things well. Most significantly, he believes they dealt with the 
families well. In fact, one family of a survivor who lived in Tennessee moved to College 
Station because of the connections and relations they'd made with university people in 
the community (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 2003). 
Another objective that Bowen believes was successfully achieved was the 
credibility of the institution was preserved, even though there were charges against it. 
The university relied to a large degree on families they had helped to respond to 
allegations that the university was not caring for their needs (R. Bowen, personal 
communication, November 13, 2003). 
Another critically important thing the university did was to shield the students 
from accepting blame. The Wall Street Journal was going to write an article putting 
blame on the students; Bowen felt it was wrong and would have been very harmful. So, 
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he went to a friendly media source and did an interview. The interview promulgated the 
message that, if you want to blame anyone blame the president (R. Bowen, personal 
communication, November 13, 2003). In that interview, Bowen stated, "I personally take 
responsibility for everything that happens at A&M," Bowen said. "At the end of the day, 
the buck stops here." If the commission concluded the accident was the product of poor 
leadership on the part of the administration, Bowen said he would resign. Bowen now 
believes that was a mistake. He probably should not have answered the question because 
it directed attention away from the families (R. Bowen, personal communication, 
November 13, 2003). And it did generate criticism from some quarters when he did not 
resign following the findings of the special commission. Nonetheless, the statement was 
made with the good faith principle of not placing blame on the students (Bonfire Should 
Not Cost, 2000). 
The advisor to Bonfire, Bill Kibler, outlined the University's guiding commitment 
during an interview with the local newspaper: 
In the days and weeks that followed we focused primarily on our concern for the 
families and loved ones of the victims and the injured. We committed to our 
students that anyone who wanted to attend any one of the 12 funerals would be 
provided a way to do that. We organized transportation, food, and funds for 
students to travel throughout the state. We chartered a plane to transport over 130 
people to a funeral in California. The president and/or one of the vice president 
and many students and staff attended each funeral. (Former Bonfire Advisor, 
1999) 
The University raised $700,000-800,000 for funerals and transportation costs to 
funerals and created a memorial scholarship for the families. Included in the total 
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expenditure of almost a million dollars were significant personal items needed by certain 
of the students, including two automobiles (R. Bowen, personal communication, 
November 13, 2003). 
From his office and at home, Bowen used email to keep in touch with the world 
on the issue of the Bonfire collapse. Hundreds of people contacted him and he 
responded to many of them. The emails were made public through open records. 
Reading the messages and responding was a type of therapy for him, "It kept me from 
sitting and crying. It gave me something to do between meetings and on the plane to or 
from a funeral" (Bowen Leads A&M Through, 1999). 
Bowen says he tries to change the subject whenever someone asks him how he's 
holding up: 
A lot of people will try to characterize this as a personal tragedy for Ray Bowen. 
It's not. It's a personal tragedy for the people who lost their sons and daughters, 
and it's a personal tragedy for the young people who were hurt and their families. 
(For Bowen Memories, 2000) 
The local newspaper offered that, 
Dr. Bowen, say those who know him well, is a man who keeps his innermost 
thoughts and emotions private. Bowen expresses concern that discussing how the 
bonfire tragedy has affected him personally could be construed as drawing 
attention to himself. That's something he wants to avoid." (For Bowen 
Memories, 2000) 
There is a two-year statute oflimitation for filing a lawsuit in Texas. The first 
lawsuit against the university was filed within a couple of weeks of the expiration. All 
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total, twenty lawsuits were filed against the university, but many families did not file 
lawsuits (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 2003). 
In 1999, the Texas A&M Bonfire was cancelled for only the second time in its 90-
year history. The only other time it was not lighted was in 1963 after President 
Kennedy's assassination (Kavanagh, 1999). Bonfire will not be lit again until it can be 
done safely. Bowen thinks it unlikely the Bonfire event will be restored. The university 
cannot buy enough insurance to cover the risk, and it cannot afford to spend $5 million 
on having professionals build it, even if the cultural bias that it must be student built and 
of a certain size can be overcome. So for safety, cost, and litigation issues, Texas A&M 
University probably will never be able to have a Bonfire that remotely resembles 
previous ones and do it within the cultural constraints that still exist (R. Bowen, personal 
communication, November 13, 2003). 
Bowen views his own leadership style reflects a tendency to delegate. He 
believes he listens well. He doesn't mind people telling him he's made a mistake and has 
an open door policy. He attributes his success to the fact that he is usually dealing with 
high quality people. On those occasions when he has not been successful, he believes it 
is often due to lack of information. He is confident that he tends to make good decisions 
when he has good information (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 
2003). 
When asked what he is most proud of while president, Bowen tells you that he 
was able to create a consensus that academics was the top priority. He wanted to be 
known as an academic president and he thinks he achieved that. It took about a year and 
a half because Texas A&M is a "huge place, and always going in twenty different 
directions" (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 2003). Indeed, when he 
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retired in 2002, he was remembered in media statements by his senior staff and faculty 
for "Vision 2020," a plan for A&M to become a top university while retaining its unique 
traditions and character. The other thing for which he was remembered was the Bonfire 
collapse: 
As his legacy takes shape, Bowen's supporters will no doubt praise him for 
steering Texas A&M through the horror of the Bonfire collapse ... His critics, 
though, will continue to blame Bowen's administration for failing to make sure 
Bonfire was safe. An investigation into the collapse blamed generations of 
administrators for letting the tradition grow dangerous, but some said Bowen-an 
engineer-should have been particularly keen on Bonfire's faulty design. 
(LeBras, 2002) 
Bowen feels that the impact of the Bonfire tragedy on Texas A&M University 
will last forever. A monument to those lost in the Bonfire collapse is being built on the 
Polo Grounds site of the Bonfire. The monument will be completed on November 14, 
2004 (R. Bowen, personal communication, November 13, 2003). 
Secondary Case Crisis: Aircraft Crash, Wichita State University 
On October 2, 1970, a Martin 404 chartered airplane, N464M, one of two aircraft 
transporting members of the Wichita State University football team from Wichita, 
Kansas, to Logan, Utah crashed in the mountains of Colorado. After a refueling stop in 
Denver, the flight crew deviated from the flight path and proceeded via a "scenic" route 
with mountains on both sides of the flight path. The aircraft, which was overloaded by 
5,165 pounds, flew into a box canyon (Aircraft Accident Report, 2003; NTSB 
Identification, 1970; Plane Crash, 2003). 
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Confronted with steeply rising terrain, the pilot made a sharp bank trying to tum 
around in the narrow valley and stalled, crashing into a mountainous forested area on Mt. 
Trelease. The pilot had only 123 total hours in a Martin 404, the copilot, 30 hours. The 
aircraft, operated by Golden Eagle, crashed into a mountain in Clear Creek Canyon eight 
miles west of Silver Plume, Colorado. Thirty-one of the 40 people aboard the plane died 
in the crash. The pilot was one of the survivors. Most of those who died perished when 
the full load of fuel exploded and burned. The few survivors had gotten out of the crashed 
plane before the explosion. 
The cause of the crash was ruled by the National Transportation Safety Board to 
be pilot incompetence. Other factors included overload conditions, lack of flight 
planning, and minimum qualifications of the crew (Aircraft Accident Report, 2003; 
NTSB Identification, 1970; Plane Crash, 2003). 
Two senior administrators at Wichita State University, Dr. Jim Rhatigan, Dean of 
Students in 1970, and Roger Lowe, Vice President for Administration and Finance in 
1970 until the present day, have vivid recollections of those days. 
First Response 
The President of Wichita State University in 1970, Dr. Clark D. Ahlberg, traveled 
to Colorado the morning after the crash. He took with him the Director of University 
Communications, Max Schaible; Director of Planning, Dr. George Platt; Director of 
Research and Sponsored Programs, Fred Sudermann. They set up at a motel and one 
room in the motel was manned at all times, usually by Platt and Sudermann, to ensure 
that there would be no delay in communicating with the campus. They also made travel 
arrangements for a number of family members. None of the family members of the 
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fatalities traveled to the crash site, but at least some family members of each of the 
injured traveled to Colorado. 
Ahlberg made rounds at the hospital, met with parents of the injured, and called 
back to the campus relaying what he learned on those visits. One football player and one 
WSU staff member died while in the hospital. Those deaths created significant additional 
stress for everyone, even for the families of those who were less seriously injured (J. 
Rhatigan, personal communication, November 4, 2003). 
At the campus, an impromptu command post was established in the basketball 
arena. There was a campus plan to counter student unrest, a not uncommon phenomenon 
in 1970, but there was not a plan to handle other kinds of crises. Lowe remembers that, 
with the president at the accident site, there was no meeting of the campus leadership to 
develop a plan, "I would say we were pretty much in charge ( of the campus 
response) ... We were decentralized. We didn't meet. I don't know who got it together. I 
don't remember" (R. Lowe, personal communication, November 4, 2003). Rhatigan 
adds, "I don't recall that Clark Ahlberg got us together" (J. Rhatigan, personal 
communication, November 4, 2003). 
After two days, Dr. D. Cramer Reed, Dean of the College of Health Professions, 
went to Colorado as well. He was a medical doctor and longtime friend of the president. 
He joined Ahlberg on the hospital rounds and took over for a number of days after 
Ahlberg returned to Wichita. Also within the first few days, the campus minister traveled 
to Colorado of his own volition and joined in the rounds of hospital visits and talked with 
players and their families. 
Roger L9,we remembers, "The people at the crash site were there for nurturance 
and for grief sharjp.g. At the site, those people were invisible (to us at the campus)" (R. 
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Lowe, personal communication, November 4, 2003). Lowe remembers also that the 
president was not able to communicate back to the campus to give guidance to the 
campus leadership in Wichita, "He was gone about 5-7 days. That's why he didn't have 
time to write anything or think about-he asked we have a memorial service ... There was 
no email or cellular phones," recalls Lowe (personal communication, November 4, 2003). 
The Assistant Director of University Communications was the director of the 
command post, since the information going out was receiving so much attention. Lowe 
and the Vice President for University Advancement, Dick Reidenbaugh, were in charge 
of operations at the command post and in dealing with all the family members in the very 
early hours. They were the ones who made initial contact with families to advise that a 
loved one survived or had not survived. The primary responsibility of the command post 
was to communicate with and attend to the needs of the families of those who were 
killed. The Director or Assistant Director of University Communications handled 
contacts with the media with statements and press releases (R. Lowe, personal 
communication, November 4, 2003). 
The Recovery 
Ahlberg returned to the campus after 5-7 days and brought Schaible back as well 
because ''the whole matter was too much for him to handle" (J. Rhatigan, personal 
communication, November 4, 2003). 
Upon his return to campus, President Ahlberg was "the picture of stability 
throughout." Rhatigan and Lowe both remember Ahlberg as "an administrator." One of 
his strong points was that "He was a highly stable man. He was not an emotive man .... 
When we went through that tragedy, he just wanted to distance himself. He occupied 
himself fully on the crash." Rhatigan, Dean of Students at the time, describes President 
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Ahlberg as "an administrative president. His whole history of work was administrative. 
He was Vice President for Research at Syracuse and the Director of the Budget for the 
state ofNew York (under Governor Averill Harriman). His whole life was 
administration" (J. Rhatigan, personal communication, November 4, 2003). 
In the years to come, there was some criticism from players and from some family 
members about the degree of Ahlberg's involvement and concern. Many apparently felt 
that Ahlberg did not share their grief. Those senior administrators most closely 
associated with the event believe the criticism was unfounded. Rhatigan recalls, 
As it turned out, it was an incident of misunderstanding that President Alhberg's 
demeanor was one of stability and calm. While a lot of people were suffering, 
they thought he wasn't suffering any. He didn't shed any tears. So it was a 
complete misreading ... Players told me, 'Well, the President didn't seem to care.' 
He didn't come to a lot of the ceremonies (annual observances) didn't mean he 
didn't play any role. He would always be there. Well, they thought he didn't 
want to do it. He couldn't do it-and he knew that. It was just too hard. (J. 
Rhatigan, personal communication, November 4, 2003) 
; 
After the round of funerals, a memorial service was held at the campus for all the 
victims. A faculty member was assigned for each family of a victim. According to 
Lowe, 
The faculty member was to have all the answers. No one was allowed to wander 
around, wondering what to do next. In fact, we had one faculty member for every 
family member who came to that memorial service, and for the funerals. (R. 
Lowe, personal communication, November 4, 2003) 
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Rhatigan remembers that, "The president had his grief but it was not apparent in 
his conduct of business. He spoke very tenderly at the memorial service and did not 
falter" (J. Rhatigan, personal communication, November 13, 2003). 
Funding of the memorial service, transportation of family members, and funerals 
was a significant issue. President Ahlberg decided early on to disregard the lack of 
identified funding and do what seemed to be the right things for the families. Within a 
matter of weeks, the idea of a fund-raising event was developed which resulted in "The 
Night of Stars." Seats were sold at $1,000 and each seat in the basketball arena was sold. 
Entertainers such as Minnie Pearl, New Christie Minstrels, Bill Cosby, and Flip Wilson 
volunteered, although Wilson and Cosby ultimately cancelled---something that is still 
resented by Rhatigan and Lowe (R. Lowe, personal communication, November 4, 2003). 
The Night of Stars was the first opportunity Rhatigan and Lowe had to meet some 
of the parents and other family members of victims they had spoken with on the phone. 
Roger Lowe relates the following: 
You can kind of imagine how high the emotion was, but for those of us, 
Reidenbaugh and myself who had communications with those family members, 
and, Jim, I'm sure you had quite a bit yourself, when it came to the Night of Stars, 
and those people were there, and you then put a face to the name that you had 
talked to over the phone. It was enormously emotional. (R. Lowe, personal 
.communication, November 4, 2003) 
At this point, the voice of the vice president who dealt with the tragedy more than 
thirty years ago, breaks. 
Within six weeks of the Wichita State crash, an aircraft carrying the Marshall 
University football team back to Morgantown, West Virginia, crashed near the Tri-state 
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Airport, killing all aboard. The Night of Stars was being put together at the time, and 
President Ahlberg decided it was appropriate to invite Marshall University to participate 
and share in the funding. Jim Rhatigan relates, 
And so, right in the middle of that, six weeks later, was the Marshall crash, and so 
the President said the very next day, 'We can't have this. We can't have a 
national television telethon money raiser and not include Marshall.' (J. Rhatigan, 
personal communication, November 4, 2003) 
Marshall did participate and share in the proceeds; however, "After the event was 
over, the interim president of Marshall called and said he wanted an audit of the finances 
to ensure they got their part of it. So, I always hoped he'd never become president 
anyplace," recalls Lowe, with some bitterness (R. Lowe, personal communication, 
November 4, 2003). 
Roger Lowe was also responsible for the on-campus memorial that was built. 
There was concern that placing it in an area that was too conspicuous might not be the 
appropriate thing to do. A monument to a disaster might not be suitable as a campus 
centerpiece. Therefore, a relatively peripheral area of the campus was selected for the 
memorial site. Regardless, in the years to come, a main campus road would be built 
along side the monument area that highlights it to most visitors (R. Lowe, personal 
communication, November 4, 2003). 
In the years after the WSU plane crash, Jim Rhatigan would make it a point to call 
other colleges to offer advice when disaster struck there. He and others called Marshall 
University after its airplane crash, and he believes they provided valuable lessons-learned 
that helped Marshall dealt with its own tragedy. He believes he was the first to call Texas 
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A&M to offer support after the Bonfire collapse, and he called President Halligan after 
the OSU plane crash (J. Rhatigan, personal communication, November 4, 2003). 
Dr. Don Beggs, current President of Wichita State University, observed, "It is 
almost like a network. When you've had the accident, you try to help whoever has that 
episode. You try to help them get ready for it. And until it happens to you, you don't 
understand" (D. Beggs, personal communication, November 4, 2003). 
In retrospect, the senior administrators ofWSU who were a part of the response to 
tragedy in 1970 believe they did some things very well. They believe they took good 
care of the accident survivors and the families of the fatalities immediately after the 
event, and that was what they considered to be most important. 
There are two things the senior leaders would change about how they dealt with 
the accident. First, they believe they did not pay enough attention to the impact the 
accident had on the football players: 
We realized later on that the culture of the football players was stoic, manhood, 
and all that. And we had unbelievable suffering by our football players we didn't 
address in even the most primitive manner, and we paid a real price for that. (J. 
Rhatigan, personal communication, November 4, 2003) 
Secondly, and long after the fact, the senior leaders would have handled the 
survivors and family members as a group differently, with the president taking a central 
role. Wichita State University holds a memorial service every year on October 2nd and 
has a series of other events to remember the tragedy every five years. The presidents 
were always there, but they played no particular role. Rhatigan comments, "We try to 
observe it on October 2 and between 50 and 100 people always come and are predictable. 
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The same people with a few coming on and a few dropping off' (J. Rhatigan, personal 
communication, November 4, 2003). 
In 2000, the current WSU President, Don Beggs, decided to invite them to come 
together as a group at his home, 
I just thought in my role it was my job to do something for them. We had done 
something about providing facilities, by encouraging, by being supportive, but we 
had not, as an institution, been involved. Individuals had, but not the institution. 
(D. Beggs, personal communication, November 4, 2003) 
So, Beggs sponsored an "outdoor buffet" at his home to which the surviving 
family members, teammates, and coaches of the· 1970 football team were invited. It was 
the first time the people had been together as a group ''where they could all sit down and 
talk to each other." The result was ''phenomenal! It was probably the most dramatic 
thing we did after this crash, as people met, ate, laughed, and cried together" (J. Rhatigan, 
personal communication, November 4, 2003). Rhatigan remembers the following: 
The president would always attend these (memorial service) events, and so forth, 
but this was the first time we ever had the president extend himself in a significant 
way. President Ahlberg just didn't know how to deal with it after it was over 
with. It was a terrible part of his life. But people that night (the outdoor buffet) 
actually said, to our just unbelievable surprise, 'We didn't realize the institution 
cared. We actually thought that they were hiding. Actually ashamed of the event, 
that they were hiding, as though it were an embarrassment to the institution. (J. 
Rhatigan, personal communication, November 4, 2003) 
President Beggs adds, 
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A bunch ofus had those comments made, and it really surprised us. At least I 
thought the things that were going on, that I was told about, were very appropriate 
things. Allow people to have distance. You don't want to hover around a person 
who doesn't want it. (D. Beggs, personal communication, November 4, 2003) 
In any case, the gathering of those who were most impacted by the tragedy 
appeared to be significantly beneficial for them even 30 years later. 
President Beggs, Roger Lowe, and Jim Rhatigan believe most people view the 
campus memorial to the victims of the airplane crash in 1970 as a caring and supportive 
icon of an institution that remembers its past. But to those who lived the experience--as 
did Lowe, Rhatigan, and President Clark Ahlberg-it remained a painful reminder. 
Ahlberg would serve as WSU President for another 12 years, but the aircraft accident and 
its aftermath were the defining moments in his presidency. As Rhatigan says, "How you 
handle it will never be forgotten" (J Rhatigan, personal communication, November 4, 
2003). 
Jim Rhatigan closes with a sentiment that is identical to Halligan's perspective, 
"It never goes away. It's just a terrible part of my life" (J. Rhatigan, personal 
communication, November 4, 2003). That sentiment is the single most commonly shared 
observation by those involved with the tragedies at Oklahoma State University, Texas 
A&M University, and Wichita State University. 
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ChapterV 
Theoretical Analysis 
This chapter discusses the presidents' leadership with respect to the two 
theoretical concepts previously discussed. First, the chapter examines the relationship 
between the cognitive frames of reference of Bolman and Deal (1984, 1997) and the 
actual actions and perceptions of the presidents at each institution. The chapter also 
discusses the degree to which individual frames of reference contribute to the presidents' 
effective leadership during the crises. Secondly, the chapter identifies the more 
significant leadership actions by the presidents as either instrumental or 
interpretive/symbolic. 
Leadership Response and Cognitive Frames of Reference 
To understand which cognitive frames of reference are significant in a president's 
response to a crisis or tragedy, it is helpful to understand those perspectives in the context 
of non-crisis circumstances. Halligan's ability to perceive situations and issues through 
multiple lenses is clear under both crisis and non-crisis situations. 
Non-Crisis Context 
The literature suggests a correlation between effective presidential leadership and 
the ability to perceive events through multiple cognitive frames of reference (Bensimon, 
1989). The literature also suggests that some cognitive frames ofreference, specifically 
the symbolic frame, correlate with the president's leadership effectiveness (Bolman & 
Deal, 1991). Halligan's actions and perspectives of leadership reflect a president who is 
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cognitively complex in his ability to understand situations in terms of multiple realities. 
Indeed, the evidence suggests his cognitive awareness of people, symbols, and politics 
are highly developed. 
Human Resource Frame. 
First, Halligan's focus on interpersonal relationships was fundamental to his 
approach to creating a team orientation and commitment, listening to trusted staff, 
courting donors, hosting local citizens, and in creating rapport with students. It was 
through personal relationships that he believes he was most effective in achieving 
important milestones for the university and fostering a sense of community and optimism 
on the campus. 
Additionally, his participatory style led others to believe that their actions and 
thoughts were important and would have an impact. The human resources frame focuses 
on human needs. Leaders who perceive issues through this frame value relationships and 
feelings (Bolman & Deal, 1991 ). Presidents who use a human resource or collegial frame 
seek participative decision-making and place emphasis on interpersonal skills, motivating 
others, and putting the interests of the institution first (Bensimon, 1989). These 
characteristics were strongly evident in Halligan's leadership practices. 
Symbolic Frame. 
Halligan's understanding and use of symbols were highly refined. He noted that 
symbols can be more important than substance, and his actions reflect an awareness of 
sending the right symbolic messages in everything he did. This included paying attention 
to the messages his persona projected as he walked around the campus. He was always 
careful to project the image that things were going well and optimism was appropriate. 
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Perhaps the most quintessential, cognitively complex practice of Halligan was his 
habit of taking baskets of cookies to various individuals. He used the occasion to 
recognize people and create personal relationships. At the same time, he created political 
alliances, and sent a powerful symbolic message that the president was interested in them 
and in their needs. 
Bureaucratic Frame. 
The bureaucratic frame was less evident in·Halligan's perceptions. There is little 
evidence that he placed emphasis on a structural approach to framing issues and 
problems. To be sure, he used the structure effectively. He believed in getting input 
from his executive staff, having an inner circle of very trusted colleagues, and limiting 
the number of people who reported to him directly. His senior staff operated without 
detailed guidance. They were empowered to get the job done. His style of managing the 
bureaucracy of the institution worked for him and gave his staff room to work the issues. 
His philosophy of the institution's governing board role, ''Noses in, fingers out," 
appeared to also apply to his own supervisory and administrative roles (Halligan Notes, 
2003). 
Political Frame. 
President Halligan clearly was skilled in understanding and creating political 
alliances and believed that, "It is the way the really important work gets done. It is the 
process human beings use to make really important decisions" (Halligan Notes, 2003). 
He created alliances at every level and at every opportunity. Examples are the efforts he 
made to establish relationships with the editors of the student newspaper and leaders of 
student government as well as state elected officials and their staffs. Halligan also noted 
that the president's personal involvement in lobbying was extremely important. 
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Under traditional conceptualizations of a college president's role as senior 
manager, first among faculty equals, head fund raiser, political stakeholder, and symbolic 
leader, Halligan's leadership was effective by virtually any standard of excellence. His 
ability to perceive the institution, its issues, and its constituents from several frames of 
reference was fundamental to his ability to change the course of the institution in multiple 
dimensions. His ability to communicate to his senior administrative staff the importance 
of personal relationships, symbolic messages, and political alliances was central to their 
effective participation as well. The total personal commitment that he demonstrated to 
his staff was important, and perhaps indispensable, to sustaining a strong commitment 
from them. The comments, recollections, and descriptions of virtually all of the OSU 
participants support that assessment. A summary of the actions by Halligan that illustrate 
specific cognitive frames ofreference in non-crisis scenarios is in Table 3. 
Table 3 
President Halligan's Non-crisis Leadership Actions 
Human Symbolic Bureaucratic Political 
Resource 
Halligan - Participatory - Positive - Small inner - Multi-Alliances 
- Interpersonal persona circle -- News Editor 
:-Empowered .- Cookies -Decisive -- Legislators 
others - Noses in-Fingers -Lobbying 
- Commitment out -Cookies 
by example 
- Cookies 
When it came time to respond to a less-traditional concept of a president's role, 
the tragedy of January 27, 2001, Halligan's leadership reflected a similar ability to 
understand and communicate the event through multiple frames ofreference and respond 
accordingly. 
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Crisis Context 
Halligan's leadership during the crisis response of the aircraft crash reflects a 
level of cognitive complexity that is fundamentally unchanged from his approach in non-
crisis situations. It reflects integration and differentiation of frames ofreference at both 
organizational and personal levels. 
Human Resource Frame. 
First and foremost, the initial actions and guidance by Halligan reflect concern for 
the surviving people and establishment of a personal relationship with each of the 
families to "envelope" them in care. His guidance and standard for the response was for 
the university to "do the right thing by the families." His first action was to "go where 
the situation was worst." He and Coach Sutton, who had the closest relationship with 
those killed, personally notified the families (J.E. Halligan, personal communication, 
October 24, 2003). 
Indeed, throughout the crisis response and recovery, Halligan made caring for the 
families on a very personal level the guiding principle of the institutional response. He 
hosted them at his home. He visited their homes and played with their children. He took 
the lead in caring for the families to the extent that he virtually became a grieving family 
member himself. Some of his senior staff members think he may have became too 
involved for his own health and were worried about hiin. In any event, the hallmark of 
the president's leadership was an overwhelming personal caring for the surviving family 
members. 
Symbolic Frame. 
Secondly, Halligan took great care that the right and appropriate symbolic 
messages of concern and remembrance were part of the response and recovery. 
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Memorials reflecting the significance of the lives of those killed were .built at the crash 
site and at Gallagher-Iba Arena and included words provided by the families. Inviting 
the families to provide the words for portions of the memorial for each individual was 
significant. Instead of the monument being an OSU memorial for the ten people, it 
became a family memorial to their loved ones as well. Services were held at the campus 
and for the dedication of each memorial. Halligan spoke at each one and it was a painful 
experience for him. 
Symbols and venues such as ribbons, a message of condolence board, designated 
site for flowers, and other mementos were created so that each person in the university 
community could share the grief and a commitment to remember with the families. 
Halligan went to the crash site in March, not because there was any practical merit for 
him to actually see the site and the aircraft wreckage, but because it was an important and 
appropriate symbolic gesture for him to go there. 
Finally, it was an important symbolic gesture that the group that revised the OSU 
travel policy included surviving family members. It was also symbolically important that 
the NTSB report included the revised policy in its report and that the NTSB forwarded 
the revised policy to the NCAA President as a benchmark for other institutions. These 
acts symbolized a caring institution, one that is clearly committed to doing the right 
things. Through the use of symbols, the institution was able to carry the message of loss 
and grief to a much larger audience than was possible through personal relationships. 
Conversely, the symbols conveyed from a larger audience a sense of shared grief to the 
families themselves. 
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Bureaucratic Frame. 
Halligan effectively used the existing university bureaucracy to respond to the 
crisis. The way he used it did not differ significantly from his normal operational 
practice. He assembled his senior team and with their input laid out a response and 
recovery plan. He tended to be heavily involved in the decision-making on the big 
picture issues, but empowered his senior administrative staff to work the details. He had 
a great deal of confidence in his team and they responded exceptionally well by all 
accounts. Halligan himself tended to do the things that resulted in symbolically 
enveloping the grieving families with caring and also establishing personal relationships 
with them to share their grief. 
One form of bureaucratic structure that was appropriate for Halligan and his staff 
to use as part of a crisis management system was a crisis response plan. Crisis 
management systems consist of mechanisms and structures that help deal with crises and 
typically consist of an institution's plan, procedures, and organizational structures-such 
as a crisis management team (Mitroff, et al., 1996). 
Some of the senior administrators erroneously believed that OSU had a crisis 
response plan in place in 2001, but that it was not used. In fact, there was no such plan in 
existence at that time. What was used in 2001 was a telephone roster or "tree" to make 
notification to the senior staff. Since then, OSU has developed a comprehensive plan (L. 
Bird, personal communication, October 13, 2003). 
Virtually every senior administrator believes that a crisis response plan would not 
have been beneficial in the response and recovery, since the crisis was beyond the scope 
of planning. However, they misunderstand the value of having pre-established 
communications lines, recall procedures, coordination procedures, and various functional 
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area plans. For example, the entire notification process was disjointed. Notification of 
many of the senior staff came through subordinates or newscasts. Support staff seemed 
to operate effectively on instinct and on their own initiative, but not a pre-established 
plan. 
Political Frame. 
Certainly the alliances and political goodwill Halligan had previously developed 
were available to him and the institution during the crisis response and recovery. There is 
no indication that any new political alliances were developed. 
There appears to have been none of the hallmarks of a political perspective such 
as negotiations, conflicts, or competition for resources or power between the president 
and other political entities within the context of the crisis response and recovery (Bolman 
& Deal, 1984, 1997). However, Halligan did use some of the existing political coalitions. 
For example, invitations were extended to the governor and lieutenant governor to speak 
at the memorial service, and the governor offered his airplane to fly Bosserman and the 
others to the crash site. Existing political alliances were nurtured during the crisis, but 
the ability to perceive the crisis situation through the political frame was least significant 
to the crisis response and recovery. 
Crisis Context: Secondary Cases 
Data gathered from the secondary cases are less extensive, and deal only with 
leadership during the crisis contexts. However, the presidents' leadership at Texas A&M 
and Wichita State do inform the relative significance of different cognitive frames of 
reference in executing an effective crisis response and recovery. 
In some important aspects, the presidential responses were shaped by significant 
differences from the Oklahoma State crisis situation. Wichita State's accident had 
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survivors. Texas A&M's not only had survivors but had students still at risk as well, and 
the accident was on the campus. These differences defined ''where the situation was 
worst," and both presidents went first where the situation was the worst. 
Institutionally, both Texas A&M and Wichita State set the families of victims and 
survivors as the top priority, and they were committed to it. During the recovery phase, 
both institutions established memorials, provided funding and counseling, offered 
education to siblings, and established a dialogue for meeting the needs of the families. 
The presidents of both institutions seemed instrumental in the decisions that drove those 
actions. 
Human Resource Frame. 
From a human resource frame of reference, Ahlberg at WSU either did not sense 
the importance of leading the caring for the families on a personal level, or he was not 
able to do it. The descriptions by Rhatigan and Lowe give the impression of a man who 
was deeply impacted by the tragedy. But Ahlberg apparently ''was not an emotive man" 
in a manner that led the families and surviving players to believe he cared. As Rhatigan 
recalls, "He couldn't do it-and he knew it. It was just too hard." Consequently, 
surviving players commented, "Well, the president didn't seem to care" (J. Rhatigan, 
personal communications, November 4, 2003). 
The consequence of Ahlberg's actions lends credence to the observation of 
Birdwell (personal communication, October 21, 2003), "If expressing the empathy and 
sympathy and grief of the university were not a priority of the president, not nearly so 
much would have happened to benefit the families or heal the university. The tone comes 
from the top." 
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Ultimately, it would be 30 years before the families and survivors would feel 
personally embraced by the institution, by the president, in the form of an outdoor buffet 
at the president's residence. Individual members of the institution would make those 
personal connections from the beginning, as did Rhatigan and Lowe, but without the 
president's personal relationship, families and survivors apparently felt estranged from 
the institution. As one noted, "We didn't realize the institution cared" (J. Rhatigan, 
personal communication, November 4, 2003). 
Symbolic Frame. 
From a symbolic perspective, each of the presidents established appropriate 
symbols for sharing grief and expressing the loss of the institution. Both presidents 
provided memorial services and monuments to the victims. They both presented 
statements to the media concerning the grief and sense ofloss the institution shared with 
the families. Provisions were made at both universities to offer education benefits to 
surviving siblings and to fund travel to funerals. Personalized support was provided in 
the form of individual liaisons and counseling to grieving families. 
At Texas A&M, Bowen decided not to cancel classes while injured people and 
bodies were still being removed from the Bonfire site. This decision was based on his 
belief that it would not be good to have 40,000 students with nothing to do but go to the 
disaster site. While this was a rational decision, it may have sent the wrong symbolic 
message. Similarly, his statement to the news media that he would resign if the 
independent investigation commission faulted the administration in any way was 
intended to divert any blame from the students. It did indeed divert blame, but the 
symbolic damage done to the president and the institution when he later did not resign 
was potentially significant. 
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Bowen's decision to create an archive of all infonnation associated with the 
Bonfire was a practical decision, to be sure. It helped ensure the same infonnation would 
be available to all inquiries, and that no misstatements would be made. It freed up the 
administration from managing individual requests for infonnation. It was also a 
symbolic message that the institution and its administration had nothing to hide. When 
the independent investigation commission convened, the administration announced it 
would no longer discuss the Bonfire accident or any material in the archive. That sent 
another symbolic message. The independent commission was indeed independent. The 
university had no intention of influencing its work. 
At the Wichita State accident scene in Colorado, Ahlberg's limited opportunity to 
personally interact with the grieving families was a symbolic message that the institution 
was not grieving with them. Ahlberg's non-emotive style and stable persona may have 
contributed to the perception. In any event, the president, the symbolic leader of the 
institution, did not effectively embrace the families and survivors. 
Bureaucratic Frame. 
Both presidents appear to have used the existing bureaucratic structures well and 
adjusted them to meet the needs of the crisis. Indeed, in both cases it seems the 
institutional bureaucracy made important and timely adjustments without direct guidance 
from the presidents. 
President Bowen was not notified immediately due to the happenstance of an 
inoperative phone line at his residence. By the time he was notified, an operations cell 
had coalesced to provide security and communications. His Vice President for 
Administration was leading it. The immediate concerns of the families of victims and the 
survivors were handled by a "command post" over the course of 30 hours operated by 
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Student Affairs. The rapid arrival of several highly qualified rescue units was a godsend 
to the immediate response to free trapped students and recover those fatally injured. 
Although the university had a crisis action plan, it was not used. 
Over the course of the 30 hours, the situation was the worst at the Bonfire site, 
and before the searing eye of national news coverage as trapped students and bodies of 
victims were recovered. Bowen was at the site throughout and was the key representative 
to the national press. The most significant impact Bowen appeared to have on the 
bureaucratic response to the tragedy was later. 
At a follow-up meeting of his senior staff, Bowen decided to establish another 
bureaucratic entity, an independent commission, to study the accident, against the advice 
of legal counsel. This, he concluded, was the right thing to do. Additionally, Bowen 
established an archive of all records associated with the Bonfire and made it available for 
any inquiry. This clearly established that the institution was responding to the incident 
with honesty and with a bureaucratic system to ensure that the integrity of the 
investigation was assured. 
Similarly, Ahlberg immediately departed Wichita for the accident site and the 
local hospital where the survivors were taken. That was where things were worst. 
Consequently, much of the immediate response from the bureaucratic structure of 
Wichita State was without his direct guidance and oversight. The response was 
"decentralized." Ahlberg was kept informed by his senior administrators and did provide 
some guidance from Colorado, although communications were difficult. In his absence, 
his senior administrators established a command post and provided notification, 
counseling, and other considerations for the victims' families. They handled the media as 
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well. Wichita State also did not have a crisis response plan, except for one that dealt with 
student unrest. That plan was not used for the response. 
At both institutions, the bureaucratic structure was able to operate during the 
crisis response without direct, detailed guidance from the presidents. Competent and 
motivated senior administrators acted to provide the necessary structural support for the 
crisis, even without a formal crisis response/recovery plan. 
Both institutions were also able to effectively provide the organization and 
infrastructure for liaisons for the families, counseling, transportation, education for 
siblings, and other forms of administrative support. While these provisions are symbols 
of caring for the family members, they also reflect and require a bureaucracy that can 
execute effectively. 
Political Frame. 
The political frame of reference seems the least significant to the effective crisis 
response and recovery of the secondary cases, as it was in the primary case. Existing 
alliances were cultivated, as when Bowen and the governor spoke on the morning of the 
Bonfire collapse. Additionally, some actions on the part the presidents can be perceived 
from a political perspective, such as Bowen's request for a special commission and 
creation of an archive of Bonfire data and Ahlberg's invitation to Marshall University to 
join in the fund rising effort, Night of Stars. However, any political alliances were 
previously established and they appeared to play the least significant role in the way the 
presidents responded to the crisis events. 
Summary of Significance of Individual Frames 
Each of the cognitive frames of reference is relevant and has meaning in the 
context of a crisis situation. However, the ability to perceive issues and situations from 
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the perspective of some frames appear to be more important for effective presidential 
leadership in the response and recovery from crisis. 
The measurement of effective leadership is ultimately based on the priorities of 
the president and the institution: Does leadership result in the institution successfully 
achieving those things that are its highest priority? The top priority of Halligan and of 
Ahlberg was to take care of the families of the victims and do the right thing by them in 
memory of their lost loved ones. 
The top priority of Bowen was also to take care of the surviving families. But 
early in the response, he had an additional and even higher priority of preventing 
additional loses by rescuing those trapped in the collapsed Bonfire. Because his arrival 
on the scene was delayed, and because a host of highly skilled professionals were 
actually orchestrating and executing the recovery of the injured, Bowen's leadership was 
not a factor in that aspect of the response. It seems clear that preservation of life would 
be the top priority for any president, but that did not apply for the crises Halligan and 
Ahlberg faced. 
Human Resource Frame. 
The human resource frame of reference is most suited for caring for people-the 
top priority. Halligan's response was framed primarily by a concern for the people who 
were impacted most. This was consistent with his focus in non-crisis scenarios but it was 
more intense in the aftermath of the airplane crash. It reflected his personality and belief 
in the importance of personal relationships, and it certainly played a key role in how the 
institution responded to the crisis. Indeed it provided the overall framework within which 
every aspect of the response and recovery was executed. 
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The response by Wichita State University was also oriented toward taking care of 
the families but the president was not successful in leading from a human resource 
perspective. His senior administrators did make individual human relations a priority but 
were not able to overcome the fact that the president did not. Consequently, individual 
family members did not feel "the institution" cared. 
In order to effectively achieve the highest priority, providing care for the families 
and any accident survivors, a human relations perspective is imperative. 
Symbolic Frame. 
The symbolic frame ofreference is also imperative. However, it is less 
imperative for the highest priority--taking care of the people most severely impacted in a 
crisis. Symbols are shorthand for communicating, for conveying meaning and 
establishing a common understanding. They provide the best way of communicating a 
message to the largest number of people for the longest duration. But symbols pale in 
comparison to personal interaction in caring for the people who are most severely 
impacted. Even symbolic gestures such as funding funerals and education for siblings are 
not as effective in caring for people. Symbols are effective in communicating to the 
world at large, the campus community, campus visitors, and anyone who happens to view 
them, but they cannot replace the caring that is directly conveyed through a personal 
relationship with a grieving family member or teammate. 
Additionally, memorials and ribbons are symbols that allow people to share grief 
and demonstrate a sense of loss. Therefore, they are helpful to the larger community. 
They allow the larger community to demonstrate solidarity with the grieving families and 
friends. But, by and large, they are less helpful than interpersonal relationships to those 
most adversely impacted, especially in the short term. 
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Bureaucratic Frame. 
Effective bureaucracies are also critical in responding and recovering from crisis 
situations. However, effective bureaucracies are not built overnight. If an effective 
bureaucracy or structure is in place, the president will likely not get involved except to 
provide fundamental priorities and overarching guidance. That happened at OSU in the 
early morning meeting following the crash wherein Halligan made several key decisions. 
It happened at Texas A&M during a meeting wherein Bowen decided to ask for an 
independent commission--one of the most critical bureaucratic decisions made. Due to 
difficulties in communications with Ahlberg as he attended to the matters at the crash 
site, senior administrators at Wichita State modified the bureaucratic structure, and 
created a "command post," on their own volition. 
If there are people still at risk of injury or death in a crisis situation, an effective 
use of bureaucracy becomes the most important frame ofreference. That did not apply in 
any of the three cases under study. Even at Texas A&M, where there were people still in 
danger, the key bureaucratic structures and systems were provided by outside agencies 
and professionals. Those external bureaucracies and structures dealt with the emergency 
medical and rescue efforts. In none of the three crisis cases in this study did the 
president's guidance appear to be indispensable to the effective operation of the 
bureaucracy in its crisis response. 
Political Frame. 
A summary of the leadership actions of the three presidents in the crisis scenarios 
and specific cognitive frames of reference through which the actions can be perceived is 
in Table 4. 
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Table 4 
Presidents' Actions in Crisis Scenario 
Human Resource Symbolic Bureaucratic Political 
Halligan - Enveloped families -Memorials - Met with staff - Invited Governor 
- Provided Liaisons - Ribbons - Scholarships & Lieutenant 
- Visited homes - Message Board - Funded family Governor to 
- Hosted families - Visit to site expenses memorial 
- Established - Included families - Governor offered 
relationships in planning plane 
- Traveled to site 
Bowen - Provided Liaisons -Memorials - Met with staff - Spoke with 
- Group meeting of -Ribbons -Requested Governor 
families prior to - Media focal point Special -Requested 
report - Included families Commission Special 
in planning - Scholarships Commission 
- Funded family - Set up archive 
expenses 
- Classes met 
- Set up archive 
Ahlberg - Traveled to site -Memorial - Funded family - Invited Marshall 
- Met with injured - Traveled to site expenses University to 
- Provided Liaisons - Met with injured - Scholarships join fund-raising 
venture 
There were no explicit or overt areas in any of the three crises wherein a political 
frame of reference contributed to or inhibited an effective response. Nonetheless, 
political alliances were undoubtedly exercised during the course of the crisis event and in 
the aftermath. 
In particular, at Texas A&M the potential for political factors to become involved 
in the crisis aftermath seem significant. Each of the institutions in the three crisis cases 
was eventually faced with litigation over the tragedy that visited its community. Due to 
the circumstances of the tragedy, Texas A&M University seems particularly vulnerable to 
plaintiffs who claim the institution was responsible for the loss of life that occurred. 
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Without significant political capital and political alliances, it is conceivable that Bowen 
could have been in political trouble. He seems to have been particularly vulnerable 
following the independent commission's conclusion that a cause of the Bonfire collapse 
was inadequate oversight, when he had verbalized his intention to resign if that was a 
conclusion of the commission. In fact, it seems reasonable that political capital, the 
confidence that the Texas A&M Governing Board placed in him, allowed Bowen to 
remain as president. 
Leadership Response: Instrumental or Interpretive/Symbolic 
Many acts of presidential leadership reflect both instrumental and interpretive 
forms to different degrees (Birnbaum, 1992). Such is the case in crisis scenarios as well. 
Each of the three presidents demonstrated instrumental leadership in non-crisis 
situations. Each displayed technical competence, experience, and judgment through 
effectively coordinating administrative activities, making rational decisions, meeting 
deadlines, representing the institution to others, and achieving goals through effective 
communication, administration, and management processes. Each of them demonstrated 
these skills in the crisis scenario as well. 
Instrumental Leadership. 
Presidential leadership in crisis situations is instrumental in nature. The president 
should ensure that the right actions are taken in response to a crisis. An adequate 
response and recovery cannot be based on human caring, relationships, and symbols 
alone. Efficient and effective actions in preventing further loss oflife or damage to 
infrastructure and providing timely support of accident victims and their families are 
critical. Response activities must be effectively coordinated, communicated and 
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managed if the institution is to successfully maintain its good intentions and integrity to 
do the right things. 
Good intentions without effective actions are inadequate if the institution is to 
respond and recover from a crisis. Indeed, the emotions and inherent stress of crisis 
response makes execution more difficult and more important than under more normal 
circumstances. However, it is possible for instrumental leadership to take place without 
direct input from the president. Good administrative staff leadership and teamwork can 
substitute. These observations are reinforced without exception in each of the crisis cases 
under study. 
Interpretive/Symbolic Leadership. 
There is no incongruence in concluding that presidential leadership in a crisis 
situation is also interpretive/symbolic in nature. Interpretive/Symbolic leadership 
emphasizes the management of meaning of situations and activities. When tragedy 
strikes, an institution's fundamental values and relationships are challenged and must be 
affirmed. What value does the institution place on people and how is it demonstrated? Is 
·the institution a business, or is it family? Is a student a customer, or is he/she family? 
When members of the university community perish, or the institution is harmed in some 
catastrophic way, what does it mean for the institution? It appears that only the president 
can provide the leadership, communicate the meaning, and represent those things the 
university truly values. That meaning comes from the top. 
The senior administrators of Oklahoma State University say that Halligan 
provided the key decisions within the first 24 hours that guided the response and recovery 
of the institution. The effective management of the institution's actions and the countless 
details to provide support for the family members fell largely to the senior administrators. 
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The experience and commitment of the senior administrators, and the team orientation 
Halligan engendered, enabled them to proceed from there. That is not to say Halligan 
was not involved further in the instrumental response, just that his broad guidance at the 
beginning shaped the response throughout the recovery process. 
The senior administrators at OSU also say that the president framed the response 
and interpreted the meaning of the event for the institution such that the families, the 
other members of the university community, and outsiders as well knew that the 
university cared about its people and cared about things that mattered. It was Halligan's 
interpretation of the tragic event that most gave meaning to the institutional response in 
an extraordinarily personal way. 
As a result, the commitment to remember Nate Fleming, Dan Lawson, Kendall 
Durfey, Will Hancock, Pat Noyes, Brian Luinstra, Jared Weiberg, Bill Teegins, Denver 
Mills, and Bjorn Falistrom will be fulfilled. 
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Chapter VI 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Presidential Leadership 
This study shows how presidents lead during periods of crisis. Additionally, the 
study relates leadership in crisis scenarios to concepts of presidential leadership in the 
traditional roles of the position. Existing literature is divided on the role of the 
president's leadership. Most presidents and former presidents contend that presidential 
leadership is indispensable to the direction and speed of the institution, and the president 
is largely responsible for both. Most importantly, they contend that the president has the 
power to match that responsibility. 
Others, consisting primarily of scholars of leadership in higher education, contend 
the institution has the characteristics of an organized anarchy to the extent that the role of 
the president is largely interpretive/symbolic and that the concept of a "heroic" leader in 
the president's office results in false expectations and disappointments. 
The president's importance in interpreting the meaning of things for the 
institution and using symbols to convey the meaning is irrefutable. However, interpreting 
meaning is only one manifestation of a president's power. Instrumental leadership, the 
ability to make things happen directly by making decisions, setting a course, providing 
guidance, managing people, and through other means, is at least as important to the 
institution. President Halligan's non-crisis leadership is possibly testament to what our 
expectations for the office should be. 
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Instrumental and Interpretive/Symbolic Leadership in Crisis Scenarios 
Both instrumental and interpretive/symbolic leadership seem essential in a crisis 
scenario. It is important in those highly intense, time-critical situations that the president 
makes the right decisions and gets the right things done without fail and in a timely 
fashion. It is also important during those situations that the right messages and 
interpretations of events are provided by the president in an emotionally charged situation 
from which there also is no room for error. 
For an effective response in getting the right things done, the cases in this study 
demonstrate that capable and committed senior administrators can respond without 
necessarily receiving detailed guidance from the president. Indeed, a crisis situation is 
not the time for micromanagement by the president. Time constraints do not allow it and 
there is too much that must be done immediately. An experienced and capable senior 
staff can respond effectively provided they know the priorities. Hopefully, the president 
has already communicated priorities such that the senior staff can take coordinated, 
effective action. Hopefully, the tone comes from the top well before a crisis situation 
develops. 
In crisis cases where life or property continues to be threatened, such as the first 
24 hours of the Bonfire scenario at Texas A&M University, instrumental leadership of an 
effective, well-coordinated response is most essential. It can indeed be a life or death 
proposition. Arguably, all else is insignificant by comparison. In the Bonfire crisis 
scenario, the life-saving structure came primarily from outside the university, but if that 
support had not been available, instrumental leadership of the institution would literally 
mean the difference between students living and dying. 
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If the threat to life and property has passed, such as in the crises involving 
Oklahoma State University and Wichita State University, an instrumental response is still 
necessary. It is necessary in order to effectively do the right things for those injured, the 
families of victims, and for the integrity of the institution. It is then that instrumental 
leadership results in timely and effective benefits for survivors such as scholarships for 
siblings, travel to funerals, changes to travel policies, and review of unsafe practices and 
traditions. 
When the potential for additional loss of life or property has passed, it appears 
that an effective interpretive/symbolic response becomes more important to an effective 
response. It is then that the institutional response should be a symbolic and personal one 
as well. Interpersonal relationships and symbols are essential to not only express the 
meaning of the crisis to the institution for all to see and understand, but also to convey 
solidarity with grieving family members over the loss. 
One approach that seems helpful is to establish those relationships at the earliest 
possible opportunity. In addition to personal contact with family members, it also seems 
beneficial to bring any surviving family members together as a group so a bonding 
between those who share individual loses can help them cope and understand that they 
are truly not alone. 
Symbols cannot replace the human interpersonal response. Symbols are 
particularly inadequate to meet the needs of those most devastated by the crisis or 
tragedy. The interpersonal response is essential for survivors and family members to feel 
their loss is indeed shared by the institution. And, it is apparent from the Wichita State 
University scenario that only the president can effectively convey the sense of shared loss 
for the institution. 
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Presidential leadership in the aftermath is indispensable to an effective 
interpersonal response for the surviving family members and friends. Symbols, such as 
ribbons or memorials, demonstrate to a wider audience the significance and the meaning 
of the loss. They also provide comfort to the surviving families as visible manifestations 
of shared loss and commitments to remember, but not to the extent that people do, as 
representatives of the institution, through shared personal grief. 
Consequently, the interpretive/symbolic leadership role of the president assumes 
secondary importance to the instrumental role of guiding the crisis during the response 
phase, particularly when life and/or property are still at risk. During the recovery phase, 
when the focus is on returning the institution to a more normal, pre-crisis existence, the 
interpretive/symbolic role of the president is more prominent in providing meaning that 
will comfort and endure. The president thereby pronounces what the institution holds 
most dear. 
Cognitive Frames of Reference in Crisis Scenarios 
Perceptions through each of the cognitive frames of reference are critical for a 
president to effectively lead during a crisis scenario, with the exception of the political 
frame. During a crisis or emergency, political forces subside. The entire community and 
each constituency tend to let the president respond. Although outside the scope of this 
study, it is reasonable to believe that political forces reemerge if the crisis response or 
recovery is flawed, or if the administration is deemed responsible for the crisis in some 
way that could not be absorbed. 
The institutional response to a crisis will be largely determined by the leadership 
style and even the personality of the president. In the three cases under study, the highest 
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priorities dealt with caring for the families of the victims and maintaining the integrity of 
the institution. In all three cases, the best efforts of presidents were toward those ends. 
One can only guess how the outcomes would have differed had, for example, 
President Halligan been the leader for the Wichita State University tragedy and President 
Ahlberg been the president for the Oklahoma State University accident, or if President 
Halligan had been at Texas A&M at the time of the Bonfire collapse. Similarly, if 
President Bowen had been persuaded by the Texas A&M legal representatives that the 
investigation commission should not be independent, the outcome and impact to the 
integrity of the institution might have been radically and irretrievably changed. 
No matter what changes would have occurred with different presidents in the 
lead, it seems clear the response and recoveries would likely have been different, and 
perhaps significantly so. Presidential leadership was perhaps the overriding factor in 
framing the institutional response in each of the three cases. 
Personal Toll 
Compared to the non-crisis roles of the president, the demands upon a president 
when a crisis strikes is indeed the ultimate test. It may well be the standard against which 
a president's entire tenure will be measured. It will likely be the most stressful, 
harrowing, and demanding period of his or her life. It will forever change a president. It 
will similarly change the senior administrators who deal with it. 
I did not anticipate the depth of personal anguish virtually every respondent 
expressed in dealing with the crises scenarios. Even the tragedy of the Wichita State 
University airplane crash, after more than 30 years, is a deeply emotional remembrance 
for the senior administrators who were involved there. 
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Without exception, the participants in this study responded that the experiences 
they had in dealing with crisis changed them forever. Suddenly, for those who remained 
in senior administrative positions, "the dance with the faculty seemed so trivial" (J.E. 
Halligan, personal communication, October 24, 2004). Virtually every person who was 
close to a crisis response and recovery expressed the sentiment of Rhatigan and Halligan. 
Rhatigan has carried the experience with him for more than 30 years and "it just never 
goes away" (J. Rhatigan, personal communication, November 4, 2003). 
A university the size of Oklahoma State University suffers approximately seven 
to ten student fatalities a year. Texas A&M University had already experienced the 
deaths of 7 students by the late fall of 1999, before the Bonfire collapse: two of five 
people killed in a skydiving plane crash, one of six killed in a pickup rollover, three 
others killed in separate car accidents, and one suicide (Brown, Nov 20, 1999). Yet, the 
impact of those losses typically does not seem to be acknowledged by the institution in a 
meaningful way. They are personal losses for those who know the individuals, to be 
sure, but the institution hardly takes note. 
However, when the losses occur all at once, it is a tremendous impact upon the 
institution and its people. Even people who did not know those killed are enormously 
affected. None of the presidents and few of the senior administrators personally knew the 
people lost in the crisis events. However, that did not lessen the personal impact to the 
people who responded to the crises. Many of them sought counseling in the aftermath. 
Many more perhaps should have. 
Awareness of the responses that a president and an institution make when 
confronted with a crisis event is important. However, understanding and awareness of 
the toll it takes upon the president, senior administrators, and others is critical. The 
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personal toll upon the participants of this study in dealing with a crisis was an unforeseen 
but important issue. 
Significance of the Study 
Contribution to Knowledge 
The study contributes to knowledge by identifying those cognitive frames of 
reference that are important to effective presidential leadership in the context of a crisis. 
Bolman and Deal ( 1991) reported that the effectiveness of a leader tends to be most 
associated with the symbolic frame of reference. In this study, the human resource and 
symbolic frames appeared to be most significant for effective presidential leadership, 
particularly in the recovery phase of the crises. In the recovery phase, leaders are likely 
to be involved with conveying the sense ofloss to surviving family members on behalf of 
the institution. Additionally, they are more likely to make lasting commitments, both real 
and symbolic, to the surviving members. 
Bolman and Deal (1991) also reported that the bureaucratic frame of reference 
was least identifiable with effective presidents but most identifiable with effective 
managers. Most of Bolman and Deal' s (1991) scenarios and illustrations do not deal with 
crisis situations. None of them deal with the life and death issues university presidents 
may face. A bureaucratic perspective appears to be most important for the crisis response 
phase, particularly if lives or property are at risk. However, it is during the crisis 
response phase that an effective bureaucracy is most able to operate without presidential 
involvement. If an effective bureaucratic structure is in place, a well-qualified senior 
administrative staff can function without detailed guidance and oversight, but the senior 
staff must have an understanding of the priorities of the president. During the recovery 
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phase, an effective bureaucratic structure is necessary to follow through on commitments 
made to survivors. 
The study also contributes to understanding the significance of instrumental and 
interpretive/symbolic presidential leadership during a crisis scenario. Both instrumental 
and interpretive/symbolic leadership are important in effectively managing a crisis. The 
importance of each kind of leadership varies with the circumstances of the crisis. For 
example, the circumstances define where the situation is worst and may demand that the 
president be relatively isolated from the bureaucratic structure that must respond to the 
crisis. This significantly reduces the instrumental leadership role of the president. 
The personality of the president involved also appears to influence the relative 
importance of instrumental and interpretive/symbolic leadership. It appears that only the 
president can adequately represent the institution in some contexts that require 
interpretive/symbolic leadership. For example, surviving family members of the WSU 
tragedy did not feel the institution grieved when the president did not personally appear 
to be grieving with them. 
Relevance to Policy 
The president sets the tone before, during, and after a crisis. The study suggests 
that institutions and presidents must be prepared for crisis situations before they occur. 
Policies are also symbolic statements of priorities and values. They will help establish a 
tone before a crisis occurs. Higher education institutions should have policies in place 
that provide guidance and direction for efficient and effective response to crisis. Policies 
should address the full range of crisis management processes and activities. 
Crisis mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery procedures are all part of a 
comprehensive crisis management plan. Crisis management plans should also include 
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stipulations for crisis response teams or cells, crisis counseling, and coordination of plans 
with external law and safety organizations. The plans should be exercised regularly. 
Crisis management plans from other types of institutions do not typically address 
the levels of caring and commitment that colleges and universities provide for surviving 
family members. Policy should recognize both the near-term and long-term 
commitments that typically accompany campus crises scenarios. 
Use to Practitioners 
The study contains important implications for practitioners. It provides insight 
into how a crisis affects the institution and its people. It suggests that a crisis event 
affects an institution more pervasively and deeply than just managing the event and its 
aftermath. 
Perhaps the most significant implication of this study for practitioners is that a 
crisis event will not be just an intellectual challenge or activity that must be managed. It 
will affect the mind, body, and spirit. It will be a significant emotional event that may 
persist for many years to come. Personal counseling may be an important consideration 
for the president and senior administrators as well as for students and family members. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
The study raises issues and questions that are beyond the scope of its design but 
that demand consideration nonetheless. The readiness of a president to respond to a crisis 
is a relatively new concern. It is an area of responsibility that is still not typically 
considered in discussions of the role of the president. Without question, it is one of the 
most significant. 
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Crisis Management Planning 
Additional research is required to provide the most comprehensive and effective 
plans for dealing with crises involving higher education institutions. Plans developed by 
government and public safety agencies focus most heavily on crisis preparation, 
mitigation, and response phases that are devoted to preventing loss oflife or property. 
These are important considerations for higher education as well. However, those plans 
do not focus upon the long-term recovery, which is a significant part of crisis 
management for a college or university. 
Crisis management plans from government agencies provide a good departure 
point; however, colleges and universities have unique features that require creation of 
plans for crises tailored to them and their specific campuses. As we have seen, the 
president of a college or university is faced with a response and recovery phase that is 
tied much more extensively to the welfare of those deeply affected by a crisis and for a 
longer period of time. Our understanding of how best to prevent and mitigate such 
adverse and long-term effects is not fully developed. 
· Crisis Management Education 
Leadership by the president during a crisis scenario is certainly more than just 
ensuring there is a crisis management plan. Most presidents progress through their 
careers and enter the presidency with no experience and no training for the eventuality of 
a crisis event. 
A crisis situation is a learning experience. Therefore, after a crisis situation has 
been resolved, it is vital that the institutional leadership revisit and review their actions. 
Other institutions can learn from the experiences of those who experience a crisis as well. 
Conferences and workshops such as "Best Practices: Crisis Management Planning for 
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Higher Education" which met in Oklahoma in August, 2002 are essential for generating a 
body of knowledge that will help institutions be prepared (Crisis Management Experts, 
2002). 
Personal Toll 
Perhaps the subject most worthy of additional research is the issue of personal 
impact to presidents and other administrators when dealing with institutional tragedies. 
Presidents need to understand that the emotional strain upon them and their senior staff 
will be profound and they must be prepared to ameliorate the impact. 
Presidential Leadership in Crisis Management 
Our most significant voids of understanding continue to be in leadership in higher 
education. Indeed, there are voids in our understanding of leadership at every level of 
leadership: in basic leadership theory, in the traditional roles of the president, and in the 
president's role during a crisis scenario. 
The evolution of basic leadership theory continues. We still have no 
comprehensive theory of the leadership phenomenon. Leadership in higher education is 
even less refined. We have no consensus of our leadership expectations for the president. 
The gap between what many scholars and practitioners believe about presidential 
leadership persists. This divide must be bridged ifwe are to have appropriate 
expectations for presidents. Additional research is clearly necessary. 
Moreover, our understanding of presidential leadership during a crisis, the 
ultimate leadership challenge, is not as developed as our concepts of the traditional roles 
of the office. Comprehensive study of how a president leads in a crisis will have 
significant value to presidents and the institutions they lead. 
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The president of a college or university is responsible for a great deal even under 
normal circumstances. The demands of the job can be immense. A crisis scenario is a 
uniquely demanding circumstance that calls for the ultimate in leadership. For Drs. Jim 
Halligan, Ray Bowen, and Clark Ahlberg, the men who set the tone from the top, the 
ultimate challenge was arguably the most significant event in their respective 
presidencies. There is no question it was one of the most significant events in their lives. 
There is no question Jim Halligan speaks for all three presidents and a number of other 
administrators when he concludes, "I am sure someday it will diminish in intensity but it 
certainly has not. .. It's just there all the time. It's there all the time" (J. Halligan, personal 
communication, October 24, 2003). 
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Notes 
Verstehen is the infinitive form of the German ''to understand". It is a 
fundamental concept to interpretivism and contrasts to the explicative approach of 
Erklaren which is "to explain," as through a cause-effect relationship. The concepts are 
based upon the philosophy of the German social scientist Max Weber. Wilhelm Dilthey 
contrasted Verstehen and Erklaren, proposing the natural reality and social reality were 
fundamentally different kinds of reality and called for different methods into the 
investigation of each (Crotty, 1998) 
2 On one side of the "Great Divide" is the philosophical position 
characterized by positivism and postpositivism. Positivism is based on the philosophy 
of Aristotle, Bacon, Locke, Comte, and Kant that there is a method for studying both 
the physical and social worlds that is value-neutral and provides cause-effect 
explanations to a single, knowable reality. Postpositivism developed from 19th century 
writers such as Comte, Mill, Durkheim, Newton, and Locke. Postpositivism also 
acknowledges the existence of a single reality but contends that it can be known 
imperfectly because of human limitations. Postpositivism continues the deterministic 
philosophy in which causes probably determine outcomes (Creswell, 2003; Mertens, 
1998). 
On the other side of the divide is the philosophical contention that social 
constructs and people define the social world and one cannot understand or explain 
reality independent of the meaning that people within those constructs assign to those 
constructs. The interpretivist/constructivist paradigm is based on phenomenology, 
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which defines experiences from the participants' perspective, and hermeneutics, which 
focuses on interpretive understanding or meaning. It is a socially constructed concept 
with no absolutes and no meaning outside of the human concept. Reality is multiple 
and relative. 
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APPENDIX A-INTRODUCTORY LETTER TO PRESIDENT 
STREET ADDRESS 
OWENS ST ATE University 
CITY STATE ZIP 
Dear President HAWKINS, 
DATE 
Congratulations on your retirement! The legacy of commit, service, and integrity with which 
you leave us, manifested in numerous outstanding achievements and successes for the Owens 
State University system, will not go away soon. You have shaped the course of the institution 
for many years and many people to come. As a doctoral student at Oklahoma State University, I 
understand just how truly fortunate Owens State University was to have you as their leader. 
I write you this letter with the hope that you will be willing to offer your support to my 
dissertation research. My dissertation topic is in the broad area of presidential leadership in 
higher education. Specifically, I plan on researching the leadership role of the president during 
and in the aftermath of crisis or emergency situations involving members of the campus 
community, using as cases for study specific tragedies such as the collapse of the bonfire at 
Texas A&M University and the dormitory and fraternity fires at Seton Hall University and the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, respectively. 
The central case study of the research effort will be one with which you are painfully familiar, 
the tragic airplane crash that resulted in the fatalities of ten members of our Owens State 
University family. You were the leader who framed the response on behalf of the University, a 
response based upon a sincere commitment to remember all that they meant to us. I believe the 
way the University, under your leadership, responded to that tragedy could serve as a guide for 
other presidents during similar circumstances. It could also help us to understand what 
constitutes effective leadership under the most difficult of circumstances. 
I would like to contact you in the near future to explore your availability to participate in this 
research effort. Until then, please accept my heartiest congratulations on a career of service that 
has culminated in wonderful and lasting achievements for the Owens State University system. 
Sincerely, 
Randy Mills 
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APPENDIX B-INTROUCTORY LETTER TO PARTICIPANTS 
MR./MRS/DR. PROSPECTIVE STUDY PARTICIPANT 
STREET ADDRESS 
CITY STATE ZIP 
Dear PROSPECTIVE STUDY PARTICIPANT, 
DATE 
I write you this letter with the hope that you will be willing to offer your support to my 
dissertation research. As a doctoral student at Oklahoma State University, I have selected a 
dissertation topic in the broad area of presidential leadership in higher education. Specifically, I 
plan on researching the leadership role of the president during and in the aftermath of crisis or 
emergency situations involving members of the campus community, using as cases for study 
specific tragedies such as the collapse of the bonfire at Texas A&M University and the dormitory 
and fraternity house fires at Seton Hall University and the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill, respectively. 
The central case study of the research effort will be one with which you are very familiar, the 
tragic accident that resulted in the fatalities of ten members of the Owens State University 
family. You were involved in the crisis recovery phase of this event and helped the President 
frame the response on behalf of the University, a response based upon a sincere commitment to 
remember all that they meant to us. I believe the way the University responded to that tragedy 
could serve as a guide for other institutions during similar circumstances. It could also help us to 
understand what constitutes effective presidential leadership under the most difficult of 
circumstances. 
I would like to contact you in the near future to explore your availability to participate in this 
research effort. 
Sincerely, 
Randy Mills 
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APPENDIX C--Research Participants: 
Study Title Role in Crisis Role in Case Study 
Participant Management 
(Pseudonym): 
Owens State 
University Case 
President President, Owens State President, Primary Case Key Participant 
Hawkins University 
Dr. Kelley Provost Provost Central Participant 
Ms. Ethers Secretary to the Support Staff Support Information 
President 
·Dr. Prather Athletic Director Senior Administrator Support Participant 
Ms. Banks Director Counseling Administrator Central Participant 
Services 
Dr. Bartley Vice President, Senior Administrator Central Participant 
Administration 
Dr. Kelly Vice President, Financial Senior Administrator Support Information 
Affairs 
Mr. P. Ellington Chief, Campus Police Administrator Support Information 
Ms. Watterby Director, Public Affairs Administrator Central Participant 
Captain Engels Local Sheriff at Disaster Local Official Support Information 
Site 
Dr. Bingley Vice President of Senior Administrator Central Participant 
Student Affairs 
Mr. Wilcox Member, Board of Board Member Support Participant 
Governors 
Dr. Farley Chair, Faculty Council Faculty Member Support Information 
Participant, 
Williams State 
University Case 
President A very President of Williams President, Secondary Key Participant in 
State University Case Secondary Case 
Participant, 
Treller State 
University Case 
President President of Treller State President, Secondary Key Participant in 
Barlow University Case Secondary Case 
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APPENDIX D--Prospectus and Information Sheet for Study Participants 
Randy W. Mills 
Ed.D student in higher Education Administration 
Oklahoma State University 
Prospectus and Information Sheet for Study Participants 
Introduction: You are invited to participate in a doctoral dissertation research study. 
This prospectus and information sheet will provide you with information about the study and 
highlight the purpose and procedure of the research. 
Purpose: The purpose of the study is to examine presidential leadership in the aftermath of 
tragedy through a case study during and following an institutional crisis and distinguish those 
leadership actions on the part of the president that appear to be effective or ineffective, 
instrumental or symbolic, and the perception of constituents of those actions. 
Significance of the Study: This study has implications for future and current presidents. The 
research will discover and examine the leadership actions of a president in the aftermath of a 
tragic occurrence/crisis. It will help determine the impact ofleadership actions and the overall 
impact of presidential leadership. The study will help institutions and presidents identify those 
actions that are effective or ineffective and will help prepare them for future tragedies. 
Statement of Research Question: The research question is concerned with the role of 
presidential leadership in crisis management and recovery. What is the nature of effective 
presidential leadership in such circumstances? 
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APPENDIX E--Advisement and Consent for Participation in Research 
Invitation to Participate: You are invited to participate in a research study. The 
following information is provided to give you information about the study and to describe 
your rights as a participant in accordance with the requirements of the Oklahoma State 
University Institutional Review Board. 
Research Title: In the Wake of Disaster: The President's Ultimate Leadership Test. 
Study Purpose: The purpose of the study is to examine a case of presidential 
leadership at a university during a crisis response and recovery scenario, the aircraft 
crash in January, 2001 that killed 10 people associated with the Oklahoma State 
University athletic department. The focus will be on the president's leadership actions 
and the perceptions of them by people associated with the scenario 
Information and Study Parameters: Research will be conducted through a series of 
interviews. Interviewees will consist of the president emeritus of Oklahoma State 
University as well as presidents of two other institutions involved with similar crisis 
scenarios, executive-level administrators and other staff members, as well as other 
constituents of the University. To facilitate the gathering of data, interviews will be tape-
recorded. Each participant has the option of requesting that his/her interview(s) not be 
taped. Data will be analyzed as it is collected so that it can be used in guiding further 
data collection. Once the data collection and analysis are completed, participants will 
be asked for feedback. The audiotapes will be destroyed after the dissertation is filed 
and data gathered from the studywill be securely stored and kept confidential. 
Benefits: This study has implications for current and future presidents. The research 
will examine the leadership actions of a president in the aftermath of a tragedy. It will 
help determine the impact of leadership actions and the overall impact of presidential 
leadership. The study will help institutions and presidents identify those actions that are 
effective or ineffective and will help prepare them for future tragedies. 
Confidentiality: All notes and recoded data will be kept confidential and in the 
possession of the researcher. Every effort will be made to provide confidentiality. If 
names are used in the final report, they will be in pseudonyms or the individual will be 
referred to in terms of group or constituent membership, such as "senior administrative 
official." No participant will be identified by specific administrative position unless full 
disclosure is authorized by that participant. The research may be submitted for 
presentation at a professional conference or for journal publication. 
Due to the nature of specific scenarios involving presidents, specific 
tragedies/crises discussed in the study can be linked with specific universities, 
presidents, and other participants. Consequently, anonymity cannot be guaranteed. 
However, participants will be explicitly informed of this through the consent form. 
Contact: If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures, you may 
contact the researcher, Randy Mills at 2026 Iba Drive, Stillwater, OK 7 407 4; phone: 
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(405) 385-0086; email: millsfamily2@aol.com or millsrw@okstate.edu. You may also 
contact the advisor to the research: DL Edward L. Harris, 308 Willard Hall, Stillwater, 
OK, 74078; telephone, (405) 744-7932; email: elh@okstate.edu. Questions about your 
rights as a participant in this project may also be directed to the Institutional Review 
Board, Sharon Bacher, Executive Secretary, 415 Whitehurst, Stillwater, OK 74074, 
telephone: (405) 7 44-5700. 
Participation: Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may decline to 
participate without penalty. If you decide to participate, you may withdraw from the 
study at anytime. If you withdraw from the study before data collection is completed, 
your data will be destroyed immediately. 
Consent for participants who agree to be identified in research reports: The 
following statements of consent reflect your decision with respect to permission for the 
research to use your real name in reports that are produced from this study and to have 
your comments audio-tape recorded: 
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Statement of Consent 
PART 1: Please sign one of the following statements: 
I acknowledge receiving a copy of the Advisement and Consent for Participation in 
Research form/statement. I have read and understand the consent section and I agree 
to participate and AGREE to be identified in reports that are produced from this 
research study. 
Participant's Signature Date 
I acknowledge receiving a copy of the Advisement and Consent for Participation in 
Research form/statement. I have read and understand the consent section and I agree 
to participate BUT DO NOT AGREE to be identified in reports that are produced from 
this research study. Please use either a pseudonym or classification category in reports 
that are generated from this study. 
I understand that, due to the nature of specific scenarios involving presidents, specific 
tragedies/crises referred to can be linked with specific universities, presidents, and other 
participants. Consequently, anonymity of participants cannot be guaranteed. I 
understand that I may also decline to answer any questions or provide partial answers 
to questions. 
Participant's Signature Date 
PART 2: Please sign one of the following statements: 
I agree to participate AND AGREE to the audio-tape recording of my comments: 
Participant's Signature Date 
I agree to participate BUT DO NOT AGREE to the audio-tape recording of comments: 
Participant's Signature Date 
If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures, you may contact 
the.researcher, Randy Mills at 2026 Iba Drive, Stillwater, OK 74074; phone: (405) 385-
0086; email: millsfamily2@aol.com or millsrw@okstate.edu. You may also contact the 
advisor to the research: Dr. Edward L. Harris, 308 Willard Hall, Stillwater, OK, 74078; 
telephone, (405) 744-7932; email: elh@okstate.edu. Questions about your rights as a 
participant in this project may also be directed to the Institutional Review Board, Sharon 
Bacher, Executive Secretary, 415 Whitehurst, Stillwater, OK 74074, telephone: (405) 
744-5700. 
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APPENDIX F--Interview Protocol: Biographical 
1. Name: 
2. Telephone: 
3. email: 
4. Education: 
5. Title/position at the time of the crisis: 
6. Years associated with the University: 
7. Relationship to president: 
8. Experience with crisis management/response: 
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APPENDIX G--Interview Protocol: Presidents 
Leadership Background and Perspectives: 
1. How would you describe your philosophy of leadership as the president? 
2. What are the things of which you are most proud in your tenure as president? 
3. In those instances where you believe you were effective as a leader, to what do you 
attribute your effectiveness as president? 
A. If there were instances in which you believe you were ineffective as a leader, to what do 
you attribute that ineffectiveness? 
5. Describe the most significant leadership challenges you encountered as president? 
6. How did you deal with them? 
7. When do you seek input from each of the following: governing board, executive group, 
deans, faculty council or faculty members, students, local or state officials? 
8. Describe any previous experiences in crisis/emergency or tragic occurrences? 
Leadership in Crisis Response: First Session 
1. What are your memories from the day of the accident? 
2. Describe what you were doing when you first learned of the crisis. 
3. What were your first thoughts after learning of it? 
4. What were your first actions and priorities? 
5. What directions did you give? 
6. What suggestions did others make? 
7. Whom did you seek out or call? 
8. To what extent did you rely upon the existing institutional structure? 
9. Did any of the relationships of your administrative staff change over the course of the 
crisis response? In other words, did you grow to rely more on some colleagues over time 
and less on others? 
10. What contact did you have with constituencies outside your immediate staff? ( e.g., family 
members of the victims, board members, students, faculty)? 
11. What do you think was done well in responding to the crisis? 
12. What changes would you now make in the response? 
13. In what ways was the leadership style you used during the crisis response different from 
your normal leadership style? 
Leadership in Crisis Recovery: Second Session 
1. In the weeks and months following the memorial service and funerals for the victims, 
what were your concerns with respect to the tragedy? 
2. What actions did you take? 
3. What directions did you give? 
4. What suggestions did others make? 
5. Upon whom did you rely? 
6. What contact did you have with family members of the victims? 
7. What do you think was done well in recovering from the crisis? 
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8. What changes would you now make in the recovery effort? 
9. In what ways was the leadership style you used during the recovery different from your 
normal leadership style? 
10. What are your thoughts on the long-term impact of the tragedy upon the University? 
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APPENDIX H--Interview Protocol: Administrative & Other Participants 
(Where applicable, questions prefaced with ''To the extent that you could observe ... ") 
1. How would you describe the president's philosophy ofleadership? 
2. What are the things of which you believe the president is most proud about his 
presidency? 
3. To what do you attribute his effectiveness as president? 
4. In those instances where you believe he was ineffective as a leader, to what do you 
attribute the ineffectiveness? 
5. Describe some of the most significant leadership challenges you believed the president 
faced? 
6. How did he deal with them? 
7. Describe any previous experiences in crisis/emergency or tragic occurrences? 
Leadership in Crisis Response: First Session 
1. What are your recollections from the day of the accident? 
2. Describe your overall role in the response to the crisis. 
3. What you were doing when you first learned of the crisis. 
4. What were your first thoughts after learning of it? 
5. What were your first actions and priorities? 
6. What thoughts or directions did the president give? 
7. Whom did he seek out or call? 
8. What suggestions did others make to him? 
9. Upon whom did he rely? 
10. What contact did he have with constituencies outside his immediate staff? ( e.g., family 
members of the victims, board members, students, faculty)? 
11. What do you think was done well in responding to the crisis? 
12. What changes would you now make in the response? 
13. In what ways was the leadership style the president used during the crisis response 
different from his normal leadership style? 
Leadership in Crisis Recovery: Second Session 
1. In the weeks and months following the memorial service and funerals for the victims, 
what were the president's concerns with respect to the tragedy? 
2. What actions did the president take? 
3. What directions did he give? 
4. What suggestions did others make? 
· 5. Upon whom did he rely? 
6. What contact did he have with family members of the victims? 
7. What do you think was done well in recovering from the crisis? 
8. What changes would you now make in the recovery effort? 
9. In what ways was the leadership style the president used during the recovery different 
from his normal leadership style? 
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10. What are your thoughts today on the tragedy and the long-term impact upon the 
president and the University as a whole? 
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